Self beyond Self/Lost in Practice: Surveillance, appearance and posthuman possibilities for critical selfhood in children's services in England by Hubbard, Ruth
1 
 
SELF BEYOND SELF/LOST IN PRACTICE 
 
Surveillance, appearance and posthuman possibilities for critical selfhood in 
children’s services in England 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted by Ruth Hubbard to the University of Exeter  
as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Education(EdD), August 2014. 
  
This thesis is available for library use on the understanding that  
it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published  
without proper acknowledgement. 
  
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has 
been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and  
approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. 
 
Signature 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
The selfhood of social professionals in children’s services is under-researched, and where the 
primary focus is on practice ‘outcomes’.   Informed by a critical social policy frame this thesis focuses 
on the selfhood of social professionals in children’s services to ask how it might, or might not, be 
possible to think, and do, self differently.  I bring into play a critical posthumanist (non-sovereign)  
becoming self alongside, and in relation to, the other ‘allowed’ or ‘prescribed’ selves of neo-
liberalism, professional practice and (critical) social policy itself.   Utilising theoretical resources, in 
particular from Arendt, Deleuze and Guattari, and Foucault, I characterise this as thinking with both 
‘surveillance’ and ‘appearance’, and self as an explicitly political project.  In a post-structural frame I 
pursue a post-methodological rhizomatic and cartographic methodology that aims to open up 
proliferations in thinking and knowledge rather than foreclose it to one clear answer, and where I 
also draw on a small number of interviews with experienced professionals and managers in 
children’s services.   A rhizomatic figure of thought involves irreducible and multiple relations that 
are imbricated on the surface; it is a flattened picture where theory, data, researcher, participants 
and analysis are not separate, where all connections are part of an overall picture, and in movement.   
I argue that social professionals occupy a deeply striated landscape for being/knowing/practising, a 
particular ontological grid that tethers their selfhood to the pre-existing, and to intensifications in a 
neo-liberal project.  Here, ‘rearranging the chairs’ becomes more of the same, where the sovereign 
humanist subject is “a normative frame and an institutionalised practice” (Braidotti, 2013, p.30).    In 
thinking otherwise, beyond traditional critical theory, a posthuman lens draws attention to the ways 
in which we might be/live both inside and outside of the already existing and where we become with 
others, human and non-human in shifting assemblages.  However, the self prescribed and prefigured 
in dominant discourses constitute the historical preconditions from which experiments in self, and 
other possibilities may emerge.  Practices of de-familiarisation, a radical, non-linear relationality, and 
a hermeneutics of situation are suggested as strategies for thinking forward, for appearance, and a 
self beyond self.   
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C h a p t e r   1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Presenting and mapping the territory 
 
 
 
Dominant strategies do not occupy an empty landscape.  They have to overcome 
resistances, refusals and blockages.  For many reasons, the public realm....is part of 
the ‘grit’ that prevents the imagined neo-liberal world system functioning smoothly….  
The contested fortunes of the public realm are testimony to the limitations of neo-
liberalism’s plan to rule the world.        
        (Clarke 2004, p.44-45) 
 
If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing 
the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies 
on the other side of silence.  As it is, the quickest of us walk around well wadded with 
stupidity.       (Eliot, 1973, p.226) 
 
 
1.1 SELFHOOD AND SOCIAL PROFESSIONALS IN CHILDREN’S SERVICES 
 
Social professionals operate in the spaces between policy goals and practice 
outcomes.  The task of securing the professional to the ‘dominant strategies’ of any 
given order becomes, then, part of its project, as alluded to by John Clarke in relation 
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to neo-liberalism1.  The battle for the “teacher’s soul” and the “terrors of 
performativity” (Ball, 2003) indicate that the “ground of such struggles is often highly 
personal” (p.216), and penetrating.  That selfhood is multiply and repeatedly 
constituted in, or saturated by, material and discursive relations2 is a broad position 
explained and advanced from a whole variety of theoretical positions, though with 
varying degrees of attention to, or the problematisation of, questions of dominance 
and subjection (and the possibilities for something other – ‘agency’ perhaps).  
Kitzinger’s simple statement “Identity….is what you can say you are according to 
what they say you can be” (1989, p.82) does direct attention to the operation of 
power pointing out that we can only name ourselves within, or in relation to, 
discourses and practices that are permitted us (see also Scott 1992).  One paradox of 
neo-liberalism and its modes of governance is that it claims such a bounty for 
‘freedom’ – “the magic of the marketplace” (Cohen and Arato 1994, p.22) - yet offers 
such a poverty discourse and narrow axis for self.  Ball declares “we are none of the 
things we now do, think or desire” (2012, p.33).   
 
Informed by a critical social policy frame this thesis focuses on the selfhood of a 
range of social professionals in the children’s workforce – the diverse array of 
professionals and practitioners in the public, private and third sectors in, broadly, 
social work, health, youth work and education - to ask how it might, or might not, be 
possible to think, and do, self differently.  This declares selfhood as a central concern 
for practice but in this (re)claiming I seek to disrupt and to rework an understanding, 
to move beyond (or through, or with) the requirements of self in neo-liberalism, and 
                                                          
1
 By ‘neo-liberalism’ I mean both a political (commodifying) project and ideological commitments (discursively 
and materially produced) that promote free market economic (individualism) as the fundamental driver of 
economic and social progress, and a concomitant residual welfare state. 
2
  The phrase ‘material and discursive relations’ refers to the idea that both discursive and material practices 
may be important; it signals the inclusion here of a variety of theoretical positions that might focus on the 
material, rather than, for example, a classically poststructuralist emphasis on discursive productions in 
language.  Of course, the discursive can also include the material and my general usage of ‘discourse’ is 
intended to include both, unless otherwise specified; I do not intend to produce a binary. However, the 
materiality of lived practices can sometimes be left out of the equation as has been noted by various material 
feminist theorists and captured in Barad’s (2003, p.801) assertion that “Language has been granted too much 
power”, and by others such as actor-network-theorists (for example, see Fenwick 2010; Fenwick and Edwards 
2010).  Discourse refers to specific social conditions that are historically situated and “Discourse is not what is 
said; it is that which constrains and enables what can be said.  Discursive practices define what counts as 
meaningful statements” (Barad, 2003, p.819).    
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the alternatives in other ‘allowed’ discourses, such as those of ‘the professional’.  I 
utilise theoretical resources, in particular from critical posthumanism (for example, 
from Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, and Braidotti) and Foucault and Arendt, 
bringing into play a non-sovereign (posthumanist) self alongside, and in relation to, 
the prescribed sovereign, humanist subject of the neo-liberal project.  I characterise 
this as thinking with both ‘surveillance’ and ‘appearance’, and self as de-centred, 
dynamic, and emergent.   
 
Children’s services in England is a particularly pertinent space for an examination of 
self given the explicit moves to inter- and multi-professionalism and notions of 
integrated working that were central to their development; such moves clearly 
involve an ‘encounter’ between self and (the new) policy/practice in terms of who 
we are and what we do.  In this, research themes and approaches (for example, 
about the nature of knowledge), and technologies, are also swept up.  Similarly, 
Watson and Forbes point out that their slash in ‘inter/professional’ can be seen “as a 
moment for disorder/reorder [that] gives warrant for new conceptualizations” (2012, 
p.187, emphasis added).  Now might be a good time, then, to ask whether the kinds 
of selfhood and identifications required for children’s services ever held a promise of 
human flourishing, and to ask, what else is possible?       
 
Epistemologically and ontologically this is not a fixed project in the sense of following 
through one line of thinking, securely rooted.  The ‘lining-up’ and attempt to secure 
the selfhood of social professionals as part of the existing policy project assumes 
“that there is one world, one ontology” (Fenwick 2010, p.88) but (and as Fenwick 
herself asks), what of the many (or a world that is multiple)?   So I seek to expand 
space, to make difference, in terms of the selfhood of social professionals, 
introducing a rupture, and new connections, to fixed patterns.  Here, self can be 
multiple, and operate simultaneously, in a variety of configurations and connections.  
This pre-faces a de-centering of the subject, and movement, juxtapositions, and 
(new) connections in a kind of ‘working the ruins’ (see St Pierre and Pillow 2000; 
Lather and St Pierre 2013) or as ‘getting lost’ (see Lather 2007; 2008), and as 
nomadic (Braidotti, 2013), and rhizomatic (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980).  And, 
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in posthumanism, and using the image of rhizomatic thought, this produces a 
researcher subjectivity which is, itself, an assemblage of movement and 
transformation in my engagement with theory and data as mutually constitutive and 
active agents (Lenz Taguchi 2013).   
 
This thesis aims to both de-territorialize and re-territorialize; it can be seen as the 
collecting or gathering together (in the writing  - see Richardson and St Pierre, 2005), 
of elements towards a particular (novel) assemblage – the rhizomatic (be)coming 
together of expanded notions of self, with social professionals, with children’s 
services policy and practice.  The introduction of a non-sovereign (posthuman) self 
into this mix is a molecular or deterritorializing line of flight, to rupture and produce 
different effects and new possibilities (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983/1972, Deleuze 
and Parnet, 2002/1977).  At the same time, in line with a molar or (re)territorializing 
(stabilising) move this thesis does not deny other productions of self.  This attempt is 
ambitious, something of a hybrid, a double(d) move which takes seriously the 
production of self and knowledge in multiple ontological and epistemological 
configurations – not only the rhizomatic but also the linear, as a kind of “ontological 
politics” (Mol, 1999) or ‘choreography’, in a reparative reading (Sedgwick, 1997).  
This is self not as either/or but as a “both/and” (Lather 2004, p.2) multiplicity, 
working together, in connection and in which I, too (as the researcher), am 
entangled.  The juxtaposition of the linear alongside and with/in the rhizomatic also, 
then, in part, undermines any impression of something called ‘mastery’ or an 
attempt at some kind of definitive ‘truth’ for: 
The rhizome pertains to a map that must be produced, constructed, a map 
that is always detachable, connectible, reversible, modifiable, and has 
multiple entryways and exits and its own lines of flight    
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980, p.21) 
 
My thesis title reflects this double(d), both/and approach  – ‘Self Beyond Self’ 
signifies the de-territorializing move and ‘Lost in Practice’ the re-territorializing one; 
with the slash their tension and interaction.  
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As it is, professionals in children’s services can be described as both everywhere and 
nowhere (Hubbard, 2010).  They are everywhere because professionals are the 
primary resource between policy imperatives and practice outcomes, therefore 
pivotal to government agendas.  However, professionals are also nowhere – “the 
missing subject” (Thompson 1990, cited in O’Doherty and Willmott 2001, p.457) - 
because they are constructed simply as tools, oriented towards, and required, to 
produce and demonstrate policy outcomes in particular ways, in marketised, 
managerial and performative (Ball, 2003) policy discourses.  Latterly (post 2008), 
these reflect more than ever the “colonisation of the ‘social’ and the ‘educational’ by 
the ‘economic’” (Stronach and Clarke, 2012, p.54).  Whilst they may never be fully 
secured, far from shaping practice, professionals appear virtually absent, simply the 
neo-liberalised and ontologically linearised, technicised, scientised instruments of 
policy diktat.  (And, inasmuch as they fail to deliver to this agenda, they fail as 
selves.3)   This invokes a self stripped of self, and therefore disappeared as legitimate 
territory for contestation, one of “power’s clever ruses” (Allen, 2007, p.2).  Both an 
absent self and a required (tightly deciphered and disciplined) self means discussion 
of alternatives, or different assemblages for self, is simply irrelevant to the ‘real 
business’ of improving outcomes – examining notions of expanded or possible selves 
is not in the neo-liberal/managerial orbit, or at least only insofar as this supports the 
main agenda.  Self (as an expansive project) is in shutdown, as Latour might say, “a 
closed argument” (Latour, 2004), or a ‘gated community’4 shielded from 
examination.  This is also the self as lost (or locked) in practice.  In the face of the 
everywhere and nowhere (lost) self, my stance represents an assertion of self, and of 
professionals as people, drawing attention to potential attempts to surface, recover, 
or develop (spaces for) personhood in practice – and a questioning of the 
possibilities for ontological reorientations in the ‘post’ (human).  This is an attempt 
                                                          
3
  The situation is captured succinctly by an anonymous reviewer of Ayre and Preston-Shoot’s (2010) Children’s 
services at the crossroads, on Amazon: “Many of us who work in children’s services have become increasingly 
concerned at how our confidence and competence seem to have been gradually and inexorably undermined” 
(review posted 17 June 2010, my emphasis).  Anonymous reviewers aside, in his Progress Report following the 
death of Peter Connolly (‘Baby P’) on changes made as a result of the Climbie Inquiry, Lord Laming (2009) also 
reflects on the loss of confidence of social workers and, strikingly, quotes a 16 year old girl who says of her 
social worker: “She does things by textbook, she doesn’t know me as a person” (p.44) 
4
 I have appropriated this expression from Pearce (2013) and her discussion about research communities 
(p.464) 
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to displace, disrupt, or to ‘sidestep’ what have become conventional and powerful 
conceptualisations about self, and what effective, efficient, and best practice is.     
 
I should be clear: whilst questions of self and subjectivity abound in what has been 
called ‘the ontological turn’ there is, likely, no government minister, no OFSTED 
inspector, no senior manager in children’s services and no commissioner of 
children’s services that would regard the (critical) selfhood of social professionals as 
an important (perhaps even as a legitimate) arena of inquiry.  Here, I speak with 
some experience, of long-standing engagement in the academic/professional 
development of a range of social professionals (and their commissioners).   In the 
tight frame of children’s services legitimate questions arise only insofar as they 
support the main agenda - questions of selfhood are regarded as simply irrelevant 
(perhaps an indulgence) compared to the ‘real business’ of improving outcomes.  In 
the current policy/practice paradigm such questions are already impossible.  This 
situation is reflected (or pre-figured and enacted) in all the ‘machinery’ that was 
developed ‘to support’ the new services – the new structures required, the quangos, 
the (pre-defined) outputs/outcomes, the monitoring approaches and methodologies 
that went with them, the new technologies.  And, of course, the new Journal of 
Children’s Services, spawned in 2006 by the new arrangements, is in thrall to the 
quantitative, the scientised, the diagnostic measure or tool, the linearised, the 
evidence-based, the logic model, the  randomised controlled trial….in which 
(professional) self is absent, and this absence is seen as desirable.   This is arguably 
the “disciplining and regulation of inquiry practices to conform with conservative, 
neo-liberal programs and regimes” (Lincoln and Denzin 2005, p.1116; see also Ball 
2003).  My point is not so much that particular organisational structures are not, 
somehow, legitimate, nor that particular approaches to practice cannot bear fruit (at 
least for someone or something), nor that knowledge cannot be ‘produced’ in 
positivism/neo-positivism.  It is that this, simply, is limited, and paradoxical – and, in 
absenting self from the agenda it is at the same time prescribed, inscribed, and such 
a limited production - for those engaged in multiply complex practices, and as part of 
a (our) public sphere.   
 
15 
 
So, this thesis is not about ‘improving outcomes’ in the way that has been prescribed 
and pre-figured, for this also rests on an ontological assumption of the world 
consisting of discrete units (including social inter/professionals themselves) 
connected via straightforward, unidirectional static forces and upon which children’s 
services policy (change) has been premised, and “where policy-making is 
disconnected from endorsing the openness of the future” (Dewandre 2013, p.10).  
And, as Radford asserts: “Research cannot deliver the kinds of clear and simplistic 
lines between evidence and practice or policy that is being demanded” (2008, 
p.156).       
 
1.2 RESOURCES 
 
The approach and resources adopted to look at self here involve not just a question 
of the dominance of neo-liberalism as an ideological frame of reference and the 
elucidation of a critical theoretical lens in opposition.  However, nor is it to follow the 
moves in some wider academic (and particularly professional practitioner) literature 
where there is some questioning and critique of the mode of operation of self 
prescribed in children’s services from a (re)professionalising standpoint.  These 
involve (re)asserting professional identity/ies - the policy imperatives for children’s 
services can, indeed, be seen as involving a weakening or de-coupling of self from 
professional identifications for the purposes of their (re)securing to the new (neo-
liberalised) agendas.  Hence, counter-responses that attempt to shore up 
professionalism, professional identities and professional agency where ‘professional’ 
stands for something other than a mere tool of policy prescriptions (see, for 
example, Ayre and Preston-Shoot 2010; Baxter 2011).  My suggestion is that these 
arguments may be limited in a number of ways.  Watson and Forbes challenge us, for 
example, to think about how we might actually envisage the “deterritorializing of 
professional silos” (2012, p.187) for interprofessional practice.  Further, these 
approaches offer or propose alternatives that continue to be rooted in, and to 
replicate, the same structures for self, that is, as confined within the liberal humanist 
model - a sovereign self and his (sic) desire for ‘mastery’.  Both neo-liberal policy 
formulations and professional discourse are premised on the existence of the 
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humanist subject.  This is problematic if one does not, indeed, see the world (and 
professional self/practice) as narrowed to, and aligned with, this understanding.   
 
Another line of enquiry could focus on the discursive and linguistic practices that 
shape (or construct) social realities (and self).  However, strict adherence to 
discursive practices and social construction models can rest heavily on a 
language/reality dichotomy that tends to a kind of disembodiment where the self is 
lost in language (games).  This also creates problems for linking knowledge to things 
(Barad 2003); and can come close to a disavowal of real lives going about real 
business with real meaning (and effects).  If poststructuralism has provided 
important insights about how discourses intersect and overlap, it has been “less 
effective at providing insight about how discourses…..intersect with phenomena” 
(Davis, 2008, p. 57).  My turn to the posthuman, therefore, is not a turn to the 
linguistically created self but one to the performed, enacted, materialising, and 
entangled, in its doings.     
 
1.2.1 The dominance of humanism  
 
Enlightenment thinking posits Man as conscious and self-regulating with an infinite 
capacity for rational thought and advancement.  The principal dogma of humanism is 
that of the separation of human from nature, the idea that to be human is to 
transcend the biological and evolutionary.  This asserts the primacy of mind over 
materiality and embodiment, and makes the human independent of other life forms, 
conferring him (sic) with reason, authority, autonomy and agency (Wolfe, 2010; 
Nayar, 2014; Braidotti 2005, 2013) and with a “voice….emanating from a unique, 
essentialist subject conscious to itself” (Mazzei, 2013, p.734).  This Cartesian dualistic 
separation of mind and body from which flows multiple other binary distinctions – 
man/woman, self/other, science/nature, black/white - is that upon which our 
organisation of the world appears to depend.   
 
The self in a classical humanism, then, “derives directly from ideals of human 
perfectibility, rationality, and agency inherited from Renaissance humanism” (Wolfe, 
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2010, p.xiii).  Here the human operates in opposition to a world that he (sic) can 
master and control or at least follow a course of action in accordance with his needs, 
desires and wishes in a way that produces history (Nayar, 2014).  In addition, the 
‘human’ as it emerges from its historical configurations is normatively Eurocentric, 
white and male, with its mirror images (women, disabled people, ethnic minorities) 
confirming the same.  In this way processes of ‘othering’ and classifications of the 
less-than-human highlight exclusions from the ideal - not only are humans privileged 
over other forms of life, likewise some kinds of humanity (Nayar, 2009; Braidotti, 
2013); this particular ‘human’ in humanism has formed the basis of widespread 
critique, particularly from feminist and post-colonialist perspectives.  
 
According to Braidotti, the sovereign humanist subject called forth is “a normative 
frame and an institutionalised practice” (2013, p.30) as well as bedding down in a 
universalising and Eurocentric “civilizational model” (ibid, p.13) founded in its faith in 
human self-reflexive reasoning and progress.  In its working through in (a dominant) 
liberal humanism, the self is an autonomous, independent individual with agency 
and responsibility; it is through the exercise of a conscious and self-governing will 
that the subject achieves individual freedom and mastery (Hayles 1999).  In more 
radical forms humanism emphasises solidarity, collective endeavour and social 
justice.  But in both formulations the humanist subject is writ large and separate 
from other things in the world.    
 
In this world-view, a (pre-existing, sovereign, knowing) subject thus has the capacity 
to act on the environment, just as is assumed in policy and practice configurations 
for children’s services.  Neo-liberalism is premised on just such a rational, free 
subject with agency and, as I have suggested above, the requirement placed on (the 
self of) practitioners is to align to a neo-liberalised children’s services project.  In this 
commodification (or interpellation) of self, what is involved is a continual 
(re)production, refinement and demonstration of self as reasoning instrument 
directing, acting on, and intervening in, the practice arrangements of particular 
settings – what happens (and what is demanded) in children’s services practice rests 
on the existence and  (re)production of the liberal humanist subject.  Hayles 
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describes the liberal humanist world as one involving a close relationship between a 
desire for mastery, an objectivist account of science, and an imperialist project of 
subduing nature and where “conscious agency is the essence of human identity” 
(1999, p.288).  Not only does this prescribe particular humanist selves, the backdrop 
of policy is, likewise, based on its assumptions, and most research follows suit. 
 
1.2.2 Posthumanism and monism 
 
Coleman and Ringrose (2013) note shifts in social science that move away from the 
linear and that might require us to pay attention to the world as mobile, messy, 
creative, changing and open-ended, and sensory and affective.  It is this kind of 
world (the world of children’s services practice) that I suggest is not captured by 
dominant modes of research, policy and practice that, as part of this world, also 
assume the largely stable, coherent, responsible individual of an underpinning 
humanism.  In turning to a critical posthumanist frame, I am encouraged by Foucault 
who, in ‘What is Enlightenment’ asserts: 
….the critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered…..as an attitude…..in 
which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical 
analysis of the limits that are imposed upon us and an experiment with the 
possibility of going beyond them       
       (Foucault, 1984, p.48) 
 
The autonomous subject of enlightenment thinking and as the centre and observer  
of the world, is de-centred in posthuman ontology - we are not the ‘history-makers’  
or disembodied intellects, nor is the world passive and inert waiting our inscriptions 
or agency (Deleuze and Guattari 1987/1980; Barad 2007).   As Hayles tell us: “In the 
posthuman view….conscious agency has never been ‘in control’” (1999, p.288). 
 
A recently coined term, posthumanism runs through the history of ideas, for 
example in Nietzsche and Spinoza.  If humanism rests upon Cartesian dualism, then 
posthumanism turns to the moral philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, and monism.  Here 
there is only one single substance in the world where things are inseparable (Grosz, 
1994), there is oneness, one living matter – a nature-culture continuum (Haraway, 
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1997), and “bodies are not substances but rather modifications of a single 
substance” (Manning, 2012, n.p.).  From this oneness, all other things flow – 
everything is connected, mind and body are not separate but, actually, both are 
‘bodies’ and able to affect each other in relation.   This means what we are 
internally, and the external world we seek to control and ‘work on’  (as humanist 
subjects), as well as all the borderlands between the two is not up to us exclusively, 
but are outcomes of interacting forces.  It is also why Barad (2003, 2007) prefers the 
term ‘intra-action’ rather than interaction, to capture how things get inside each 
other, rather than simply exist as separate from each other; this evokes a 
‘skinlessness’ to people and things, whereby they are enabled to affect and change 
each other both inside and out.  Deleuze reminds us of Spinoza’s seventeenth 
century exclamation in his Ethics III - “We do not know what the body can do” - and 
Deleuze continues: 
This declaration of ignorance is a provocation.  We speak of consciousness 
and its decrees, of the will and its effects, of the thousand ways of moving the 
body, of dominating the body and its passions – but we do not even know 
what a body can do.      
       (Deleuze, 1988, p.17-18) 
 
This blurring of boundaries between all things in the world obviously conflicts with 
Cartesian rationalism and the separation of mind and matter – it turns out that 
“these are not dualistic entities structured according to principles of internal or 
external opposition” (Braidotti, 2013, p.56).   
 
Instead, the world is one that “incorporates important material and discursive, social 
and scientific, human and non-human and natural and cultural factors” (Barad 2003, 
p.808) together, as parts of the same.  This, then, involves a turn to the relational, 
the material, and a self not as pre-existing, not “sovereign, coherent and 
autonomous” (Nayar, 2014, p.2), but as multiply diverse and performed/enacted, in 
the middle5.  Here agency “is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurations of 
the world” (Barad 2003, p.818), in entanglement, as becoming, as an effect of 
                                                          
5
 A number of general formulations can be posited here, including self as enacted, emergent, becoming, 
performed, effected; these are utilised in particular ways according to specific theoretical formulations – my 
point here is a general, post-humanist one about self not pre-existing. 
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relations not vice versa.  ‘Experience’ in these posthuman formulations is outside 
ourselves, something bigger than us that overflows, it can include “a draft, a wind, a 
time of day, a stream, a place, a battle, an illness” (Deleuze, 1995/1990, p.141) 
involving an experiential, affective encounter with difference through which we 
make meaning.  It is not an individual property, it is “contextual and collective, 
therefore a singular experiential event is (as yet) subject-less” and “subjects are 
constituted in relation within experience itself” (Semetsky, 2010, p.477, emphasis 
added).  The self is a part of the forces, intensities, connections and flows-in-
movement that is life (Braidotti, 2005).  This is a ‘post’(humanist) space of becoming 
heralding an attempt at “enlarging the space of the possible” (Osberg, 2010, p.xiii).   
 
This theorisation of selfhood draws attention to the ways in which we might be/live 
both inside and outside of the already existing (and beyond the humanist sovereign 
and a priori subject of liberal individualism).  In this respect, Spinoza’s moral 
philosophy is one that emphasises joyful, affective relations (Deleuze, 1988) where 
“matter is one, driven by the desire for self-expression and ontologically free” 
(Braidotti, 2013, p.56).  ‘Joyful’ relations are those where the self/body can be 
composed in productive, expansive, multiplicitous relations with other things 
(human and non-human) in the world (Deleuze, 1988).  Drawing on Deleuze and 
Guattari, Ringrose captures this, “we have to analyse what the affective capacities of 
assemblages are in political and ethical terms – are they ‘life-affirming’ or ‘life-
destroying?” (2011, p.602).  
 
 
1.2.3 Performativity, and  bringing things into relation 
 
Posthuman relationality involves a deliberate uncertainty , an opening to, and 
interest in, the formation of novel bodies and existences (whether human, 
conceptual, technological and so forth), and the ways they are mutually implicated, 
co-existent, tangled and and imbricated on the surface (St Pierre, 2011a).  It guides 
us to an interest in the practices through which knowledge is produced (what is in 
the mix, the assemblage).  This involves a consideration of relationships between 
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material and non-material things that produce self, or through which self emerges, at 
any given time or moment, and what new effects might be enabled if one introduces 
new elements in relation.  This performative view, emphasising practices, stands in 
contrast to a representational understanding of the relationship between science 
and the world where science seeks to represent nature and produce knowledge that 
is a map, or mirror, of a reality (Pickering, 1995), but is separate from it (words and 
things exist in separate domains).   
 
Instead, the world is “continually doing things, things that bear upon us not as 
observation statements upon disembodied intellects but as forces upon material 
beings” (Pickering, 1995, p.6).  This directs our attention to the potential limits of self 
in current formulations and the things that might be brought together in relation - 
whether they be material, conceptual, technological and so forth - for new emergent 
formations.  Here self is a participant in these formations and not a priori, and a 
product of multiplying configurative practices.  This means self is in a continuous 
process of subject and bodily formation through discursive formations and practices 
– bodies materialize inextricably interwoven with how they are represented and 
become and in interaction with things (Butler, 1993).  By introducing new 
configurative elements into the mix, then, in (affective) relation, different effects 
(selves) might be produced.  This performativity locates knowledge in what is 
happening, in multiple practices in the world.   
 
1.2.4 Posthumanist differing 
 
The monistic world of posthumanism also draws attention to what is ‘other’ as part 
of the same, that is, things are not strictly different/other but, instead, we are 
engaged in processes of differing depending upon the ways in which ‘things’ (ideas, 
technologies, bodies) are brought into different configurations and connections, as 
they can be ad infinitum.  This is why Deleuze and Guattari assert that “pluralism = 
monism” (1987/1980, p.20) because the (one) world multiplies according to ongoing, 
dynamic configurations.  Likewise, Lorraine refers to moving beyond “oppressive 
self/other relations…[and]…the differentiating force of life itself”  (2008, p.60) and “a 
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range of continuous variations in human living” (2011, p.81).   This confers a kind of 
plenitude on the self as it moves, and makes new relations with, things in the world, 
both affecting and being affected.  The point is to keep producing new 
configurations for self in practice.  One might ask what is the point of producing 
more and more multiplicity because in the end one has to decide, or to act (for 
example in children’s services).  However, if one sees the world as performative, and 
engaged in knowledge practices, one cannot separate thinking about or being, from 
acting or doing; for example, our descriptive accounts are themselves specific ways 
of relating things and enacting reality, we already construct self as we argue about 
how to construct it.   Making multiplicity is action and enacts reality in what it 
enables to exist; discussion is decision-making or normativity in action. 
 
1.2.5 Posthumanism and perspectivism 
 
It is important to understand that posthumanism is not an alternative perspective 
where we perhaps make some argument or establish some facts about it, then 
(re)look at self in children’s services where, for example, posthumanism can be 
brought to bear, in a disavowal or negation of the liberal humanist subject.  In a 
monist posthumanist world this is, of course, not possible.  Productions of the 
subject in humanism are, simply, part of the complex mix of relations in the world, 
but they cannot be negated.  It is the world itself that is multiple rather than it being 
possible to have multiple perspectives on the world and decide between them.  
Perspectivism maintains the distinction between an object and how we experience 
it, forcing endless (re)productions of that distinction, for example in research 
formulations.  In posthumanism as performative, involving the foregrounding of 
practices, things cannot be entirely rejected, only reconfigured, or brought into new 
relations, for the formation, enactment and production of things. The introduction of 
a device, idea, technology and so on can become a new part of a configuration and 
can help produce different effects, but it cannot negate other existences, only 
multiply them.  This relationality makes for a vibrant reality.  In her research work in 
healthcare in a Dutch hospital, Annemarie Mol foregrounds practices in this way 
highlighting the performative practices of different kinds of health professionals in 
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relation to complex health problems.  Here, she says, “reality multiplies” (Mol, 2002, 
p.5) as an inherently complicated and multiple and fragmented assemblage in 
relation, and where various pieces of data relate and are in juxtaposition with each 
other; she says this is inherently productive for treatment practices.  It ‘unbrackets’ 
practices (from representing merely different perspectives to be decided between), 
and makes all different realities significant and consequential.  The point is to bring 
new things into relation, and to see what happens. 
 
There are, then, key ontological (and epistemological) issues at stake here.  These 
emerge and work through a situation where the policy, professional practice (and, 
for that matter, related research discourses) available to children’s services 
practitioners are anchored, more or less, to versions of the Western humanist 
subject.  This is a sovereign self “endowed with a will, a freedom, an intentionality 
which is then subsequently ‘expressed’ in language, in action, in the public domain” 
(Butler 1995, p.136) – ‘the professional’ acts on ‘the environment’.   Different 
ontologies, as Mol demonstrates, can generate different realities; in posthumanism, 
different things and different people (selves) can become-with, or transform, each 
other. 
 
 
1.2.6 Power, surveillance and appearance 
 
In critical posthumanism, not all things are equal in terms of their influence in the 
world.  Foucault and Arendt also provide some theoretical resources that potentially 
help to organise thinking posthuman personhood, and as effects of power.  For both, 
self is not a natural or given entity (so they align with a posthumanist understanding 
as described), it is a political project involving power; both analyses see self as 
emerging from systems of social relations (and, importantly, involving a non-
sovereign self).  However, Foucault’s account characterises self as constituted in 
“spaces of surveillance” (Marquez, 2012, emphasis added) subject to specific 
‘disciplinary’ and ‘normalizing’ technologies that profoundly shape the constitution 
of self and what becomes possible, and that implicate self in reinscriptions.  Thinking 
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with Foucault, then, is to consider how power implicates the production of selfhood 
in its re-making.  Arendt’s more optimistic account conceptualises power as 
communicative (and desirable in itself), hence the emergence of self in “spaces of 
appearance” (Marquez 2012, emphasis added) through ‘action’, and in the context 
of plurality.  Thinking with Arendt, then, is to stress the condition of being an actor 
as inherent with possibility (for presence/appearance) through engagement wth 
others.  
 
The spaces and interaction of surveillance and appearance are thus implicated in the 
production of critical selfhood, in the dynamics of being both implicated in 
reinscriptions (Foucault) and, at the same time, being an actor with potential to 
create newness (Arendt).  This is not to (try and) create a binary (or reintroduce 
mutually exclusive perspectives) between ‘surveillance’ and ‘appearance’.  After 
Foucault, Sharon (2012, p.12) points out the possibility of reinstating modern 
categories in efforts to capture something new or think differently; this would be a 
reversion to Cartesian dualism and the point is more to work what ‘surveillance’ and 
‘appearance’ can do, in intra-action .  This is less to pit deconstructive/postmodern 
potentials versus the disciplinary and modern (in Sharon’s case in relation to 
emerging biotechnologies), more to show how they might co-exist, tangled and 
imbricated on the surface, in becoming (St Pierre 2011a).  As Barad explains: 
“individuals emerge through, and as part of, their entangled intra-relating” (2007, 
p.ix).    
 
So surveillance and appearance are intended to draw attention to the conditions, 
balance, or dynamic mix/infusions perhaps reflecting moment-by-moment 
opportunities and risks for selfhood in complex practice assemblages or operations 
and that, rather than simply involving the “shuffling round of foundational 
categories” (Sharon 2012, p.12) might also capture their co-relations as more than, 
simply, intersections, but as mutually constitutive.  I am suggesting there may be a 
multi-faceted, interrelated, ever changing interplay of spaces of appearance and 
surveillance for the production of selfhood in appearance, sometimes operating at 
the same time, and in which the workings of power (in neo-liberalism) are taken as 
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part of this, as read .  That is, the narrow performative self identified, for example, 
by Ball (2003) and Stronach and Clarke (2012) that is prescribed and inscripted as 
economised, mechanised and marketised, in policy technologies of neo-liberalism – 
in surveillance – may always already be there.   
 
This means that the ways in which the multifaceted systems operating in children’s 
services flow through and with particular selves (‘surveillance’) are a significant 
sphere for analysis and critique, but the point is to unsettle and disrupt these 
perhaps as a form of “ontological politics” (Mol, 1999).  The bringing into relation 
and the juxtaposition of a different (posthuman) ontology for self - in tension, fluid, 
affective, and as levering different formations, is a “focus on making difference 
rather than making similarity” (Fenwick 2010, p.92).  Moulard-Leonard describes 
what might be thought and done as:  
experiments in living that push towards a threshold of another kind of self: 
can we extricate ourselves from the connections and assemblages of which 
we are a part in order to form new assemblages more in keeping with the 
unfolding of our new capacities?  
       (Moulard-Leonard, 2013, p.103) 
 
 
 
1.3 CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
I should reiterate that my work is not about trying to produce a ‘successor regime’ 
for self (the new, real story of self) – Foucault, Butler, and many others make  
it clear that this would simply be to court continuing participation and reabsorption 
in what already exists.  Nor is it an attempt to domesticate further, by ‘explaining’ 
the workings of self more thoroughly or presenting a more inclusive notion of self, I 
seek to transgress the boundaries and structures of that (permitted) self.  And I do 
not wish to reduce what practice is to the workings of self, nor essentialise the 
subject (whether of professionals or of users).  To focus on selfhood and claim it as 
important in itself, and for practice is, then, not to centre the subject – in fact, I have 
presaged a radical de-centering, in assemblage – however “a deconstruction of the 
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subject does not liquidate the subject” (Herbrechter, 2013, p.196) – people remain 
important.   
 
To bring the selfhood of social professionals into an encounter with posthumanism is 
to challenge “the panoptic immunity” (Miller, cited in MacLure, 2010, p.3) of the 
liberal subject, where current policy and practice configurations act as (Foucault’s) 
panoptican - a prison for the self  - and are resistant to different formulations.  That 
is, policy and practice in children’s services is predicated upon the existence of the 
liberal humanist subject, this is not questioned and, moreover, the requirement for 
the practitioner is to tether ‘self’ to its neo-liberal project.   The posthuman brings an 
assertion that, actually, the “states of things are neither unities nor totalities, but 
multiplicities” (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002/1977, p.vii) and so cannot be rooted in a 
narrowly defined liberal humanist subject.  What critical posthumanism does is to 
open a space for discussion and argument in relation to the actors (human and non-
human – technologies, ideologies, organisational arrangements and so forth) that 
enable and enact quite particular selves.  Our posthuman condition, beyond the 
tethered self of liberal humanism suggests people (and objects, ideas and so on) are 
networks, or gatherings, not simply to be represented, and are also themselves 
representative of multiple others.  Posthumanism suggests that self is linked to the 
particular assemblages with which self is in relation; elements in the assemblage 
enable existences in particular ways and enact particular realities.   Bringing 
posthumanism into play, into a relational mix, expands the assemblage to potentially 
lever new selves.   
 
If neo-liberal and professional discourses foreground the production of selves in 
their own image(s), then posthumanist becoming in assemblage is, likewise, 
productive and performative -  “a generative tool” (Braidotti, 2013, p.5).  This draws 
attention to what might be going on in the production of self beyond liberal 
humanist subjects.  This adds to self, conferring plenitude and abundance on the 
narrow and neo-liberalised self.  It is in the connections and interactions between 
humanist and post-humanist signifiers and shapers that something new, (a vision of) 
self beyond self, might emerge.     
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This brings some difficulties as, whilst the ‘turn to the self’ (at least in Western 
thought) has become increasingly prominent in much social theory, theory and 
practice  appear to be going in opposite directions - as social theory engages with 
self, policy and practice (for children’s services) arguably diminishes it.  Whilst this 
suggests fruitful territory for research investigations, it also cautions whether 
discussions of self can bear any fruit alongside the powerful, commodifying neo-
liberalised discourses, whether there is really any ‘elbow room’ in practice for 
discussions of  different selves.  Putting “’post’ ontology to work” (Lather and Pierre, 
2013, p.631) in dynamic interaction with the profoundly prescribed challenges a 
situation whereby government policy, regulatory apparatus, institutions and 
organisational arrangements, and a whole host of practices attempt to cohere, 
coalesce and line up a self in their own image, deeply impacted or, for example, as 
implicated, or as a desiring machine6 .   To bring into play a non-sovereign self 
alongside the powerfully commodifying is, then, a big move - it attempts to shift or 
flip, as well as to expand and traverse, the territory, to bring new possibilities and 
potentials.   
 
In this thesis I argue that the selfhood of children’s services professionals is under-
researched and also, despite the availability of social theoretical resources, always 
secured to versions of the liberal humanist subject, and one particularly required by 
neo-liberal and managerialised policy-making and implementation (but also by 
professional identifications and discourse).  I have introduced this self utilising a 
number of descriptions – as the everywhere and nowhere self, as lost or locked in 
practice, and self as a ‘gated community’ - the humanist subject aligned with a 
prescribed self of neo-liberal policy frames is a narrowing of self.  My premise is that 
the self(hood) of social professionals in children’s services is important - 
professionals operate in the spaces between policy prescriptions and practice 
outcomes – and the importance of self is the case in itself, for practice, and as linked 
to a dynamic public sphere (for democracy) – it is political.  In moving beyond 
                                                          
6
 This is a reference to the Deleuzo-Guattarian notion that institutions can be productive of desire (see also 
Watson’s (2009) vivid descriptions of her “Complicity/Resistance” in this frame (p.22).   
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standard, critical theoretical moves, my overall research question is to ask how it 
might be possible to think (and do) self differently, and this can be expanded in three 
further questions: 
 
(i) How, and in what ways, is the selfhood of children’s services ‘professionals’ 
pre-figured and constituted? 
(ii) How might posthumanism (as a generative tool, and brought in to relation) 
help in re-thinking and re-framing the selfhood of social professionals? 
(iii) What might be thought and done then, in connection between the 
prescribed, and the open?     
 
Chapter two develops the ontological and epistemological positioning outlined, and  
explicates my research strategy and methods.  
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C h a p t e r   2 
 
METHODOLOGY AND BECOMING-RESEARCHER 
Research strategy and methods 
 
 
Each researcher who puts the “posts” to work will create a different articulation…..remix, 
mash-up, assemblage, a becoming of inquiry that is not a priori, inevitable, necessary, 
stable, or repeatable but is, rather, created spontaneously in the middle of the task at hand, 
which is always already and, and, and….. 
(St Pierre 2011, p.620, emphasis in original) 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
When (knowledge and) research is seen as performative, ‘science’ becomes a 
practice that enacts particular realities, rather than providing answers about the 
world as we ‘know’ it.  This entails risks because it brings with it questions about the 
particular practices one engages in through which knowledge is produced or 
assembled, and what is brought to bear, or not.  Why this particular ‘invention’ of 
reality and not that one, when, in a monistic world, everything can be connected to 
everything else?  Understanding research as performative draws our attention to the 
prevailing configurations and representations and the ways they interact dynamically 
with and are productive of self; a sovereign and pre-existing self is not assumed.  
Prevailing assemblages (and how its elements work together) for self are important.  
In this thesis existing possibilities for, and representations of, self in children’s 
services are seen as productive of self-practices that are pre-figured in certain ways 
(and dominant), they order the world of self in particular sedimented or ‘gridded’ 
ways.  They are important because they cannot be expelled or ‘disproved’ as in a 
classical view of science and the world, in the monistic domain of posthumanism 
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that I have outlined, they remain part of the mix.  Paying attention to existing 
configurations for the emergence and practice of selfhood does, however, provide a 
starting-point and potential for introducing novel elements that can be productive of 
different or new practices of self.  By focusing on how self is produced in current 
representations, policy and practice in children’s services, this opens up spaces for 
discussion, contention and the possibility of different or novel configurations in a 
relational mix or assemblage, and a self beyond the existing.  The theoretical (and 
ontological and epistemological) resources I have outlined help to lever these 
spaces, and their assumptions are embedded in my research questions. 
 
This chapter develops (my rationale for) the research strategy employed, firstly in 
relation to the already existing ; that is, I locate the research approach with/in and 
alongside existing paradigmatic research typologies.  Then I discuss the research 
‘apparatus’, mechanisms and methods employed for a performative and relational 
(posthuman) research practice.  This leads to (is productive of) the four subsequent 
chapters which are all responses to the propositions that the selfhood of social 
professionals in children’s services is  pre-figured, and that thinking in the 
posthuman, by introducing it into the mix, can potentially expand or reorient the 
landscape for self.  The chapters do different things, but In their different ways, they 
are all consequent upon the introduction of ‘posthumanism’  and in relation to 
existing representations and configurations for selfhood.            
  
 
2.2 ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 
Climate, wind, season, hour are not of another nature than the things, 
animals or people that populate them, follow them, sleep and awaken within 
them     (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980, p.290) 
 
At the workshop ‘The subject and language in the “posts”’ at the 2013 Summer 
Institute in Qualitative Research at Manchester Metropolitan University, Elizabeth St 
Pierre presented the latest iteration of her and Patti Lather’s Postpositivist New 
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Paradigm Inquiry table7, and this is reproduced in table 1, over.  This table, like 
others (for example, Guba and Lincoln 2005), can be used as a means of 
distinguishing different paradigms (worldviews) in the classic formulation of 
‘epistemology driving theoretical perspective, driving methodology, and methods’ 
(for example, see Crotty, 1998).  They are based on Kuhn’s paradigms that are 
differentiated by “incommensurable ways of seeing the world differently and of 
practicing science in it” (Kuhn 1996/1962, p.4).  Traditionally, then, a Kuhnian 
paradigmatic incommensurability has driven research within set paradigmatic 
‘fields’.  These are founded in “the basic belief system or world view that guides the 
investigator” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994, p.105) as they are:  
essentially intellectual cultures......fundamentally embedded in the 
socialization of their adherents: a way of life rather than simply a set of 
technical and procedural differences  
(Oakley, 1999, p.155).  
Hence typologies, such as Lather’s and St Pierre’s abound8.  Theirs, however, tends 
to try and indicate more movement and complexity (and the possibility of less 
incommensurability) than some others, despite the separations of the table.  In 
addition, their version is also more extensive in terms of an expansion (in labels 
applied to) particular positions (in the two right-hand columns of the table), after 
‘structural’ methodologies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Previous iterations of this table are in several publications and journal articles, notably Lather (2006; 2007) in 
which she also gives an account of its development (p.37 and p.164 respectively).  
8 It is still quite common to find a small number of competing alternatives, for example, divisions drawn along 
quantitative and qualitative lines and a distinction between positivism and interpretivism; sometimes these 
two dimensions are conflated (quantitative/positivism vs qualitative/interpretivism) although many others 
have shown how these divisions are by no means clear cut and mutually exclusive (eg Hammersley 2007; 
Crotty 1998).  Guba and Lincoln (1994) are amongst those that distinguish critical approaches in addition to 
positivism and interpretivism, and O’Donoghue (2007) adds postmodernism.  Zuber-Skerritt (1996) posits 
educational action research as a core paradigmatic approach.  In their detailed typology, Denzin and Lincoln 
(2005) offer positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, constructivism and participatory (after Heron and 
Reason, 1997) paradigms. 
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Table 1 
Postpositivist New Paradigm Inquiry 
 
Predict Understand Emancipate Break Deconstruct Next??? 
*Positivist *Interpretive *Critical  *Poststructural Post Post 
Neopositivist Naturalistic Neomarxist  Postmodern Post theory 
Mixed methods Constructivist <Feminist>  Postcolonial Ontological 
Turn 
New 
Empiricisms 
New 
Materialisms 
 Phenomenological Critical Race 
Theory 
 Post-critical Citizen Inquiry 
 Ethnographic Praxis-oriented  Post-humanist  
 Symbolic 
interactionist 
<Freirian 
Participatory 
Action Research 
 Post-Fordist Neopragmatism 
 Interpretive mixed 
methods 
Gay and 
Lesbian 
Theories 
 Queer Theory Participatory 
Dialogic 
Policy Analysis 
  Critical 
Ethnography 
 <Discourse 
Analysis 
 
    Race-feminist 
Poststructuralism 
(Wanda Pillow) 
 
    Postparadigmatic 
Diaspora (John 
Caputo) 
 
    Post-everything 
(Fred Erickson) 
 
      
*Indicates the term most commonly used 
<Indicates cross-paradigm movement 
Break indicates a shift from the modernist, structural, humanist theories/discourses on the left to 
the postmodern, poststructural, post-humanist theories/discourses on the right.  In the post 
theories, all major epistemological, ontological and methodological concepts (e.g. language, 
discourse, knowledge, truth, reason, power, freedom, the subject, object, being reality, method, 
science) are deconstructed 
 
Reproduced from Lather and Pierre (revised July 2013), originally Lather (2006). Presented by 
Elizabeth St Pierre at ‘The subject and language in the “posts”’ workshop 24.7.13 at the Summer 
Institute in Qualitative Research: Putting Theory to Work 22-26 July, 2013.  Education and Social 
Research Institute, Manchester Metropolitan University. 
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Paradigms (and their methodologies) in the positivist, interpretive and critical 
traditions (the left-hand columns of the table) rely on a self-contained structure 
(often of a dualist nature, involving a number of binaries such as subject/object, 
nature/culture) and system of methodological rules that guide thought to (better) 
truths (knowledge).  For example, Jennifer Greene, in responding to (questioning) a 
collection of diverse explorations of ‘post-qualitative research’ in a Special Issue of 
the International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education (2013), captures her 
own position as a blend of interpretivism and critical theory and simply states she 
thinks of research as “the systematic process of recording and analyzing information 
about targeted phenomena….toward better understanding of those phenomena” 
(Greene, 2013, p.752)9.   This indicates an attachment to theories linked to a 
tripartite Enlightenment ontology (what is in the world, what is real), as separate 
from epistemology (what we know about the world) with the further separation of 
the research subject (who knows it).  In addition, there is an orientation here 
towards a better understanding of what already exists.   
 
Poststructuralist responses have involved a questioning of what already exists, and 
an orientation to deconstruction; in particular, poststructuralism has drawn attention 
to how meaning (including the subject) is constituted by language and the discursive, 
and so inherently unstable.  As part of this, the link between knowledge and power 
(in critical perspectives) has also been (re)worked in poststructural formulations.  
Grasswick (2011) argues, for example, that it is situated knowing (Haraway, 1988) 
that is the most influential concept to have been developed out of feminist 
epistemologies, the assertion that knowing is located and limited, and linked to 
one’s social location (and power).  She asks “if knowledge is situated then in what 
sense can knowledge be objective….[and]….if social location limits one’s knowledge, 
how can we know across social locations?” (2011, p. xvi).  As a result, many have 
sought to combine critical theoretical positions (such as from feminism) with (newer) 
poststructural perspectives to work towards a whole variety of ‘liberatory 
                                                          
9
 Greene (2013) is chosen here to exemplify as she specifically responded to an invitation to explain her (very 
different) approach alongside a collection of articles all working with the ‘post-qualitative’ in the Special issue 
cited. 
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epistemologies’.  Poststructuralism has thus generated a wide range of theoretical 
positions and methodologies, particularly in relation to discursive and linguistic 
practices, and social construction models that are not to do with a better 
understanding of what already exists, but seek to unsettle the apparent stability on 
which such understandings are based.  Hence, they also challenge methodology as a 
set of (disinterested, objective) rules that guide the researcher to ‘truth’ or a better 
understanding.  As Coleman and Ringrose (drawing on Law and Urry 2004, and Barad 
2007) comment: “social science methodologies not only describe the worlds they 
observe but…are involved in the invention or creation of the world” (2013, p.1).   
However, a number of emerging bodies of thought have further critiqued and 
challenged classificatory paradigmatic/methodological approaches, and their 
epistemic bases.  In looking back at Lather and St Pierre’s classification (Table 1), 
positivist, interpretivist and critical paradigms can be understood as linked to 
modernity, and a poststructural paradigm as emerging from conditions of 
postmodernity.  For my purposes, the difficulty with both of these is that they both 
separate professionals and their practice, albeit in different ways, that is, they are 
representational not performative, are variously humanist, not posthuman.  On this 
point, Dolphijn and van der Tuin comment: “postmodernisms and modernisms are 
manifold, on the one hand, and epistemologically similar on the other” (2012, 
p.110). 
 
The claim here is that both the modern and the postmodern are humanisms, that 
both ‘science’ and ‘the postmodern’ maintain a “representation/materiality 
dichotomy” (Colebrook, 2004, p.56), that is, they are both part of the same 
organizing structure whereby things might be either real or discursively 
produced/socially constructed but that, nonetheless, maintain the humanist subject.  
Similarly, Braidotti (2000) identifies, the humanist subject of both biological 
determinism and social constructivism.  The ‘linguistic turn’ has come in for 
particular criticism – Karen Barad (2003) opens with “Language has been granted too 
much power” and, citing Nietzsche, challenges representationalism where we are 
placed above or outside the world we “allegedly merely reflect on” (Barad, 2007, 
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p.133).  And, Maggie MacLure, in asking ‘where are the ruins?’, similarly 
acknowledges “a cast of postmodern characters, lurking, strolling, or dancing in the 
ruins of research” (2010, p.2) whose purpose has been to problematise and 
destabilize the idea of the objective social scientist, her “disinterested truths…” [and 
to maintain appropriate] “…safe distance between herself and the research 
participants” (p.2), yet maintains “interpretive mastery and narrative coherence…the 
‘panoptic immunity’ of the liberal subject” (p.3), “the bland dialect of mutual regard” 
(p.4) and, in data analysis, “once again, digging up themes and stacking up 
categories” (p.4).  Her point is that these practices can only replicate a given world 
rather than make available different opportunities or possibilities.   
 
The problem of researching in this vein is that, in one way of another, self is 
reproduced, replicated and reinstated in all the (pre-)existing structures for self upon 
which such paradigmatic positions are founded.  Self here does not have the 
opportunity to escape, to present or produce anything different or new.  For 
empirical rigour this insight is arguably important – research ‘objects’ (in this case, 
the self) have to be presented with the opportunity to produce different knowledge 
from that which is predicated, expected, or assumed.  Emergent bodies of thought – 
Chandler groups these around “new materialists, actor-network theory and post-
humanist approaches” (2013, p.516) – do offer different kinds of research 
(inventions) and opportunities, via the introduction of posthumanist approaches that 
emphasise inclusion of all the non-human actors in activities, meaning-making and 
knowledge building, as well as the human.  In a posthuman world, moving against 
pre-set structures of self that are assumed in existing research arrangements, what 
happens, or is (and the production of knowledge), involves a variety of things (both 
human and non-human, material and non-material) where agency or intentionality is 
distributed.  Knowledge or being (self) becomes an enactment or effect of an 
entanglement or assemblage (made up of multiple things – representations and 
language, material objects, ideas/theories, ideologies, organizational arrangements 
and so forth) as a “living force” (Colebrook, 2004, p.64).  What is in the world 
(humans and non-humans) and what we know about the world cannot be separated, 
they are entangled, interacting, and constantly shaping one another in what happens 
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(and in the production of knowledge).  This is beyond any individual’s direction and 
not reducible to their individual qualities or powers; paraphrasing Barad (2007) 
(about Haraway), Mazzei states:  
In other words, agency to change the world and be changed by the world 
emerges within the intra-actions of multiple people and things and does not 
pre-exist those encounters.    (Mazzei, 2013, p.734)  
 
Of course, posthumanism as a frame of reference does have an interest in presenting  
the world as messy, unstable, complex, open and uncertain (rather than linearized, 
reduced, ordered and manageable).  But my point here is that it is only through the 
introduction of ‘the posthuman’ in some form that the possibility or option for 
something different for selfhood becomes available.  Posthuman possibilities are 
thus concerned with a research rigour in this respect, in their making available other 
possibilities (in relation). 
This introduces a performative and relational ‘onto-epistemology’ (Barad, 2003, 
2007) where things emerge in the world which are, at the same time, shaped both 
by what we know and the material and, likewise, we cannot think it separately.  This 
is why St Pierre, in particular, writes of the collapse of the ‘categories’ of humanist 
qualitative inquiry and coins the term ‘post-qualitative’ research practices.   
The ‘Post Post’ (see Table 1) does not, however, simply herald an additional 
paradigmatic classification in a territorial (and transcendentalizing) gesture as this 
involves “invoking sequential negation and a narrative of progress (ie it is dualist)” 
(Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012, p.111).  This is a transversal move which intersects 
epistemic divides across the horizontal on Lather and St Pierre’s classificatory table.  
It invokes a realism (but not in the traditional sense of one separately knowable, and 
even less as object), and agency (not as an individual attribute) and knowledge (not 
as ‘out there’), but all as “the ongoing reconfigurations of the world” (Barad, 2003, 
p.808) in entanglement, together, and as a ‘post’(humanist) space of becoming.  
Likewise, language and social constructivism (of the poststructural) is still ‘in the mix’ 
(relationally) in this ‘material-discursive’ character of all events (Dolphijn and van der 
Tuin 2012), in movement.  They summarise:  
37 
 
Not primarily interested in representation, signification, and disciplinarity, 
new materialism is fascinated by affect, force and movement as it travels in 
all directions.  It searches not for the objectivity of things in themselves but for 
an objectivity of actualisation and realization    
       (Dolphijn and Van der Tuin 2012, p.113) 
 
This performative onto-epistemology (knowing in being) is one of Deleuzian 
immanence where the various elements of the world are not consistently or 
substantially divided up but where connections are emphasized over forms of 
separation in mutually constitutive patterns, non-linear intra-actions (Barad, 2007).  
This is knowing-being as caught up in the fold where a researcher-subject (or any 
person) is:  
Neither a sacralized inner sanctum nor a pure socially-shaped entity, the 
enfleshed Deleuzian subject is rather an ‘in-between’: it is a folding-in of 
external influences and a simultaneous unfolding outwards of affects.  A 
mobile entity, an enfleshed sort of memory that repeats and is capable of 
lasting through sets of discontinuous variations, while remaining faithful to 
itself.”     (Braidotti, 2000, p.159, emphasis in original). 
 
In addition, in research that relates to practice and being (in children’s services), a 
performative ontology of becoming (onto-epistemology) which focuses on what 
happens (or at least with what is happening) is, I think, particularly important; the 
multiple ‘requirements’ of ‘research’ seem, so often, to take the practitioner away 
from practice (rather than ever-more engaged with it).   So, a performative concern 
about what is happening is, in this sense, strikingly affirmative (for 
practice/practitioners), it involves a belief in the world and “belief in the possibilities 
of world(s) we have not yet thought” (St Pierre, 2013, p.652).    
 
At the same time (perhaps paradoxically), research remains, here, ‘productively 
irritating’ as it refuses to simplify, reify or ‘fit’ a positivist/post-positivist ‘standard’ 
(with the RCT as its apotheosis), by its insistence on something much more messy, 
complex and contradictory, “disrupting the metaphysics of closure” (Watson, 2009, 
p.4) around knowledge, the subject, and how we know it.  This is also, of course, 
where my research questions (and content) become the same problem as that of 
conducting the research – the research seeks to explore beyond the liberal humanist 
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subject of practice, invoking posthumanist configurations and becoming in 
entanglement or relation (both performative and relational) and this is the same 
demand I have then made via my paradigmatic position, for my becoming-
research(er).  In this I also acknowledge my (part) ‘invention of the world’ (see 
above), its partiality (as well as temporality), rather than claiming research as 
something called objective, and truth-seeking.  
  
2.3 RESEARCH DEVICES 
 
2.3.1  Rhizomes and assemblage 
 
The image of thought (or figuration) here is the rhizome, increasingly being called 
upon, and put to use, by researchers who articulate Deleuzian and post-
humanist/new materialist starting points10.  Deleuze and Guattari compare the 
rhizome to the arboreal where the latter (re)presents a research methodology 
rooted in orthodox, scientific formulations (with a singular root, sequentially 
linearised/ordered, and hierarchical).   The rhizome is not opposed to this 
unidirectionality but is different – instead, a multiplicity, ceaselessly making myriad 
and multidimensional connections; making lines of flight, the rhizome: 
….exemplifies nomadic movements across spaces: as embedded in a 
particular situation, rhizome goes in diverse directions instead of a single 
path, multiplying its own lines and establishing the plurality of unpredictable 
connections in the open-ended smooth space of its growth 
(Semetsky, 2008, p.xv)  
And: 
Any point of a rhizome can be connected to any other, and must be….A 
Rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, 
organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and 
social struggles.   (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980, p.7) 
 
The purpose of the rhizome is to be generative of meaning via connections and 
intensify ‘knowing’, to move towards thinking (and doing) differently (though this is 
                                                          
10
 See, for an exemplar, Sellers (2013); also several of the chapters in the collection edited by Coleman and 
Ringrose (2013); Ringrose (2013); Watson (2009); Mazzei (2013); and Lenz Taguchi (2013). 
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never settled, established, definitive, as moment-by-moment things fold, and fold 
again in the and…and…and…), and to create and constitute, (im)plausibly, ‘the real’. 
 
A rhizome is a figuration for how thinking/knowledge can be “opened up and 
proliferated rather than foreclosed and simplified” (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p.vii).  
A rhizomatic figure of thought (enacted, or formed as an assemblage) involves 
irreducible relations (not separate entities), and should not be thought of as an 
(en)closed picture, it connects multiplicitously beyond what is represented to the 
not-yet-thought, and is only temporary and in movement.  There are many ways one 
might get into it – and its infinite variations – and many ways out.  A rhizome is 
flattened (no overarching or horizontal/vertical ‘themes’ with some kind of ‘deep 
structure’; indeed, themes are not appropriate (here are only ‘schematic cues’ ) for 
everything exists alongside (and in connection) with the rest, in Deleuzo-Guattarian 
terms this flattened plane is referred to as ‘smooth space’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987/1980).  What is sought is what happens in the connections and the interactions 
(or intra-actions) and in the process of making and un-making (and the multiplicities 
that lie beyond).  Here, the trappings of conventional qualitative inquiry such as 
coding, thematising, and data reduction (for a clear answer) are seen as narrowing 
and reductive (and these work within entirely different paradigmatic formations).  
Jackson and Mazzei describe these conventions as involving “commodification” and 
the rhizomatic assemblage an alternative, a “process of plugging in as a production 
of the new, the assemblage in formation” (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p.2; see also 
Haggis, 2008).  Thus, knowledge is not about (fore)closure to clear answers but 
about relations between different points of connection and how these work and 
what they do, and of continuing to make more connections, to keep moving , to 
produce novel configurations and emergence. 
 
2.3.2 Mapping and Cutting 
 
Thinking selfhood rhizomatically draws attention to infinite possibilities through 
infinite connections, whereby self is produced as part of a rhizomatic assemblage.  It 
reminds that any assemblage delineated or gathered via specific connections made 
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between points, or that are brought into relation with each other, can only ever be 
partial.   Gathering together in a (textual) assemblage is a mapping, it is cartographic 
(Dolphijn and Van der Tuin, 2012).  Mapping produces something, but it does not 
assume ‘representation’ because drawing means “to create and not to copy” 
(Semetsky 2006, p.xx), it is a process, and “what is drawn…does not pre-exist the act 
of drawing” (Massumi/Deleuze and Guattari 1987/1980, p.xvi).  Deleuze and Guattari 
(1983/1972) want to know how these (mapping) creations work, and what they 
produce. 
   
In her discussion specifically about interviews in posthumanist, post-qualitative 
enquiry, Lisa Mazzei (2013) utilises the Deleuzo-Guattarian (1983/1972) image of a 
Body without Organs and develops the idea of a ‘voice without organs’ (VwO) for 
interviewing in posthumanist inquiry.  She explains: 
…all the things that have been understood as possessed by humans and 
products of their agency (e.g. ideas, language, speech, social relations) are 
entangled flows that are in a continual process of making and un-making, of 
becoming.  Thus, voice in postqualitative inquiry becomes an entanglement of 
desires, intensities, and flows, a VwO that is made and unmade in the process 
that we call research and analysis.  If, as in posthumanism, agency is an 
entanglement of flows….then a VwO is becoming in the entangled flow of 
social relations, existing in the between-the-two of research-data-
participants-theory-analysis.     
(Mazzei, 2013, p.735) 
 
What Mazzei is explaining is that ‘voice’ in interviews emerges from, and is itself, a 
rhizomatic assemblage “in the entangled flow of social relations”.  Mazzei’s ‘map’ of 
this in a research process involves, as she says, ‘research-data-participants-theory-
analysis’, and through which voice emerges, it does not emanate from a singular, 
traditional essentialist (rather a multiplicitous, overflowing) subject.  She is 
attempting to capture/map the gathering of different parts of the productive 
assemblage contained in ‘voice’ to look at how things work, how knowledge is 
produced, rather than simply their meaning per se.  The significance is in the map 
that is created (and the particular connections and potential transformations that 
are then enabled, or not).    
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Barad (2007) also refers to mapping practices, and as involving the drawing of 
boundaries; boundary-practices run counter to smooth spaces but, nonetheless, are 
necessary for intelligibility, as the rhizome can never be fully mapped (in a monistic 
world this might involve mapping everything).  Barad calls these boundary practices 
‘agential cuts’ and they involve the process of choosing what one brings into 
connection in an assemblage, even as one (as the researcher) is also entangled in it.  
The ‘cuts’ made are knowledge-making practices that enable and constrain certain 
things (and that also invoke an ethical research responsibility), so researchers need 
to be explicit in their making. 
 
Here, then, in identifying and mapping elements in a particular assemblage for self in 
children’s services a number of boundary-practices (cuts) have been deployed.  The 
four chapters subsequent to this one are the ‘productions’ that then emerge, based 
on these cuts.  For this study, which is both an examination of what currently exists 
for self, and an opening to a possible new territory invoking posthumanist 
formulations, I have operated at a level of generality (unlike Mazzei, as discussed 
above, my concern is not only ‘voice’).  That is, I am not examining the specific 
selves, of particular individuals, in certain practice settings (which might suggest 
quite different and specific assemblages operating for productions of self).  Instead, 
my ‘rhizome’ is the much broader territory of children’s services policy and practice 
(and as it has developed) and, of course, this includes the selfhood of social 
professionals.  My mapping therefore involves a number of ‘sub-territories’ in this 
mix, in a particular assemblage (and that are then gathered up, brought in relation).   
 
The ‘cuts’ made here are quite straightforward in their connecting together into a 
rhizomatic, research assemblage, and to become productive of meaning.  These cuts 
proceeded in the light of an initial gathering together, before they were worked into 
greater relation with each other as part of a specific research assemblage, to be 
made productive, and for a textual production (this thesis).  This initial gathering 
included eight interviews with senior practitioners and managers in children’s 
services (see section 2.3.4 below),  reflections and writing about my own active 
policy/practice/teaching engagement over ten years with children’s services 
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professionals, organisations and policy makers/stakeholders, and a range of related 
(critical social) policy and practice, and theoretical, reading.   
 
This gathering also included, initially, some different, wider elements too, that have 
subsequently not been brought into play in the final thesis.  For example, I was in 
Norway in July 2011 when Anders Behring Breivik murdered 77 people in two attacks 
that were “intensely penetrating” (de Graaf, 2013, p.3) across the country.  As an 
affective event this had been quite profound.  It had caused me to think deeply 
about the role of citizens and those with professional responsibilities in democratic, 
civil practices in the wake of such events (for example, in relation to child abuse 
crises and responses such as those triggered by the deaths of Victoria Climbié and, 
subsequently, Peter Connolly, in England) .   Originally, it seemed important to be 
able to include discussion of these events, and the connections that could be made 
for the production or emergence of the selfhood of social professionals in children’s 
services, in particular in relation to a democratic function or role.  However, 
ultimately, I could not as effectiveIy link and connect this in as I would have liked and 
it has proved beyond the scope and size of the final thesis to bring these 
considerations into relation with the rest.  The wider point is, of course, that 
different assemblages, and connections made, might produce different outcomes, 
the point is to be as transparent and explicit about the choices made.    
 
Of course, there always must be much that lies beyond the particular ‘cuts’ made, 
things omitted, in the assemblage drawn, even where these lie arguably close by, 
and even as they remain beyond the scope here.  For example, leadership 
discourses/practices in children’s services might have been called into play to a 
greater degree, as much of the organisational development in children’s services has 
promoted and emphasized (particular versions of) ‘leadership’ in practice.       
 
What is brought into relation for the purposes of this thesis assemblage (production) 
are the following - these are the particular choices (cuts) I made in relation to a 
range of possibilities (and that also reflect a direction of travel, or folding in, through 
thesis chapters):    
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 A critical social policy territory of ‘social identity’; 
 Actual developments in children’s services in England - policy and practice 
arrangements unfolding between the Climbié Inquiry (Laming, 2003) and new 
arrangements under the Coalition government (from 2010);   
 Research in practice formulations about social professional selfhood, and the 
conceptual territory of an intensifying neo-liberalism and austerity; 
 Interview ‘data’  from research conversations with social professionals; 
 A posthuman, theoretical territory; 
 (A researcher orientation to) affective and open-ended engagement 
 
It is these territories (which are themselves unstable and multiple, involving, for 
example, material elements such as new technologies) that are brought into 
connection in the thesis, as consequential, for the emergence of self.  I am interested 
in how these elements work together, what they do, and how they are productive of 
self.  A novel connection in the configuration is, here, the posthuman theoretical 
territory, and the potential this might bring for thinking and doing self differently. 
The assemblage that is both generated (made), and generative, might, after Mazzei 
(2013), perhaps be described thus: policy-practice-ideology-participants- theory-
researcher, where each of these relates to particular ‘cuts’ made, as described, and 
where all these elements are conceived as relational, multiple actors.  Each of the 
four chapters produced places an emphasis on different points and connections in 
the assemblage; in each, however, posthumanism is also called into play as a 
relational actor, to see what might be made or enacted.  The chapters function as 
relational, performative ‘set-ups’ that enable a relational, performative orientation 
(rather than the simple replication of liberal humanist subjects or ‘essences’, for 
example).  Here self can be more than self, beyond self.  Posthumanism becomes an 
ingredient in the assemblage, and a device for inquiry practices. 
 
The rhizomatic research assemblage delineated might lack specificity in terms of 
particular assemblages for particular individual managers or practitioners in 
particular practice settings in children’s services.  However, the research aim here is 
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broader, it is to map out a general territory - to examine the potential and possibility 
for a new thinking/being for social professionals.  In addition, in this initial mapping, 
a research examination seeks to align with the theoretical territory outlined, that is, 
to give weight to a variety of different things operating in relation in assemblage (the 
practices through which knowledge/the self is produced), rather than risk the 
possibility of over-emphasising and potentially (re)inscribing an individual 
‘experience’ and an individual subject.      
 
 
2.3.3 An experiment in effecting relations 
 
What matters in the assemblage is how it works, in the connections that are made in 
novel configurations, how they (affectively) intra-act, to produce (different) selves.   
In my posthumanist, performative research formulation, concern is directed less to 
the ‘interrogation’ of particular ‘sources’ (for example as pre-existing, that is, prior to 
the relation) and more to what they produce (as multiplicitous themselves), and how 
the elements in the assemblage work together, what they do to each other, how 
they work to enable knowledge (particular selves).  This can be described as a 
research practice invoking  an experiment in effecting relations between sometimes 
quite different, even juxtaposed, things, objects and ideas (for example, the liberal 
humanist subject versus the posthuman).   
 
An interest in ‘the relation’ is not to be not interested in any one object in an 
assemblage (though this is not about the accurate representation of singular, unified 
subjects and objects with essential qualities).  On the contrary, it is to be profoundly 
interested in what they can do, what they can make, how they affect in their 
intertwinings and co-productions, and that are consequential for selfhood.  The 
research ‘intervention’ is to make available different elements, including the 
posthuman, in connection, to provide opportunities for different or new 
formulations – becoming - where entities are dynamic, unstable, complex, and the 
relation precedes the object (and new possibilities) (Pickering, 1995).   
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Effecting relations in posthumanism is to adopt an open-ended and affective 
orientation.  It is somewhat risky since, rather than deploying a set of tied down and 
pre-defined techniques it is, rather, an opening to ‘the other’, to difference.  For the 
researcher it insists on one’s own (commitment to) engagement, curiosity, and 
becoming-of-own-self as it, too, relates and intermingles with others in a way that 
will produce effects.  In her reading of Deleuze and Guattari, Tamsin Lorraine writes 
of the use of “intuitive insight” (2011, p.82) and as involving “attunement with 
fleeting intensities and affects in sensation and thought” (ibid.).  Not dissimilarly, 
Pedwell discusses and reworks empathy and “the possibility of embodied 
relationality and connection it offers” (2014, p.190, emphasis in original).  These 
affective elements capture something of my own bearing, orientation or stance to, 
and with, the ‘research materials’ (the different parts of the assemblage).  This is a 
specific interpretive stance that defies, or tries to sidestep, the conventions and 
impermeability of social borders, to feel flows, intensities and affects.  All this is a 
reference to the quality of ‘dialogue’, intra-action, communication, connections that 
I attempted to utilize to work with (apparently) oppositional ideas and things.  It is 
an attempt to move both with and beyond (the categories of) left-right binaries (and 
other dualisms) even while acknowledging the poverty of neo-liberalism and the 
‘failures’ of alternatives, and in line with a Deleuzian ‘spirit’.   
      
This “affirmative relationality” is drawn philosophically from Bergson who suggested 
that “the difficulties of ordinary dualism come, not from the distinction of the two 
terms, but from the impossibility of seeing how the one is grafted upon the other.” 
(1869, cited in Dolphijn and van der Tuin, 2012, p.121).   Deleuze and Guattari’s take 
on this is that “related terms belong to one another” (Deleuze, 1994/1968, p.30) 
emphasizing how one thing cannot exist in the same way without its other, and 
echoing a Spinozan monism.   What is therefore required is an affirmation or 
acknowledgement of belonging, in order to be able to move forwards.  It is not that 
dualisms (certainly as representational entities) do not exist, the point is to 
acknowledge and work these, and work these in ways that are structured by 
positivity rather than negativity.    
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Similarly influential in an orientation towards my research materials and in seeking 
to move with, and beyond, what might be termed traditional critique (as linked to 
critical theoretical perspectives), Sedgwick’s ideas of ‘reparative reading’ (versus 
‘paranoid reading’) inform my reading-writing-thinking and in co-constitutive 
relation with the possibilities of the rhizome/assemblage – in how I have 
thought/done it.  The idea of ‘reparative critique’ comes from Sedgwick’s strikingly 
titled ‘You’re so paranoid you probably think this introduction is about you’ (2003).  
She articulates ‘paranoid reading’ as that framing and infusing traditional critique.  
She describes it thus: 
 
Paranoia is anticipatory 
Paranoia is reflexive and mimetic 
Paranoia is a strong theory 
Paranoia is a theory of negative affects 
Paranoia places its faith in exposure 
(Sedgwick 1997, p.9) 
  
In her discussion she goes on to debunk each of these in turn and argue for an 
alternative.  For example, paranoid reading, she argues, is fuelled by a self-
confirming sense that one is making a triumphant advance towards truth and 
vindication - but truth and vindication are rare in commodified, neo-liberal, control 
societies; on the other hand, the reparative reader cultivates ‘weak theory’ with joy 
in the self-confirming nature of the affects.  Sedgwick argues, then, that our 
engagement should be reparative: 
…in which we imagine potential futures, new histories, and novel uses for 
objects or information that might otherwise be hostile to our own subjective 
purposes and identities  
(McGuire, 2013, p.141-2). 
 
In similar vein, Lather (2008) captures this move away from a traditional critical 
theoretical mode to a reparative critique that “shakes out the impacted and 
overdetermined” (p.222) and involves: 
….practices of critique that assemble and confer plenitude on something that 
can then ‘give back’ toward nurturing resistant culture in a way that helps 
save oneself by extracting sustenance from a culture not very interested in 
one’s sustenance.     (Lather, 2008, p.222) 
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In other words, this is a call to think otherwise, through and with and beyond 
dominant meanings, bringing a surplus to bear (an excess), for reworkings that might 
be productive; it accepts as given that the ‘old’ critical theoretical formulations stand 
already.  Likewise, Watson (2009) utilises the Baroque, calling up the ontology of the 
fold and the epistemology of the Wunderkammer “in which knowledge arises in the 
juxtaposition and connection of things, and is intimately connected to wonder” (p.3).  
And, Barad suggests we employ diffractive practices of reading – her image is of 
waves overlapping as they break between rocks - modes of attention which are not 
motivated by the hermeneutics of suspicion, but are rather suggestive, creative and 
visionary (see O’Rourke, 2013).  This is close to Nietsche’s concentration on amor fati 
(love of fate).  It “requires us to love a potentially repellent object….and this in the 
knowledge that our love will not modify our fate” (cited in Han-Pile, 2013, p.224).   
Braidotti contributes:  
This is why I defend the idea of amor fati as a way of accepting vital processes 
and the expressive intensity of a Life we share with multiple others, here and 
now  
(Braidotti, 2013, p.190).   
 
The idea of reparative critique, then, suggests something about the ethical quality of 
the connections in rhizome/assemblage, and in their writing; to find a way into 
association (rather than repulsion) – to live/be/deal with difference in ways that 
produce newness . 
 
2.3.4 Interviews 
 
I conducted eight interviews as part of my research, with social professionals (senior 
practitioners and managers) in children’s services.  Earlier I explained how the 
interviews were part of an early gathering, as I worked towards delineation of a 
research assemblage.  The decision to utilise interview material in the thesis was one 
of the key ‘agential cuts’ I made for a research assembling (see section 2.3.2).        
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Research ‘participants’ were (variably) known to me; all had some kind of connection 
with (children’s services) continuing professional development activities at the small 
university where I worked, whether as a former student, as a ‘supervisor’ of students 
on professionally-qualifying courses, or as someone sitting on a Professional 
Advisory Group in my university.  A spread across organizational settings and sectors 
was deliberately selected, not so much to ensure alignment with theoretical 
sampling methods (though this was the case) and therefore greater validity, but to 
secure the possibility of a greater number of connections across sectors in children’s 
services, ‘the sample’ was purposive in this respect.  Participant descriptors are in 
Table 2, below. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Interview participant descriptors 
 
 Service setting Sector Role 
1 Health services Statutory Manager/senior 
practitioner 
2 Health services Statutory Senior practitioner 
3 Social work/care Social enterprise Chief Executive 
4 Social work/care Third (voluntary) 
sector 
Chief Executive 
5 Youth and community Public/private 
partnership 
Senior practitioner 
6 Youth and community Third (voluntary) 
sector 
Manager/senior 
practitioner 
7 Education support Statutory Manager 
8 Education support Statutory Manager 
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It should be noted that Table 2 gives only descriptors, that may be misleading or 
problematic in some ways.   They do not capture the complexity, both of the settings 
and sectors involved, nor of the complexity of movements by participants (nor their 
potential ‘identifications’) in and out of sectors and settings (and cross sectors and 
settings).  For several this had involved relatively recent moves, due to significant 
numbers of changes in children’s services organisations being implemented as part 
of public sector cuts and a changed orientation to children’s services by the Coalition 
government in England.  For example, participant 4 had up until less than a year 
before the interview, been employed in a statutory, multi-agency children’s services 
setting - the descriptors imply static categories, when these are arguably anything 
but, and static/stable ‘categories’ are, of course, problematic in a posthuman 
research orientation. 
 
The argument in conventional qualitative inquiry is that the structures (or strictures) 
and methodological rules followed for ‘interviewing’ make those engagements 
different (they contribute to something called objectivity and validity).  In 
posthumanist becomings and entanglement, all connections are part of the 
enactment (a real) and they cannot be separated out by the application of such 
‘rules’ into a field of reality (what we ask, what our ‘participants’ tell us), a field of 
representation (research presentations constructed after the ‘interview’) and a field 
of subjectivity (of participants and researcher) .  Voice, in the traditional sense 
“emanating from a unique, essentialist subject conscious to itself” (Mazzei, 2013, 
p.733) is no longer present, experience is distributed and “exceed[s] the traditional 
notion of the individual” (Barad, 2007, p.23) of humanist qualitative inquiry; this is a 
move away from the traditional centering of the subject (and their 
voice/experience).  Voice, then, does not emanate from an individual person but is 
part of a milieu, and one of multiple connectives.   Words spoken by participants are 
part of a mutually constituting production (and also potential triggers to new 
connections/assemblages, or Deleuzian ‘lines of flight’) (Mazzei, 2013).   
 
The eight interviews were secured via ethical clearance and informed participant 
consent; interviews were taped and transcribed, and ‘data’ stored confidentially, and 
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so on.  Research conversations lasted between an hour and 90 minutes and took 
place anywhere the ‘participant’ felt comfortable and that was convenient for them - 
one was in a hotel, one in a café, two at participant’s homes, two in my university 
office, and two in participant’s offices.      
 
The ethical basis of ‘interviewing’ here has, however, some different concerns from 
more conventional approaches.  Here, ethics does not emanate from an overarching 
system of prior rules which Hickey-Moody and Malins suggest “work to close off and 
limit the potentiality of a situation, foreclosing its future” (2007, cited in Coleman 
and Ringrose, 2013, p.11).  My interviews were only very loosely structured, they are 
productive encounters and I simply set in train the process without knowing what 
might result .  In a loose structuring (and in the expectation of my ‘participants’ to do 
some structuring), I made some ‘agential cuts’  (Barad, 2007) in the process of 
interviewing.  These decisions, as part of my intra-action in the process, serve to 
exclude or include particular intra-active possibilities in the moment of the 
conversation, although “not as an agent in full control of outcomes and becomings” 
(Barad, 2007, p.178) .   I, too, was being made in the doing of the conversation, as 
“part of the larger material arrangement of which ‘we’ are a part” (ibid. p.178).  
Here, ethics are in-the-moment, situated, involving a responsiveness to ‘the other’ 
not as a “radical outside to the self” (Barad, 2007, p.178) but in entanglement and 
co-constitution, a responsibility of “having-the-other-in-one’s-skin” (Ziarek, 2001, 
p.55); this is “an immanent forms of ethics aligned with my performative, relational 
posthuman research approach.  This is one which “resides within….matter and 
practice, and which seeks to evaluate relations as they emerge” (Hickey-Moody and 
Malins, 2007, cited in Coleman and Ringrose, 2013, p.11).  St Pierre describes these 
kind of ethics as “invented within each relation as researcher and respondent 
negotiate sense-making” (1997, p.186).   
 
The early-ness of the interviews was largely an intuitive move, an open-ness to 
possibilities.  This meant conversations were (intentionally) not proceeding from a 
fully developed and ‘worked out’ theoretical ‘frame’ (more in a spirit of curiosity and 
interest); nor could ‘participants’ be asked to answer questions that were 
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formulated later from (came out of, or were produced in) my research.  In more 
conventional terms, the tentative or provisional nature of these have an advantage 
of potentially reducing ‘bias’, simply opening up a territory.  Connected to this, all 
kinds of possibilities and directions might have been possible, in opening up a 
territory.  The interviews were, however, theoretically informed, not only from a 
lengthy history from which I cannot disentangle myself and that informed the 
responses I made in conversation with participants, but more explicitly by an 
Arendtian notion of a non-sovereign self and ‘appearance’ (from some early 
reading).   
 
Loosely structured, conversations proceeded from three question areas: 
 
 Their working life, what they did, perhaps their background (if 
relevant), and role(s);  
 What they thought was happening in ‘practice’ and what it’s been like 
for them in the last few years; and,  
 To what extent their sense of self (in practice) was important, why, 
and what supports and diminishes this?   
 
These open question areas were designed to open up space for discussion, for 
respondents to ‘step into’ or insert themselves, and to which I responded - these 
were conversations not simply question and answer sessions; in the remainder of the 
they are, indeed, called ‘research conversations’.   I was inviting both 
description/views, and them-selves and, by open questions, I was inviting a range of 
possibilities.  
 
As part of the third question area about sense of self, I did make a further (planned, 
explicit, less open) intervention, at an appropriate point in the discussion.  I asked all 
participants whether they ever thought of themselves being made in, and through, 
practice interactions with others, and also whether they ever thought of themselves 
as being part of democratic life, enacting democracy.   This drew on my early 
Arendtian reading of non-sovereign subjects, and as this relates to an everyday 
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democratic life.  Additionally, I also wanted to create in the interview a bit more of 
an encounter between me and the participant, to build on and develop an intra-
active conversation where I, too, was inserting substance, and inviting a response. 
This was a further alignment with my paradigmatic and methodological positioning 
and aimed to be generative and productive.  
 
I was selective in my use of research conversations, in accordance with the set up, 
and (assumptions behind the) my research questions.  The purpose was not to 
supply a ‘rich picture’ for example, though the research conversations did generate a 
rich ‘data source’, nor otherwise to thematise, categorise or code to, for example, 
extract kernels or elements of an essential ‘truth’.  My purpose was to bring 
participants’ (words) into relation with other parts of the research assemblage, as 
discussed, for producing, or generating, self/ves and novel possibilities.  My 
particular research questions already assumed there were existing prescriptions for 
self, and the possibility of something beyond.  It was within this frame, and also 
where I could delineate generative connections, that selections were made.  In 
conventional inquiry, this might be said to potentially constitute an interest or bias 
and I turn to this, and related issues, in the next section.   
 
 
2.3.5 The methodology as production 
In explicating an ontological and epistemological positioning, and my research 
‘devices’, this chapter makes a number of explicit and implicit claims.  I have already 
suggested that a posthuman orientation, by being concerned with the practices 
through which knowledge is produced already involves, in part, a concern with 
research rigour.  This is because it actively allows for the possibility of alternative or 
novel or unexpected productions, rather than being rooted in, and therefore likely to 
replicate, accepted structures (for self), and as divided from the world.  As Lather 
and St Pierre comment:  
The ethical charge of our work as inquirers is surely to question our 
attachments that keep us from thinking and living differently. …. [T]hinking 
differently changes being…. and that is the goal of the new ontology, the new 
inquiry after the ‘posts’ 
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      (Lather and St Pierre, 2013, p.631)   
 
Elsewhere, Patti Lather asserts what is ‘at stake’ in rejecting scientism11  in 
poststructural research, and that others have begun to label ‘post-qualitative’:    
…what is at stake when research is at stake is whether research can be a 
mode of thought that refuses to secure itself with the consolations of 
foundationalism and nostalgia for presence, the lost object of correct 
knowledge, the security of understanding.  This is a move out of the sort of 
‘devotional scientism’ that underwrites the Christian-capitalist-industrialist 
creed and toward what Nietzsche (1974) termed a ‘gay science’, a science 
based in the very splintering of the mechanisms of control and the resultant 
incredulity about salvation narratives of scientific progress, reason and the 
over-administered world.    (Lather, 2009, p.18) 
As part of this, Lather is critique-ing the (research) rescue discourses of ‘successor 
regimes’, including those of qualitative research seeking to “restore the good name 
of research with these ‘new’ and ‘better’ methods” (2009, p.18).  She is suggesting 
we think differently about ‘research’. 
 
In posthumanist becomings and entanglement, all connections are part of the 
enactment (the real) and they cannot be separated out by the application of ‘rules’ 
into a field of reality (what we ask, what our ‘participants’ tell us), a field of 
representation (research narratives constructed after the ‘interview’) and a field of 
subjectivity (of participants and researcher)12.  Voice, in the traditional sense 
“emanating from a unique, essentialist subject conscious to itself” (Mazzei, 2013, 
p.733) is no longer present, experience is distributed and “exceed[s] the traditional 
notion of the individual” (Barad, 2007, p.23) of humanist qualitative inquiry; this is 
certainly a move away from the traditional centering of the subject (and their 
voice/experience).   What this seeks is (an explicit mapping), not “the objectivity of 
                                                          
11
 Citing Hayek, Lather defines scientism as “not so much the actual practices of science as the infusion of the 
standard elements of scientific attitude into all aspects of the social world” (2009, p.17). 
12
 See Mazzei (2013), pp.733-736 and the original quotation from Deleuze and Guattari: “There is no longer a 
tripartite division between a field of reality (the world), a field of representation (the book) and a field of 
subjectivity (the author).  Rather, an assemblage establishes connections between certain multiplicities drawn 
from each of these orders.” (1987/1980, p.27). 
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things in themselves but for an objectivity of actualization and realization” (Dolphijn 
and van der Tuin, 2012, p.113). 
In a performative, relational onto-epistemology it is therefore necessary to address 
what happens, the processes through, and in, research, its emergence – even as it 
emerges together (in entanglement) and in its temporary, space/time-specific re-
presentation or re/de/construction – and to respond to the challenge of “where our 
research goes and what it does there” (St Pierre, 2000, p.27).  This chapter has 
provided a detailed paradigmatic rationale, and as this leads to the 
employment/deployment of a number of research devices, including the production 
of a (rhizomatic) research assemblage, mapping and cutting, effecting relations, and 
the use of interviews.   
What it might also be important to draw attention to is the the methodology as 
(re)production.  Thinking outside the conventional ‘categories’ of humanist research 
is necessarily difficult.  In a performative posthumanism there is necessarily, for 
example, no pre-existing ‘researcher’ so this chapter reflects both the process of 
‘setting down’ a methodology and the ‘becoming’ of/in/through research(er), an 
attempt at both “composing and performing” (Gough, 2006, p.xiii).  It has been 
articulated in the form laid down here, after the event, and exists (like the research 
itself) only as a temporary, even momentary, ‘fix’.     
   
So, this is a particular and temporary (re)capture of research activity, happenings 
and processes – the methodological (becoming-research(er)) basis and organization 
of the research – which was not (could not be) there in planning or pre-figuration. 
How can this be ‘tested’, or held up to a light for the purpose of asking whether this 
is an ‘accurate representation’?  This can probably only be done via a logic of the 
temporality of this space, its inherent instability, and a recognition that the past 
(what happened) is never incontrovertible or absolute.   What I have done is to 
(re)construct what happened in a situation where research aims, methodology and 
content largely emerged together, and continued emerging together, over time, as 
one/a multiplicity.  My methodological (re)creation must be the perspective from 
now, looking back, in which I have attempted to do justice to the research according 
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to a logical ordering and a building up of complications and detail to the scene, and 
the (new) understandings this might generate.            
 
This study actively engages in, and attempts to make a research ‘intervention’ by the 
introduction of a performative, relational, posthuman theoretical territory as part of 
an intra-acting assemblage.  This suggests a quite particular interest.  This active, 
interested, affective engagement with(in) a research assemblage runs somewhat 
counter to more orthodox ‘scientific’ methodologies.  In these, ‘interest’ (or bias) 
needs to be minimized in order to access a real or objective (existing) world; at the 
very least a reflexivity in relation to ‘biases’ is normally de rigeur.  It is regarded as at 
least partially possible, or desirable, to gain unmediated or ‘unencumbered’ access 
to an objective world.  When research is regarded as performative, however, it is 
premised on interaction, nothing can be produced without interaction, without 
involvement we can get nothing, or at least nothing that can be articulated in a 
meaningful, full way. (Latour, 2004).  The devices, representations, theories and so 
on that we use are (knowledge-making) practices through which we cultivate and 
actualize engagement in the world and with others.  If they are understood as 
practices, then practices can be changed.  This means an active attention to the 
mode and operation of ‘practices’ is required, in order that they might be revised as 
necessary.   This, therefore, becomes less about taking care not to impose 
preconceptions, and more about engaging actively with our devices and practices 
with, as we research (and our assumptions and partiality of what is being produced, 
as we move through/with it).  
 
  
2.4 PROGRESSIONS  
 
Mine is an attempt to examine the selfhood of social professionals in children’s 
services in an interested, performative manner.  I endeavor this by way of bringing 
into relation, and working, a novel assemblage, which introduces posthumanism into 
the mix.  The four chapters that follow are productions, that is, they attempt to work 
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as actualizations, as within the parameters laid out in chapters One and Two, and 
they do, and are productive of, different things. 
 
Chapter Three examines critical social policy representations of selfhood via the 
concept of ‘social identity’ as a dominant mode of being/knowing, for practice, and 
also brings into relation a posthumanist orientation to explore these conditions and 
circumstances for self in assemblage.  So, the chapter examines the work that social 
identity (in its various forms) performs  for social policy and how it desires to affect 
and effect self-productions.   
 
Chapter Four examines the aftermath of the Victoria Climbié Inquiry Report (Laming, 
2003) and the new policy and practice arrangements that unfolded (in their do-ings) 
for children’s services in England and what these predicate for social professional 
selfhood, to secure it to its project.   This chapter brings in to play some research 
participant voices as these interact with the emergent narrative.  There is also an 
examination of some of the artefacts (materials) of children’s services (notably new 
technologies and systems) and as these, too, interact with, and produce, social 
professional selfhood. 
 
Chapter Five brings together a performative, posthuman theoretical territory, 
participants, and aspects of research and practice in children’s services.  It looks at 
representational and performative understanding in children’s services research, 
where the former is concerned with ‘impacts’ (and largely works to remove self from 
the equation) and the latter with ‘productions’ and emergence of self in action.  The 
constraints on self and how an expansive selfhood is lost in intensifications in neo-
liberalism and austerity, also emerges. 
 
Chapter Six brings a posthuman theoretical territory in relation with my interview 
data to see what might be produced.  This draws attention to the conditions and 
circumstances that shape productions of self and as self emerges in entangled ways,   
in re-presentations,  Posthumanism is used as a ‘lever’ to help see, and think, selves 
which might lie beyond re-productions of the humanist subject, in appearance.    
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     C h a p t e r   3 
 
SELF AND SOCIAL POLICY 
The limits to selfhood in critical social policy analysis; effecting a new relation 
 
 
A concept is a brick.  It can be used to build the courthouse of Reason.  Or it can be thrown 
through the window. 
(Massumi, in Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980, p.xii) 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
The posthuman subject is dispersed, not settled into itself, or divided up from other 
things in the world, it emerges with them in shifting patterns. This directs us to the 
practices of self and also to the circumstances and conditions (that are themselves 
not stable or unchanging) that are part of self-making.  
 
This chapter directs attention to (the field of) social policy (and in particular, critical 
social policy) as marking out trajectories as to how we understand (and do) self – its 
particular discursive landscape is part of the emergence of selfhood, involving 
particular conditions or circumstances.  This discursive landscape constrains and 
enables what can be, said, and done.  The chapter examines the ‘work’ that social 
policy does as part of an assemblage for, and the constitution of, selfhood.  I argue 
that the work  it does presupposes and involves both a humanist subject and a 
selfhood intertwined with social identities.  This predicates the naming of (our)selves 
according to a number of particular categories, as well as an associated and 
particular kind of politics for self.  My way into the debates considers the disciplinary 
territory of (critical) social policy and moves via an examination of a series of articles 
in key, mainstream social policy journals that focus specifically on the significance of 
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social identity for social policy.  The chapter acts as both a (re)presentation and 
critique of social identity and brings into play insights from posthumanism suggestive 
of different (re)productions of selfhood.  Making available posthumanist 
formulations as an additional connection in an assemblage for self is to provide 
leverage, to intervene, in the conditions through which self is produced, to glimpse 
what might happen in effecting a new relation.  
 
An ‘ontological turn’ has, of course, become very significant across the social 
sciences and humanities – in her recent (2013) book on The Posthuman, for example, 
Rosi Braidotti takes on ‘the Humanities’ as a whole and its problematic human-
being-at-its-centre (as even the name explicitly acknowledges), ultimately arguing 
they need to “mutate” (p.147) into “multiple posthuman futures” (p.150).  My 
ambition here is much more modest – I want to look particularly at the dependence 
in critical social policy, on (categories of) social identity, and what this does (and 
does not do) in terms of the constitution of the selfhood of professionals.  The 
quotation above gives something of a flavour – social identity is a concept from 
which much can be built and, it has indeed, come to prove something of an 
indispensable building block in critical social policy.  At the same time, Brian 
Massumi suggests that concepts are acts and have no subject or object apart from 
themselves – what matters is what they do, their circumstances and, here, how they 
work to open up or foreclose.  
 
The territory of social policy as a field of study is, of course, highly appropriate for 
moving onto a discussion of actual (children’s services) policy and practice (they are 
connected) but it does bracket or disconnect a lot, including multiple other social 
theoretical and psychological starting points for an account of self.  These are 
therefore shifted into the what-is-not-told at this point.  One can argue that this is 
simply practical, anything else would be beyond the scope.  That may be so, but I am 
making a particular ‘agential cut’ here - the nature of the demarcation made is of 
significance - there is a methodological (as well as a practical) rationale here.  Social 
policy does not (and cannot) operate separately from its own multiple 
(discursive/material) entanglements in relation, for example, with the dynamics and 
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operation of power, politics, events and so on (including this researcher, and other 
‘disciplines’).  In a rhizomatic, flattened mapping mine is a demarcation of what 
social policy (via particular notions of social identity) ‘brings to the table’ in its 
working.  An ‘agential cut’ (Barad, 2007), as outlined in the previous chapter, 
involves a significant boundary-making practice, a (temporary) delineation or 
enactment that separates out something  from (within) a phenomenon (an 
entanglement/enactment - in this case self/children’s services) in order to gain 
knowledge about it.  This is, specifically not, a Cartesian subject/object move where 
‘I’ examine ‘social policy’ because this is already entangled – phenomena are 
“relations without pre-existing relata” (Barad, 2007, p.139).  In her posthumanist 
rendering, what Barad argues is that an agential cut is part of the phenomenon itself, 
that is, it does not pre-exist its doing, the ‘observer’ is not a priori to knowledge of 
the phenomenon.  This moves against what are traditionally separate and 
dichotomized domains of being/knowing (and researching).  This is intra-activity as 
part of a rhizomatic/reparative creation-in-action (in the writing), which is an 
alternative ontological positioning, or condition: 
Reality is composed not of things-in-themselves, or of things-behind-
phenomena, but of things-in-phenomena” and “relata-within-phenomena 
emerge through specific intra-actions”  
            (Barad, 2007, p.140) 
 
This might suggest a way of reading this chapter’s movement-mapping-connections-
temporality-creation (and becoming), rather than a reading that thinks it bounded 
and settled, discrete in itself, and ‘objective’ analysis and evaluation. 
 
What I am suggesting, then, is that the social policy field, inasmuch as it is concerned 
with selfhood, has come to be dominated by a focus on this as primarily concerning 
one’s particular ‘social identity’.  Here one links oneself (or is linked) to particular 
named/pre-defined groups or categories and this creates particular striations or 
grooves that tell us something about how we can be/act.  ‘Social identity’ in the field 
of social policy adheres to, and endorses, the humanist subject.  Further, social 
policy appears to rely on social identity(ies) as not only a basic unit of analysis but 
also as a way of understanding what politics is and how it can happen – social 
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identity is a condition, or mediator for, political action, without which critical 
‘political action’ seems not very possible.  Selfhood not linked to particular social 
identities is somewhat ‘relegated’ in social policy, to the less- or non-political (or 
purely psychological), and/or sometimes the abstract and theoretical13.  In addition, 
social policy is selective and particular in the social identities it assigns/responds to 
(creates and reflects) – for example, ‘users’ appear to be (able to be) one set of 
things, and workers quite another.  There is an echo here of Celia Kitzinger’s insight 
at the beginning of my Introduction: “identity….is what you can say you are 
according to what they say you can be” (1989, p.82).  In deploying its (differential) 
‘social identity/ies’ narrative and striated patterning for self, there is significance for 
exploring and expanding (or not) spaces for the (critical) selfhood of social 
professionals that might not fit these patterns. In developing the lines of thought the 
possibilities (or not) for a differently produced selfhood are a primary concern in my 
research.  This is less a focus on what social identity is, more one on what it does, 
and how useful it is (or not), and for political effects.  In part, then, this is a working-
towards examining the conditions that allow for the disciplinary constitution of (self 
as) social identity in social policy.  My intention is therefore not so much to advance 
or attempt to resolve the specific theoretical arguments beyond those existing, but 
de/re/construction - to examine the demarcations and limits of social identity (in 
critical social policy), and to suggest a shift of focus beyond these limits, that might 
be effected by the introduction of the posthuman, in relation.  The posthuman 
subject (in relation with the humanist) in social policy is destabilising, and begins to 
prise apart the ties that bind social policy with social identity, to defamiliarise in 
terms of what we know and can be. 
 
3.2 SOCIAL POLICY TOWARDS ‘THE POSTMODERN’ 
 
A disciplinary territory of social policy throws light on what might be more or less 
possible (for self) in an ‘assemblage’ because “substantive topics are…given shape in 
the disciplines” (McCall, 2005, p.1784).  That is, social policy as a field of study is part 
                                                          
13
 Abstract/theoretical accounts are, of course, particularly evident where social policy formulations overlap 
with  sociological/social theoretical concerns and orientations, rather than with the applied/practical. 
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of the assemblage, it already ‘acts’, and is productive, of self, and this has a number 
of strands.  
 
Social policy as study is intrinsically linked to political action in ‘the real world’ - 
whilst its draws upon ideas and methods from interlinked ‘social sciences’14  its own 
emergence at the end of the nineteenth/early twentieth century was connected to 
the actual promotion of social reform as well as to the study of its effects (Alcock, 
2012).  This is part of its appeal as, in addition to my own (theoretical-
methodological) – relational, performative - stance, social policy is a field of study 
that, likewise, builds in engagement with ‘the real’, with practice, with what 
happens.  Social policy’s social administrative and empirically-based history includes, 
famously, Charles Booth’s ‘poverty map’ of London in 1889 and, in the same year, 
Seebohm Rowntree’s first study of poverty that was conducted in York and 
published as Poverty: a study of town life (Glennerster et al, 2004).  These were 
drawn on widely in actual social campaigning through organisations such as The 
Fabian Society and linked to the emerging Labour Party, and a class – left-right - 
politics.  Such empirical work, and associated political campaigns can also be 
associated with the emergence of ‘the big five’ in British post-war welfare history: 
social insurance; health; education; housing; and social services; this locates social 
policy as connected to practical concerns and ways of organising in the world and, in 
particular, as founded in attention to (class) inequalities.   
 
This post-war welfare settlement in Britain was predicated on a belief in 
universalism, that the welfare state could be a mitigation in the face of the ‘hard 
edges’, and the risks that all faced, in capitalism.  It enshrined a ‘bureau-
professionalism’ which suggested particular social relations for welfare, and where 
occupational identities were bound up with organisational structures and cultures  
(Newman and Clarke 1994).  That is, the impartial administration of welfare goods 
via a cadre of experts within a public service ethos is suggestive of a selfhood of 
                                                          
14 There is considerable debate about the status of social policy as a discipline, with some seeing it as a sub-
discipline of sociology and many seeing it at least in conjunction with, or overlapping, several other social 
sciences, that is, as an interdisciplinary field (see Erskine 2003; also Alcock, 2012). 
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professionals within this frame – one benignly dispensing diagnoses or judgements 
and services (on behalf of the national family) based on valued, specialised 
knowledge.  Therefore attendant sets of welfare ‘users’ are passive and dependent 
in this frame (Hughes, 1998) as professionals go about their important business.  
 
Later, this gave way to the emergence of what has been termed a critical social 
policy after the fracturing of the so-called (Keynesian) ‘post-war welfare consensus’ 
alongside global economic crisis (in the early 70s) and challenges to the nation state, 
the ‘re-discovery of poverty’, demographic change, and the rise of new social 
movements (from the 60s onwards).  No longer was it adequate to reform and refine 
what existed (within a dominant social democratic frame15): the ideological basis of 
welfare policy and practice, its ‘false universalism’ and modes of organizing - 
“mass/universal, state provided, bureaucratically run, and professionally-delivered” 
(Williams, 1999, p.669) were ‘surfaced’.  These elements in welfare organisation and 
delivery came under sustained and productive critique, notably by feminists and, 
gradually, via the critiques of others in emerging new social movements.  These 
critiques can be linked to largely left-wing (but not necessarily class-based, or at least 
not reducible to class) articulations and assertions of active welfare subjects 
organizing (on the basis of their collective experience and social identities) in an 
expanded democratic organization of welfare.  No longer were users of welfare to be 
passive and dependent, they were to be active in defining their own needs, in 
organising, and in demanding recognition and redistribution (Fraser and Honneth, 
2003) along multiple axes - of class, race, gender, disability and so on.  The challenge 
to social policy analysts/theorists, then, was to produce work that could account for 
and incorporate these myriad ‘grassroots’ activist perspectives. 
 
However, critique did not only emerge from those organizing on the basis of 
inequalities of gender, race, disability, sexuality and age (and, later, from a myriad of 
‘user’ groups); a different kind of analysis emerged from a newly articulated 
                                                          
15
 Of course, ‘social democracy’ is a broad church: the post-war period to the 70s was, however, one where 
both main political parties in England sought to utilise social policy as ameliorating the ‘rough edges’ of 
capitalism in a mixed economy of welfare and as, broadly, ‘a good thing’.   
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neoliberalism, and was linked to the rise of the New Right.  This involved a  
consumerisation and individualization of the welfare subject in a neoliberal-capitalist 
economic mode, and for only a residual welfare state.    The challenge to social policy 
analysts/theorists, then, was to produce work that could account for and incorporate  
myriad ‘grassroots’ activist perspectives alongside neo-liberalising policy that posited 
not collective responsibility and solutions, but individual ones.  To what extent could 
the “the progressive critiques….developed from the new forms of political 
collectivities on the left” (Williams, 1999, p.669) and their (re)constitution of the 
active welfare subject be harnessed, and possibly (re)shape the policy landscape?   
 
For those social policy theorists ‘on the left’ the new social (and cultural) identities 
(of feminism, anti-racism, lesbian and gay activism, and the disabled people’s 
movement) were a challenge to traditional class-based (neo)Marxist and political 
economy accounts and their associated ‘metanarratives’ (Lyotard, 1984).  What were 
new identities were seen as fragmenting and fracturing possibilities for class-based 
action.  This idea of what is ‘real’ social reform in the existing critical social policy 
(the weakening or overthrow of capitalism) increased a resistance to (broadly) 
postmodernism as a condition of contemporary life (Fitzpatrick, 2012).  So, whilst 
wider social theoretical explorations mushroomed to examine and explain new 
identities and their impact in welfare, these were not (at least initially) taken up 
widely in social policy – Fitzpatrick summarises: “By the time social policy took an 
interest in postmodernism, the latter had already nurtured the intellectual soil upon 
which the former depended” (2012, p.97).  
 
Perhaps more than for other social sciences (or at least in particular ways), social 
policy’s ambivalence towards emergent identities and new forms of collective 
organising  meant, at best, a zig-zagging towards the postmodern embrace in the 
face of orientations which worked to defend ‘class politics’ against the so-called 
relativism  (Hunter, 2003) and depoliticizing effects, of ‘identity politics’ .  After all, if 
one was to embrace weakened class identities (in the name of being a woman, 
disabled or black for example), was this not also to play into the hands of (global) 
forces promoting neo-liberal agendas?     
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Part of the problem for a largely applied social science like social policy also appears 
to have been particular poststructuralist discursive ‘(dis)appearances’ where no 
‘stable base’ beyond a play of language appeared to disavow real people going about 
real lives.  For a ‘discipline’ so integrally founded on, and concerned with, real lives 
and progressive political action (defined largely in class terms), the perceived 
linguistic reductions of the poststructural (which, by no means, stood for all the 
possibilities opened up) were therefore problematic, “representing the capitulation 
to cultural criticism in place of analysis of the material roots of oppression” (Heyes, 
2012, n.p.).   
 
However, postmodern explorations that are seen to be less dependent upon what 
are coined as linguistic reductions (for example, Foucauldian power/knowledge) 
have come to have considerable purchase within academic social policy literature – 
that is, solutions have been sought that can be seen as “compatible with the 
redistributive aims of social policy” (Hunter, 2003, p.325).  In addition, ‘late 
modernity’ theorists (at least influenced by postmodernism’s challenges) such as 
Beck’s ‘risk society’ (1992) and the work of Anthony Giddens, have come to be 
influential, and notably so for what was the New Labour project.   
 
However, it is arguably ‘activism’, and the new identities that were forged, that have 
been extremely influential in this period for (the study of) social policy in the 
postmodern.  Catherine McDonald (2007) suggests that the rise of ‘service user 
movements’ have brought both the most destabilising, but also the most interesting, 
set of challenges to social policy and its scholarship.  Fiona Williams argues that the 
“political energies in civil society” via the activities of social movement and (welfare) 
user groups have provided “as profound a political critique of the post-war welfare 
state as those from the New Right and New Labour” (Williams, 1999, p.668).  There 
are also the lively social theoretical debates between Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth 
(2003), partly drawing on the work of the moral philosopher Charles Taylor, about 
‘redistribution’ versus ‘recognition’ (that might be termed socio-economic and 
social-cultural aspects of injustice respectively) – these are applied in some social 
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policy/welfare analyses16 and are testament to the import of the debates and the 
significance of moving beyond strictly structuralist/neo-Marxist perspectives.   
This is where ‘social identity’ enters the picture as central, as linked to (political) 
categories, and as an analytical tool.   
 
Social policy has spawned a variety of possible identifications, though not without 
contention, that variously provide possibiIities or constraints for the emergence of 
(something called) self.  This is to be working on the ‘structure-discourse-agency’ 
boundary.  It also draws our attention to the extent to which identification is forged 
via collective internal definition or produced via structural and/or (Foucauldian) 
disciplinary/governmental power (Jenkins, 2014; Rose, 1989; Rose et al, 2006).  
Policy discourses both “define all sorts of….identities” and are “deeply implicated in 
creating and sustaining both positively and negatively valued identities” (McDonald, 
2007, p.1) – here is our ‘surveillance’ axis, with which social policy is tied up.  
Likewise, in academic (and professional) social policy, categorizations (and/or 
collective identifications) are the stock-in-trade of its social science - “vital building 
blocks in the conceptual frameworks of sociology and social anthropology…Without 
some ways of talking about them, we can’t think sociologically about anything” 
(Jenkins, 2014, p.105).  Alternatively, new sources of activism can be seen as 
generative of (a diversification of) social identities, that name a shared experience 
and expertise for, and in, their own image.    Here, “social identity therefore takes on 
the form of a mediating concept useful to explaining aspects of state structures and 
subject’s agency” (Hunter, 2003, p325-6; see also Hall, 1996).  We can talk, then, 
about the extent to which people – via categorizations or espoused social identities - 
are positioned as objects or subjects (Williams’ active welfare subjects) in our social 
policy analyses, in surveillance or appearance.    
 
But I am not sure of all of this.  I  cannot disavow the collective energies, liberatory 
instincts, and diverse/multiple achievements of at least five decades of social 
movements and user groups in welfare (locally, nationally and globally) who have 
                                                          
16
 In social work, aspects of the debate have been exercised via the British Journal of Social Work, notably 
Houston (2008,2009), Garrett (2010) and Webb (2010). 
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organised around ‘identity’ whether this is black and minority ethnic groups, women, 
disabled people, lesbians and gay men, and others (including intersectional identities 
such as black women) and that, as McNay notes (and I agree), are founded in 
“deeply felt injuries of misrecognition” (2010, p.512).  And I have long since moved 
on (if I was ever there) from concerns about ‘revisionism’ or the weakening of class 
analysis.  But, over several years, I have found myself increasingly (at least trying to) 
resist the categorizations/identifications per se (and the language that comes along), 
and that purport to do, well, lots of things, like organize (my) experience and name 
(my-)self in a kind of shorthand, and that also confer a political self-sense (related to 
something called ‘identity’) and linked to (actual or perceived) group interests of 
which I am (or am perceived to be) a part.  They also help to ‘produce’ or ‘lever’ 
particular emergences of self in the social professionals I work with, secured in their 
parameters, and the social identities deployed routinely in, and by, those I teach, 
have raised questions, and troubled me in a variety of ways.  These are not just 
about the classical critiques of essentialism, and the reification or ‘fixing’ of group 
identities/difference that comes with (a categorizing) identity politics (and even, to 
some extent, with simply ‘naming’), where these operate as a kind of foreclosure17.  
A new-wariness is, likewise, not just because of a commodification of identities in 
neo-liberalism specifically or, in more general terms, because of disciplinary/control 
features in society, that commodify or (ab)use active collective identities for 
different purposes.  For example, as I finalise this chapter, one of the (perfect 
storm?) aspects of the recent ‘Trojan Horse’ OFSTED ‘investigation’ into some 
Birmingham schools involved the signifier ‘Muslim community’ and I am aware of 
what this is (or can be) made to mean/produce in particular events/discourses18 (of 
the dominant).   
 
My concerns are, only in part, all of the above but, I think, more than this - they are 
about ‘identity’ itself, as an attachment to a kind-of abstraction, and identity as 
                                                          
17
 Very good reviews of ‘identity politics’ for sociology and philosophy respectively, are provided by Bernstein 
(2005) and Heyes (2012). 
18
 For example, where ‘extremism’ can be so easily attached to one pole and not another.  This 
commodification point also reminds me of the latter-day apparent formal ‘embrace’ of ‘the gay community’ in 
the UK via that most traditional of institutions - marriage. 
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having an “inbuilt logic of recognition of sameness and dualistic relocation of 
otherness” (Braidotti, 2005, n.p.), and identity as the mediator of political action, and 
(here) with (the study of) social policy as its handmaiden.  The questions have arisen, 
as explained, in relation to whether class is the main organising category, and the 
extent to which this is opened up by a proliferation of other identities.  In 
posthumanism the categories themselves are under examination.  This is about what 
is lost in ‘social identity’ formulations and the limits that they prescribe - for both 
‘selfhood’ and for ‘politics’.  In being caught up in uncertain and ambivalent shifts to 
postmodern formulations (or not), and focusing on how to resolve the tensions (both 
for social change and for social policy analysis), the terms of the debate have, 
nonetheless, remained the same.   Social policy tells a particular ‘story’ – selfhood 
here reproduces and reiterates the humanist subject via its categorisations; other 
(different) possibilities are lost in its tightening grip.  I want to explain this via a more 
detailed consideration of the key social policy/social identity debates and the issues 
these raise, and then move to outlining different possible formulations.     
  
3.3 CATEGORICAL, ONTOLOGICAL AND RELATIONAL SOCIAL IDENTITIES 
 
The direction of travel in developing conceptualisations about social identity in social 
policy can be traced through ‘categorical’, ‘ontological’ and ‘relational’ analyses19.   
 
In his influential article in the Journal of Social Policy, David Taylor (1998) examines 
the concept of social identity for social policy in the context of postmodern shifts; his 
                                                          
19
 ‘Intersectional’ analyses could also be added here – and they are important – but they emerge via different 
avenues, rather than strictly via a (critical) social policy (though this draws upon insights of intersectionality so 
critical social policy approaches and intersectionality are far from mutually exclusive).  Intersectionality is 
about understanding, and theorizing, multiple, simultaneous social inequalities, such as gender and ethnicity 
(see, for example, Crenshaw, 1991, McCall, 2005, Walby 2007) where simply ‘adding up’ the inequalities is 
seen as inadequate because of their mutual constitution – they change each other.  ‘Intersectionality’ as a 
concept is seen as avoiding some of the essentialism that might be associated with a notion of ‘identity 
politics’),  In promoting intersectional theorising Walby writes, for example, “the major alternative theorisation 
within postmodern paradigm has a tendency to fragmentation and to micro or cultural reductionism especially 
in the use of the concept of identity” (p.450).  Puar (2013) notes that “Numerous theorists consider 
intersectionality the dominant paradigm through which feminist theory has analysed difference” (p.49) and as 
“a feminist intervention to disrupt whiteness” (p.52) but she also notes its different, and later, genesis in 
European feminist theorising and where it is regarded now as ‘policy-friendly’ and evident in UN and, latterly, 
EU formulations (see for example, Fernandez de Vega et al, 2008). 
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work was subsequently extended, notably by Fiona Williams (for example, 1999, 
2000) and Shona Hunter (2002, 2003, 2005)20 via mainstream social policy journals, 
conferences (and also, in part, by an ESRC-funded interdisciplinary research group 
(CAVA) on ‘Care, Values and the Future of Welfare’21).  There is also a very extensive 
literature beyond this in social policy where actual concepts of social identity are 
routinely put to work – arguably, as Bernstein puts it, where there are “too many 
protagonists and not enough analysts” (2005, p.48).    
 
Taylor draws attention to the centrality of the concept of social identity for social 
policy and in relation to the rise of new social movement activism.  As in my outlining 
of the key issues, he links his discussion to social policy’s uncertainty about 
postmodernism, where he says he “attempts to transcend” the debates, arguing that 
“when combined with an analysis of social relations, [these] need not undermine a 
focus on structural inequalities” (Taylor, 1998, p.329, emphasis added).  In taking on 
board some facets of postmodern analysis, Taylor argues that social identity is 
central but under-theorised for social policy; his intention is to expand 
conceptualisations.  He proposes that (welfare subject) identities should be seen as 
both categorical and ontological.  In the former, identity is related to a variety of 
social categories that have been variously assigned and constructed but are also 
where groups have been able to surface their own, positive (re)presentations of 
identity, self, and experience.  These are inspired and underpinned by the activities 
and campaigning of (old and) new social movements (for example, those organising 
around class, gender, race, sexuality, disability and age) who have challenged both 
the subject positions assigned them, and created and claimed new identities 
                                                          
20
 These authors’ work is not in direct response to David Taylor’s and, certainly in the case of Williams, has its 
own substantial histories and trajectories.  Williams’ Social Policy: A Critical Introduction (1989) was seminal in 
this respect and, for the first time, involved a detailed and systematic analysis of race and gender (as well as 
class) in social policy theory and practice; it has become something of a classic and is still in print - it shows up 
consistently on social policy undergraduate and postgraduate reading lists.  See also Williams’ work 
subsequent to this with its emphasis on social movement and user group activism, including Williams (1992, 
1996, 1998).  The reason for starting with Taylor here, however, is because of his naming, and centralising, of 
‘social identity’ concepts whereas Williams’ is a re-working and re-framing of traditional social policy analysis 
as a whole. 
21
 CAVA) ran between 1999 and 2004.  I had some early involvement with discussions in the lead up to this 
group as, between 1996 and 1998 I was a Research Officer in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at 
the University of Leeds working directly to Professor Fiona Williams. 
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(Williams 1999), that is, in terms of ‘sameness’.  Conversely, the ontological identity 
outlined by Taylor refers to the uniqueness of the individual and the attempt to form 
a coherent sense of self from fragmented experiences and concerns (in terms of 
‘difference’).   
 
For Taylor the problem arises when categorical forms of identity subsume the 
ontological as this creates fixity in group identities and therefore cannot deal with 
the complexities and inter-relatedness of both individual and social (and of the inter-
relatedness between different ‘oppressions’) – “identity is both an historical process 
and an individual project” (Taylor, 1998, p.346).  In Taylor’s analysis then, the 
humanist subject is retained both in its own (ontological) personal, separate and 
unique identity and also in the collective categorical identity of groups to which it 
might attach itself (or be attached.)  Further, by seeing sameness (categorical 
identity) and difference (ontological identity) along the same axis, Taylor suggests 
that it is therefore impossible to see the development and operation of group 
(categorical) identities as separate from individual ones, that is, they are 
interdependent and are formed in relation to one another (and as a site where 
subject positions are resisted/reproduced and/or resignified).  What this then allows 
us to begin to understand and analyse is a fluidity of identities operating in different 
times/spaces, and in different political, economic, social and ideological conditions, 
but all within a humanist realm.  If this is quite a limited extension to wards an 
acknowledgement of changing and fluid/multiple identities it perhaps indicates 
some of the strength of resistance to postmodern analyses, as indicated.   
 
Fiona Williams’ (2000) conceptual map for CAVA builds on her own long-standing 
concern with efforts to resolve universal and particular ‘claims’ in welfare.  The 
question here is: how can we develop universal systems of social policy provision 
that, at the same time, respond to a diversity of particular needs of different social 
groups?  This is possibly the key question that critical social policy analysis has sought 
to address in the last fifty years and as the ‘post-war welfare settlement’ has 
unravelled; it is, of course, closely aligned with the shifts to postmodern theorising 
that are outlined above.  Williams has consistently approached this, and related 
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questions, via detailed considerations of ‘race’, gender and other dimensions of 
inequality and difference alongside (but not reduced to) a continuing and pervasive 
structural (class) analysis.  In this, she has been particularly concerned to surface and 
examine diverse social movement and user group activism to shed light (see, for 
example, Williams 1992, 1996, 1998, 1999) and to move away from a problematic, 
traditional subject in critical social policy – that of the “white, British, male, able-
bodied worker/father/husband” (Clarke et al. 1998, p.385) rooted in one-
dimensional structural accounts.  Whilst her CAVA conceptual map opens out multi-
layered and interacting themes for the ESRC research group, her particular 
contribution to debates about social identity in social policy here is to draw attention 
to a distinctive relational social identity.   
 
Whilst, as she acknowledges, Taylor’s ontological-categorical axis for social identity 
poses two poles operating in relation to each other, his ‘ontological’ is essentially 
concerned with articulating an internal/private/core self (as different from others, a 
unique self), in relation to collective/social identities (as sameness with others in the 
same ‘group’).  An understanding of a specifically relational social identity is seen as 
an extension to Taylor’s ontological understanding via our relationships with close 
others; importantly this can include, for example, ‘care’ relationships intrinsic to 
‘welfare’ formulations (for example, between parent and child, teacher and student, 
disabled person and carer and so on).  Williams argues this is a broader platform (of 
a wider ‘subjectivity’ beyond the ‘identity’ considerations outlined by Taylor) and 
that it incorporates some aspects of the unconscious (the psychoanalytic alongside 
the social).  She argues that this relational dimension for understanding social 
identity breaks down an unhelpful public-private dichotomy in social policy analysis 
by emphasising the localised/personal nature of aspects of identity-in-relation as 
important to public negotiations and claims in welfare (and particularly for the 
notion of ‘care’); Williams’ work here takes us is into greater complexity in terms of 
identity and its relationship to social policy.  At the same time, she places a greater 
concentration on internal, core attributes and qualities of the human subject.   
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What it is possible to see through the work of Taylor and Williams is, then, a number 
of considered, very gradual moves, that begin to take apart or loosen the ties of 
traditional political economy approaches in social policy that loosen class identities, 
through a lens of social identity(ies).  Shona Hunter’s (2002, 2003) contribution 
follows on from Taylor and Williams, and works to extend the analysis further.  In her 
2002 paper she represents (the Taylor-Williams) categorical, ontological and 
relational aspects of identity in tabular form, as below: 
 
Table 2 
Three analytically distinct elements of social identity. 
 
 Ontological Categorical Relational 
Expression of: Coherent, unique 
self 
Belonging on the 
basis of social 
relations of 
difference/sameness 
Belonging through 
close relationships 
with others 
Context for 
construction: 
Private Public Local, informal 
Agency Individual Collective Relational (individual 
and collective) 
Principles for 
identification 
Recognition 
Difference 
Recognition 
Sameness 
Recognition 
Relationship 
 
        (reproduced from Hunter, 2002) 
 
 
This is a useful summary.  The primary extension that Hunter (2003) makes is via the 
observation that considerations of social identity in social policy focus at the 
‘grassroots’ level (on those organising around new social movements and user 
groups in welfare)22.  Crucially, on the other hand, ‘professionals’ or those who work 
in welfare settings are generally not part of the social identity/social policy debate – 
professionals are simply associated with the rather amorphous ‘policy discourse’ and 
                                                          
22
 This focus is part of a ‘redressing of balance’ approach (sometimes called ‘moral reordering’) that goes on in 
a critical social policy; here it seeks to critique assigned, ‘abnormal’ identities of claimants an dusers, and seeks 
to surface and expand positive (re)presentations by those subaltern voices themselves.  This can also be linked 
to the trend to encourage user involvement/participation in both policy making and social policy research 
(Hunter, 2003). 
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so discussed “only in terms of their status as welfare professionals, ignoring their 
position in other forms of social relations” (p.333, emphasis in original).  This not 
only creates a dichotomy between ‘users’ and ‘professionals’ (as opposed to, say, 
some degree of interdependence) it creates “automatons” (p.331) of service 
providers, removing their social identities from (analytical) view, placing them in the 
box of ‘professional’.  Here, “their principal role is perceived as the maintenance of 
the status quo in terms of social policy responses to welfare constituents’ needs” 
(p.322).  Users are one thing (multiple and fragmented social identities) and service 
providers another - part of the ‘discursive’ and disciplinary policy landscape, 
operating as part of the surveillance of users, and dividing up and fragmenting the 
landscape and possibilities for the emergence of self.   
 
Here is, I think, partly a hangover from traditional, class-based accounts where 
‘professional experts’ are simply the first targets of (collective) resistance in a 
capitalist welfare state; as Hunter comments, this “seems a wholly insufficient basis 
on which to view professional involvement in welfare” (p.331).  In this critical social 
policy formulation service providers/professionals seem to become, simply, 
instruments of the (capitalist) state.  Hunter further suggests that this positioning of 
professionals (outside the ‘social identities’ landscape) also works to restrict their 
capacity for action. The alternative, of course, under a revitalised New Right analysis, 
is that professionals simply act in their own interests (as part of a wider ‘enemy 
within’ discourse). Either positioning (of professionals) is problematic and disappears 
professionals as emergent in the practice landscape making them subject to the 
formulations of others (critical social policy/the New Right)23. 
 
Hunter’s solution to what she calls this ‘false dichotomy’ between service users and 
providers is to argue for an extension to a relational understanding of social identity 
that can incorporate both service users and service providers, and she has pursued 
this in subsequent work, drawing on (particularly Kleinian) psychoanalytic insights 
                                                          
23
 Not least, it also fails to acknowledge that many (most) professionals/services providers are also, 
themselves, ‘users’ or ‘welfare subjects’ in their own right, for example, as parents, carers and/or claimants 
and also, more generally, as women, disabled people, black or minority ethnic people, lesbians and gay men, 
and so on.  Likewise, it neglects historical and current professional involvement alongside users. 
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and utilising psychosocial methodological frameworks in examinations of, for 
example, social work (see, for example, Hunter, 2005).  In these, recognition and 
connection come under the lens (including connections across different social 
identities) and it is the interdependence in relationships between service providers 
and users that comes under scrutiny for formulations of social identities of both 
parties.  These formulations also promote more localised/situated understandings of 
identity.  Once again, there is an inching forwards in the analysis here, towards 
understandings of fluid relationality as productive and linked to fragmented/multiple 
identities.  At the same time, the humanist subject, in different forms remains 
central to what self is. 
 
3.4 READING SOCIAL POLICY’S DESIRES 
 
What does this extended overview do then, and how can it inform an understanding 
of the selfhood of social professionals?  First of all, it provides limits, parameters on 
what can be thought about (social) professional selfhood.  ‘Professionals’ can not be 
thought in quite the same way as users, where the instinct in critical social policy is 
to divide these up into social (or hybrid/intersectional) identity categories still 
normatively organised around gender, ‘race’, (dis)ability, sexuality and age.  Whilst 
these may be useful for analytical purposes, as mediating categories for the idea of 
selfhood they may be clumsy and distorting, assuming too much (and this includes 
all the criticisms of ‘identity politics’ relating to their essentialist or reductionist 
tendencies).  The selfhood of those who work in children’s services is, however, not 
in the main, placed here – this is located in, and secured to, notions of ‘the 
professional’ and professional practice where this can be, at best, in relation to 
users.  Shona Hunter’s moves do attempt to break down something of a dichotomy 
but then they link this (inter)relational selfhood and to the importance of a kind of 
interpersonal production that, however, relies on (internal) operations and 
psychoanalytical insights, rather than on any political self-sense.   
 
Secondly, it is important to note that, of course, being a ‘professional’ has become 
important as a social identity, but it is, again, a categorical identity where particular, 
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named groups (social workers, teachers, youth workers) are subsumed under the 
particular umbrella of a professional grouping.  This works to a ‘logic of sameness’ 
(where social workers are this, and teachers are that, and so on), and this logic 
(must) relocate ‘others’ who are ‘different’, in reifying and foreclosing moves.  This is 
individualisation, and separation, of the humanist subject from other things in the 
world, rather as an effect of particular (identity, category) grids or ‘tramlines’ laid 
down.   
 
Thirdly, all this is linked to power; Hunter’s insight that professionals are rarely 
‘categorised’ in social policy in the same ways as users exposes not merely a 
coincidence, for ‘users’ (and whatever their posited ‘social identity’) have not been 
powerful figures in formal social policy and welfare configurations.  When asked to 
place one-self in ‘welfare workings’ (for example in children’s services) would one 
prefer the signifier of a (professional) social worker or health care professional, or a 
woman, or a young person, or a lesbian?  Actually, what the hiatus of workforce 
change in children’s services has produced in social policy terms is an instinct and 
systematic attempts to shore up something called ‘professional status’, and 
‘recognition claims’ become part of maintaining this status quo.  Time and time 
again, ‘professionalising projects’ are brought forward, this at least applies to social 
work (for example, Healy and Meagher, 2004), youth work (for example, Moore, 
2005) and education (for example, Leaton Gray and Denley, 2005) with each group 
claiming the definition of itself as a ‘marginal profession’ and proposing strategies to 
achieve traditional markers (traits) like (self) regulation but, as importantly and 
explicitly, to improve the status of the profession. It is not clear how this relates to 
improvements in the lives of children and families. 
 
Being a professional is, then, highly political, and the scramble for this status and 
identity exposes somewhat the tension with others in society in a quest for social 
rewards (status, money, power) where inequalities are justified and maintained 
partly through the existence of a ‘professional class’, and its occupational control 
and closure (for example, professions as ‘gatekeepers’ to inclusion), and so where 
professionalism is also an ideological standpoint (Larson, 1977).  The recent Munro 
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Review of Child Protection (Munro, 2011) is only the latest example; this has been 
widely interpreted as positive for (underpinning) ‘the status of social workers’.  But, 
in return for various measures to enhance the status of the social work profession 
(for example the establishment of a ‘National College’ for social work, and the 
highlighting of expertise as a defining feature of the social work profession), the 
review arguably ‘buys in’ to marketised and managerialised welfare in which users 
are also (remain) at the sharp end, simply producing what Rajan-Ranking and 
Beresford (2011) name a “more efficient, less bureaucratised system of procedures”, 
where “the problematics of bureaucratised and managerial social work practice 
remain unchallenged”  and: 
what we have is a manager’s guide to good practice, rather than a critical 
reflection on the social basis of child protection, as a concern for everyone 
living in a ‘good society’  (Rajan-Rankin and Beresford, 2011) 
 
So, social policy framings of ‘users’ (and their social identities) and ‘professionals’ 
(generally or as involving specific occupational identities) are, again, not merely 
neutral, but become entangled with relations of power, and as ‘professionals’ and 
their occupational professional bodies seek to maintain or enhance status.  
  
There is a longer story here of course, of attempts to ‘rework’ the idea of the 
professional (proposing more palatable ‘activist’, ‘transformative’ or ‘democratic’ 
professionals) and also about attacks on professionals from New Right formulations 
(and some of this story is told in later chapters).  But I remain sceptical about 
whether ‘professional identity’ is the framework or discourse within which a 
resistant or re-formed (transformative) self can emerge.  ‘Professional’ is too loaded 
an idea and this loadedness has been writ large, and frequently on display, in 
children’s services attempts at better interprofessional practice and integration, and 
as individual services and professional groupings vie for status/power (see chapter 
4), rather than organising for difference and interdependence both within and across 
professional groupings (see Wistow, 2012).    
 
However, my overall point here is not so much about the content of these debates 
(their rightness/wrongness) but more about categories themselves, about what such 
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categories (and their apparent necessity and stranglehold in the study of social 
policy) do to selfhood, how they delineate, foreclose, reduce and reify, in the case of 
those who work in children’s services, to a form of professional identity politics (and 
as, at least partly, separated from the categories available to ‘users’) and divide up 
the landscape so that being/behaving in-category becomes somehow desirable (and 
can be captured in social policy analysis).  In the same vein, Braidotti claims that 
Deleuze and Guattari’s entire philosophical enterprise can be seen as constituting an 
attack on identity: “Not on any one identity, but on the very concept of identity” 
(2005, n.p.) because of what it does.      
 
In addition, particular forms of politics are also foregrounded in this striated 
landscape of ‘selfhood’ in social policy.  There is a clear delineation in terms of the 
political action that can be produced and the story that is told.   The particular ‘story’ 
that critical social policy tells us to this point can be summarised as follows:  
 
Social change/politics happens via the collective actions of those who experience (a 
variety of structural/cultural) inequalities that can be situated/localised and/or 
evident in a wider context.  Organising collectively around (similar experiences linked 
to) particular social identities and in user groups generates critical 
consciousness/critique and collective political agency, in order that claims in welfare 
can be formulated.  Such identities, which do not replace our own core selves (these 
continue to exist and operate including in relation to the development of our 
social/political identities) can also be built through relationship/connection to close 
others so that a variability and diversity of claims can be expected to exist; in this 
way others (perhaps outside our own social identity, or other social identity 
‘categories’ and perhaps professionals) can also work alongside us in alliance or 
coalition.    
 
That is, as table 3 (above) indicates, the possibilities for a critical selfhood exist 
primarily in relation to collective organising (in social identities/categories) – via 
‘categorical’ identifications - and as far as links can be built with others in relational 
social identities.  (And, on the other hand, Hunter’s (and Taylor’s) ontological 
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selfhood largely builds in a core, unique self whereby politics may be largely 
irrelevant (although more generally might seek a more human(ist) world based on 
integrity and authenticity in human relationships.)  
 
My problem is not so much that I do not recognise this account – indeed, I do – it has 
generated a positive plethora of critical social policy literature, from the comfortable 
appropriation of identity categories (“the experience of X,Y,Z”) through to the 
scrupulously differentiated.  And I am both surprised, and tired, by the account: 
surprised because, mired in the problems of a philosophical/paradigmatic shift, it 
moves so little from a ‘standard’ critical theoretical frame; tired, because it is so 
weighed down by this and because I also recognise loss – because we can no longer 
“read history as a story of progress towards emancipation” (Lather, 2008, p.224), as 
this story tries to (continue to) do (via collective political action).  So, of course, I 
recognise the account, I just cannot recognise its possibilities (any more).  This is 
more than simply to ask - and where has this story got us in terms of social justice 
and equality? (though it is to ask this too).  What critical social policy does is to set 
the terms of a debate that affords questions of social identity a particular normative 
legitimacy in its ‘way of thinking’; its ‘disciplinary mode’ sets a system of coordinates, 
of orientations.  Yes, there are progressions which move step by step to ever-refined 
notions of social identity, but where these can never fall far from the tree – they are 
contained within the purview of a humanist world.  Indeed, these are arboreal 
movements and that do not suppose critical social policy might also have 
motivations, desires, (historical) contexts, relations of power - an assemblage of its 
own (wherein certain features become naturalized) – and that do not allow social 
identity to be its so much more. 
 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze (1994/1968) suggests that the image of good-
natured thinking (traditional images of thought) need to be reworked, that thinking 
itself is creative, desirous and combative and the task is more than simply a shift in 
concepts (content) as this is still to be locked into a traditional image of thought that 
assumes conceptual shifts shift thinking; and this still assumes rational argument and 
the ethos of critique in social policy as the mode of thinking (the image of thought).  
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Deleuze defends thought as an involuntary activity (not necessarily tied to the 
application of method) and as the effect of outside forces and elements: “something 
in the world forces us to think” (Deleuze, 1994/1968, p.139), and that this thinking is 
integrally linked to desire, affect, power - a force, something bigger than ‘us’.  Thus, 
whilst a critical social policy has an ethos of critique, its (own) image of thought 
works to its own desires, (re)producing itself.  I have suggested that these might 
involve, for example, desires to hold onto collective political agency (linked to an 
ambivalent attachment to the postmodern), and attachments to the development of 
analytical units (categorisations) that support this, and as they become ever more 
refined – critical social policy’s image of thought depends upon this.   
 
Indeed, the critical social policy literature on social identity (and that of 
intersectionality) consistently and repeatedly asserts the need for analytical 
categories through which to do its work, sometimes not even going so far as to treat 
it as problematic (rather as indispensable).  For example, Walby (2007) outlines five 
approaches to intersectionality including ‘anticategorical complexity’ (drawn from 
McCall, 2005).  She explains that in this approach “destabilisation of group 
categories” (Walby, 2007, p.352) became the aim of some forms of analysis because 
they are seen as never being able to adequately represent and as “potentially 
pernicious in their potential for false sedimentation of these categories in 
practice”(p.352) (as I have broadly been arguing).  She cites Braidotti’s border-
crossing ‘nomad’ image as one example and then simply deals with the approach as 
a whole by commenting: “such radical deconstruction and destabilization of 
categories makes substantive analysis, which requires distinctions between 
categories, rather hard…”(Walby, 2007, p.352).  In a later article (Walby et al, 2012), 
again, there is this:  
The anti-categorical approach is ‘based on a methodology that deconstructs 
analytical categories’.  This approach considers the stabilization of categories 
to be problematic in essentializing and reifying the social relations that the 
analyst may be seeking to change.  It thus prioritises fluidity over stability of 
categories. This is problematic in that it makes practical analysis difficult. 
      (Walby et al, 2012, p.227, emphasis added) 
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Here are acknowledgements of social policy’s need, itself, for categories (of social 
identity); they have utility, and for the story it wants to tell about (self and) social 
identity, so ever-more refined and differentiated categories are desirable.  This may 
be the ‘tail wagging the dog’ somewhat, as it helps to contain what can be thought 
even while self might overflow..   
 
Hence, Deleuze and Guattari claim that identity functions as a tool of the State 
(1987, p.361); in my exploration, identity “as a paradigm for social analysis” (Watson, 
2008, p.198) functions (as part of this bigger picture) as a tool of social policy.  If we 
wanted to tell a different story, we would need a different social policy, without such 
reliance on social identity (and its categories).  And, if we want self to involve an 
expansive political selfhood we need to move beyond social identities that deal with 
difference as rooted in categories of (imagined, so-called and foreclosed) samenesses 
that produce reduced collectivities; this is: 
….a political way of life that is not merely a fractious collection of sovereign 
cultural identities, but [one that] dispenses sovereignty….into new forms of 
political and social coexistence.   (Butler, 2007, n.p.) 
 
Even Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge that identity is sometimes necessary to 
pursue a politics (1987/1980, p.276) and, as I have also acknowledged, the liberatory 
political activism of multiple ‘identity groups’ (of which I have been a part, many 
times) has served a positive (even necessary) function.  But this, and the story that 
critical social policy largely perpetuates, is that this is (all that is) politics – again, 
Arendt’s “fractious collection” of identities (in which I include ‘professional 
identities’) serve as interest groups, and involve ‘othering’ – separations not 
connections.  What the parameters set in such circumstances do is to marginalize 
other forms of politics and other forms of relating, as identity (as mediator, 
abstraction, attachment, reduction, essentialiser) subsumes or overshadows other 
possibilities that might stand outside or beyond its grids, and the possibilities for a 
much more direct politics between people and the state (whatever manifestation 
this involves), and between people and the marketplaces of global capitalism (J. 
Watson, 2008, p.198).  This requires a model of belonging founded in difference not 
sameness (identity), but in connection not separation, and foregrounds abundant 
80 
 
political relationships in all their multiplicity, as they happen, and are made in their 
doing and in being (selfhood).  If we want an expansive political selfhood for 
children’s services professionals we might, for example, understand selfhood as 
about being/doing in the day-to-day in public settings, as (in every situation) civic 
actors in organisational contexts, and this as important as so-called ‘collective 
political action’.  This is not a micropolitics (of resistance) in the traditionally 
understood sense because it is not linked to particular shared identities, categories 
or analyses (outside of oneself), but to being-itself as politics.  This is not about a 
politics via a particular ‘professional’ affiliation or as collective political action 
happening (or not) via user groups and social movements, but about an expansive 
politics of being/doing in the day-to-day, the here-and-now, based on difference and 
interdependence.  If we want an expansive politics of self, we need a different 
version of politics (and what it means to operate in public spaces) than that 
foregrounded and fixed and prescribed in the humanist subject of social policy’s 
desires.  
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C h a p t e r   4 
 
VICTORIA CLIMBIÉ AND CHILDREN’S SERVICES 
Constituting the social professional in the development of children’s services 
 
 
In a control-based system nothing’s left alone for long 
(Deleuze, 1995/1990, p.175) 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The previous chapter examined the formulations of selfhood in critical social policy 
and what these do (and do not do) for thinking and being (selfhood).  Social policy 
pre-figures the humanist subject, particularly via its entanglement with, and 
enshrining of, (categories of) social identity.   This striates or divides the landscape 
for self and does groundwork for how (professional) selfhood emerges in children’s 
services.  Here I move to focus directly on children’s services policy and practice, in 
an account oriented around unfolding events in its formation.  This is to be attentive 
to performative aspects of policy and implementation in what they do.   
 
Every local authority in England now has (a version of) its own ‘children’s services’, 
subject to regular inspections by Ofsted24.  Despite this, it is in some ways possible to 
already talk about the legacy of children’s services – its project moves on, and 
intensifies (see chapter 5), and notably so subsequent to the 2010 election of the 
(Conservative-led) Coalition government.  In this sense, ‘children’s services’ is 
                                                          
24
 Inspections are carried out under Section 136 of the Education and Inspections Act, 2006. 
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already historical.  Deleuze distinguishes between history and events (or becoming 
or appearance) by suggesting that history is not “experimental, it’s just the set of 
more or less negative preconditions that make it possible to experiment with 
something beyond history” (Deleuze, 1995/1990, p.170).  Despite aversion to a 
history that is “intended to intimidate any creation” (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994/1991, p.83), Lundy comments that almost all Deleuze’s references to history, 
as above, occur in a context of becoming, and, in this sense, his philosophy “provides 
us with ….creativity as historical creativity” (2012, p.2, emphasis in original), that is, 
history/becoming in “productive relation” (p.184).  The (pre)conditions (and folding, 
and crumpling) of history contain, then, important seeds, for now and for what is to 
come, involving both history and becoming, as “without history, becoming would 
remain indeterminate and unconditioned” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994/1991).   
 
This chapter identifies (or disentangles) the (historical and current) ‘preconditions’, 
specifically, the role of policy and practice for self in children’s services.  Selfhood is 
not produced in isolation from context and my (widely held) assumption is that the 
policy and practice environment has a profound effect on the selfhood of 
professionals, that this is not a neutral process, and involves the use of power 
structured into social relations, that is, in surveillance (although this is not all that 
self is).  The chapter provides an account of key activities in the progress and 
development of a children’s services project in England – with an emphasis on its do-
ings as well as in relation to its discursive formulations.      
 
The chapter is organised around the Climbié Inquiry itself (Laming, 2003), integrating 
services, tools for research, evidence and monitoring, and workforce reform.  Whilst 
specific examples are used, this is a schematic or topological mapping across 
children’s services, rather than an examination of micro-level workings at the 
profession/occupation, or sector-specific level25; nor do I make central the 
(differential) impact of reforms for users and for outcomes.  Rather than a full 
review, then, this is an account of developments that orients towards social 
                                                          
25
 For a good example of an examination of micro-level impact in relation to interagency work see Watson 
(2012) 
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professionals (rather than outcomes for children, young people and families) that 
begins to highlight some of the implications for self.  The next chapter moves on to 
analysis in terms of the specific impact, and for constitutions, of that self.  
 
In mapping the broad contours I draw on a selection of policy and practice literature, 
my own experiences over the last decade (from within a small university) working 
with professionals, children’s services organizations and stakeholders, and my 
research conversations with a small number of professionals/managers in practice.  
This is, again, an attempt to move beyond purely a “discourse determinism” 
(Watson, 2012, p.156), and the mapping-presentation might be thought of as a kind 
of (rhizomatic. flattened) “narrative collage” (Denzin, 2001, p.29) in its writing, 
where ‘voice’ is (thought and) presented “within the entanglement it immediately 
becomes and continues to become as it joins other enactments, other assemblages” 
(Mazzei, 2013, p.737).  This is a continuing attempt to de-centre the subject, or at 
least to produce an account where ‘a subject’ is part of the mix rather than 
(humanistically) centred via their ‘experience’ (even as the humanist subject is 
(re)produced in policy and practice in children’s services) -  a ‘plugging in’  (Jackson 
and Mazzei, 2012), for a researcher-data-participants-theory-analysis (Mazzei, 2013).  
In entanglement, all these things are be-coming together.    
 
 
4.2 THE VICTORIA CLIMBIÉ INQUIRY 
 
Like many others, I begin the story of the establishment of children’s services with 
The Victoria Climbié Inquiry Report (Laming, 2003)26.  This, which was the first of its 
kind to include all three of local authorities, health services and the police within its 
remit, catapulted social professionals into an unprecedented period of reform – for 
the ‘transformation’ of services for children, young people and families.  The 
damning critique within the Climbié report produced 108 recommendations and led 
                                                          
26
 Although this is widely regarded as a somewhat seminal moment, it is important to note that the kinds of 
‘solutions’ proposed in the development of children’s services have had much wider purchase as a general 
direction of travel, at least in the West.  At European level, however, England has been regarded as something 
of an ‘outlier’ in its preparedness to adopt more radicaly neo-liberal trajectories.  
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to the Green Paper Every Child Matters (ECM) (DfES,2004) and, ultimately, to the 
Children Act, 2004.  The Green and White Papers, and statute itself, was to go well 
beyond simply strengthening responses to child abuse - the Children’s Plan (DCSF, 
2007) aim was “to make England the best place in the world for children and young 
people to grow up” (2007, p.3).  Whilst the changes actually developed some 
previous reforms by the same government attempting to address wider questions of 
risk to, and the protection of, children (Parton 2006; Collett, 2010) it was hard to 
avoid a conclusion that it was the Victoria Climbie moment that triggered, or at least 
accelerated, wholesale reform.   
 
The powerful ‘safeguarding’ discourse, the graphic and widely publicized accounts of 
what had happened to an 8-year old Victoria, and the multiple failures of individual 
professionals recorded in the Climbié Inquiry Report (Laming, 2003) led, as in many 
other reported cases of child deaths, to “a kind of stunned collective incredulity” 
(Watson, 2012, p.154) particularly evident in media reporting27.  That social workers 
competence (in particular) was questioned was not new or surprising, and a search 
for ‘villains’ arguably does not involve a level playing field (in striated and 
hierarchical ‘professional’ formulations where social work is arguably marginalized 
vis a vis more traditional professions), nor careful attention to complexities inherent 
to structures and organizations (Watson, 2012), and important contextual factors.  
For example, in a re-examination of the Climbié Inquiry evidence, Y.Taylor (2008) 
exposes some of the ways a particular ‘story’ was constructed through the ‘coding’ 
of the ‘data’ (which was the individual testimony given to the Inquiry).  In this, Taylor 
shows how contextual factors are minimized, or disappear, resulting in a highlighting 
of individual and organizational responsibility.  Not only this, Taylor shows how 
subtleties in process and evidence heard by the Inquiry was also lost, notably in the 
differential status, dignity and reliability afforded, say, consultant paediatricians as 
                                                          
27
 To give just one example, Alasdair Palmer (2001) reporting on the Climbie Inquiry and writing in The 
Telegraph - not a paper known for sensationalist reporting and florid language - included the following in his 
article: “just as incredible, and almost as repulsive, is the extraordinary incompetence, blindness and stupidity 
of the professionals who were supposed to be protecting Victoria” and “a picture of stunning and shocking 
disorganisation and incompetence” and “The only resource in genuinely short supply in Haringey social 
services department was common sense”; instead there was “the kind of invisible arrogance and stubborn 
stupidity evidenced by some of its workers and managers”. 
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opposed to inexperienced social workers – this is Taylor’s ‘tip of the iceberg’ 
metaphor in relation to the resulting Inquiry Report. 
From a socio-legal perspective, Masson (2006) constructs an alternative account of 
the life of Victoria Climbié highlighting some of the issues outside of the terms of 
reference of the Inquiry, including parental responsibility, child trafficking and 
immigration/emigration service failures, the role of the criminal law and the 
inadequacy of the wider legal framework for providing family support services.  She 
comments “the exclusion of these wider issues of prevention, focused all attention 
on the failure of the local state” (p.1), and claims her analysis:  
….illustrates the importance of the wider legal and social context within which 
child protection failures occur….inquiries which focus on the actions of 
individuals can only ever provide a partial and incomplete view of what went 
wrong…..a poor foundation for understanding practice generally or for reform                     
(Masson, 2006, p.241) 
 
From a critical therapeutic (psychodynamic) position, Cooper (2005) contrasts the 
clearly emotionally harrowing nature of Inquiry evidence heard, and as expressed in 
the body of the Inquiry Report, with its anodyne recommendations –  “by the end of 
the report, we are offered the same kind of terse, lifeless, abstract series of 
recommendations that has flowed from every other similar exercise” (p.5).  Cooper 
explains this “dismembered document” (p.4) through the difficulties of engaging, 
and staying engaged, with the emotional realities and practice dynamics of child 
protection work and that “this trend finds expression in discourses of performance, 
behaviour and professional competence, rather than explanation, interpretation and 
understanding” (p.2).  He claims this means a lack of connection between policy 
discourse and “the intensive aspects of practice” (p.9).   
 
From a social policy perspective, Rustin (2004) identifies a series of difficulties with 
the extrapolation of one case to wholesale (national) review – should one case be 
used to reform whole systems that might otherwise be working well? - and with 
connecting the failures of individuals and larger institutional structures via “rules and 
procedures, compliance with which is to be enforced by a hierarchical management 
structure….[in] an essentially bureaucratic model of organization” (p.15).   And 
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Garrett (2006) and Daniel et al (2005) critique the insignificance afforded, 
respectively, to ‘race’ and gender analyses in the Laming Report (2003) and in Every 
Child Matters (DCSF, 2003).   
Despite these later ‘unpickings’ of the Inquiry and Report itself (which were, anyway, 
largely only available in academic journals) at the outset of the children’s services 
project the selfhood of social professionals was premised at the very least on its 
inadequacies, where the term ‘professional’ could barely be applied.  As Palmer 
(2001) wrote: “The only people who were able to recognize that something was 
horribly wrong with Victoria were those not trained and paid to do so: a taxi-driver, a 
babysitter, a nurse.”  Individual professional deficits and failures were writ large.  A 
decade on it is widely acknowledged that, at the least, the individual social workers 
involved were largely offered up as a “sacrifice” to the Inquiry by employers, in order 
to avoid their “owning up to” systemic failures (Mandelstam, 2013, p.237)28.  Despite 
‘wicked’ social problems and the complexities of practice (Ball and Junemann, 2012; 
Watson and Forbes, 2012) the Inquiry ultimately confirmed for many a (narrow) 
model of accountability as settling in individuals.  At the same time, a different 
message was conveyed via the Inquiry recommendations and in what was to follow – 
the whole system, and all those in it, needed re-forming.     
So, whilst (certain) individuals could be sacked (and vilified), all were to be made 
complicit.  The ‘failures’ (and shame), as associated with the specifics of Victoria 
Climbié and what had happened to her, provided a powerful justifier – it arguably 
tempered (even de-legitimised) challenges emerging from professional bodies and 
others seen to be implicated.  ‘Stakeholders’ were thus required to demonstrate 
compliance and a degree of mea culpa, which prefaced many responses.  ‘Sign up’ to 
a new agenda would not be optional; even questioning it might have been a 
                                                          
28
 Two social workers were sacked in Nov 2002 for gross misconduct; one of these, the frontline social worker 
Lisa Arthurworrey, won the right to practise again as a social worker in 2010 following a period placed on the 
Protection of Children Act list (a highly controversial move in relation to someone who had not actually abused 
a child), and protracted regulatory body hearings and final appeal at the Health and Care Professions Council 
(HCPC) (McGregor, 2010).  The registration was subject to certain conditions for ‘the protection of the public’ 
including psychiatric assessments, and not being employed through an agency (McGregor, 2013).  Later in 
2013 Arthurworrey submitted an application to voluntarily remove herself from social work registration 
(McGregor, 2013a). 
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potential signifier of a practitioner lacking the required commitment to keeping 
children safe which had been placed so in doubt – Every Child Matters  was “an 
inescapable moral imperative” (Hoyle, 2008 n.p.) and, for example, social workers 
were “a currently distrusted profession” (Sinclair and Corden, 2005, p.2).   The 
workings of power were hidden in such a context, the possibility of critical 
questioning in doubt.  In my own research conversations, one research participant 
captured a certain attitude towards ‘children’s services’ when she typified it as: 
Children’s services have always been deemed to be a thorn in the side really, 
and the, kind of, message strategically speaking is that ‘you’re like a load of 
kids’….[  ]…it’s the way that everybody behaves. And they just need sorting 
out.  It’s an over-generalisation. 
      (Senior Practitioner, Health Services) 
 
 
The requirement in becoming, in a self-constitution for new practice arrangements 
was to make oneself malleable, recognise one’s lack/deficit, and be-come 
responsible (and this would be ensured by the scripted new arrangements imposed 
externally, for practice).  Later, in opening up delivery of a commissioned Masters 
programme for senior managers in one Children’s Trust (2008), a participant 
(student) demonstrated the absolutely ‘on message’ possibilities, and ownership of 
the task at hand, what the requirements for self were: 
I’ve come to find out about theories and models, for ideas about ‘what 
works’, to do better interprofessional practice, in improving outcomes for 
children 
   (student on MA Professional Practice, 2008, quoted with permission)  
 
There were nods around the room.  This might be called “a successful articulation or 
‘chaining’ of the subject into the flow of the discourse” (Hall 1996, p.19) or a 
Foucauldian concern with self governance.   There may always be ‘spillovers’ 
however, becomings that do not fit.   Privately, with some alarm, another student 
sought me out at lunchtime the same day to say: 
You do realise that it’s very political and controversial what you’re doing, 
don’t you; you’ve got some very powerful people round the room y’know, I 
was worried you might not know…. 
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  (student on MA Professional Practice, 2008, quoted with permission) 
 
Here, the contestation integral to ‘bureaucratic politics’ was expressed covertly, 
beyond the confines of dominant discourse and outside of a more public 
contestation.  On the public aspect of debate (politics), Arendt comments: “…the 
end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is 
permitted to present itself in only one perspective.” (1999/1958, p.58).   That is, 
whilst the becoming self could be chained to the dominant discourse what might be 
lost would be the politics of public debate (Arendt’s ‘freedom’), (a protection of) 
difference, and expansive becomings. 
 
  
4.3 INTEGRATING SERVICES 
 
Under the new policy discourse, the challenge was a (demand to) rewrite and redraw 
the lexicon and landscape for practice, with the goal of thinking and practising in 
different ways, to produce ‘better outcomes’ for children.  The five Every Child 
Matters (ECM) outcomes of being healthy, staying safe, enjoying and achieving, 
making a positive contribution, and economic well being, provided a framework 
which was widely supported by agencies and stakeholders (Williams, 2004; Straker 
and Foster, 2009).  Multi-agency developments were at the heart of reform and, it 
was said, required significant structural reorganisations across and within agencies – 
children’s services were to be ‘integrated’.  If the failure to prevent the death of 
Victoria Climbié was the primary result of individuals in different parts of ‘welfare’ 
failing to work together then the solution was that they would now be compelled to.  
Oliver and Mooney (2010) acknowledged: “Moving towards integrated working 
entails a radical change in organizational structures, working processes and cultures” 
(p.8) (see also C4EO, 2011; Hargreaves et al, 2010; Parton, 2004).       
 
The changes introduced – and driven through via structural reorganisations - 
included multiple policy shifts, rafts of new practice guidance, target/outcome 
oriented practice goals, the introduction of new (common and mandated) tools, 
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budget sharing, a new language for practice, new (required) protocols (for 
information sharing), changing job roles (and conditions of work), and the creation of 
new ones (such as the ‘lead professional’).  These changes were required both across 
the new ‘children’s workforce’ and also impacted (differentially) within the different 
sectors or professions that make it (and for the re-constitution of self).   The 
Department of Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) (2008a) claimed two million 
workers in the affected workforce, trained in up to 60 separate ‘professions’, 
although detailed workforce information in some sectors was, and remains, patchy 
at best (CWDC, NCSL and TDA, 2008)29.   Thus, many different professional groupings 
were brought together under the rubric of children’s services and as part of the new 
children’s workforce, as shown over, in Figure 1 (one of a variety of different ways in 
which the workforce has been portrayed) (DCSF, 2008).  The new integrated 
arrangements were (ambitiously but simplistically) represented by what became 
known as ‘the onion diagram’ (see Figure 2, over).  In both Figures 1 and 2 it is not 
clear if, or how, one could ever stand outside of the picture, everyone is apparently 
encircled in both and wholly directed towards pre-defined outcomes.  In the onion 
diagram, it is assumed that each layer exerts influence inwards on the immediately 
adjacent layer directing whole system attention in a nested arrangement of 
functional structures and processes producing outcomes at the centre for (notably, 
rather than with) the end user/consumer; this is a complexity reduction30 model that 
appears to largely dispense with the people in it, involving: 
….expert systems as vehicles for an evidence-based response to multiple 
problems…..associated with an increasingly technocratic culture in children’s 
services, which may be restricting professional expertise  
(Hood, 2014, p.27)  
 
                                                          
29
 Information about the workforce in schools is reported as reasonably comprehensive but in social care and 
early years (despite multiple initiatives in the latter) there remain significant gaps and difficulties with reliable 
data collection (CWDC, NCSL and TDA, 2008).  
30
 This is perhaps as opposed to an ongoing responsiveness in ‘becoming-with’ children and families. 
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Figure 1 
The Children’s Workforce (DCSF 2008) 
 
 
 
Figure 2  
The ‘onion’ diagram (DfES 2004) 
 
91 
 
Nationally, a Children’s Commissioner for England was appointed.  Local Directors of 
Children’s Services were statutorily required so that there would be both strategic  
and operational ‘join up’ of (statutory education and social care) services, including a 
statutory framework for local interagency arrangements for safeguarding children, 
and the development of extended schools.  These were all to sit under integrated 
governance arrangements, in new Children’s Trusts (Audit Commission, 2008) within 
local authority areas that were to incorporate all services to children, young people 
and families (including health services and the third, and private, sectors).  As far as  
vertical government tools to implement integration and collaborative working go, 
utilising fulsome statutory/mandatory regulation is of the highly authoritative 
version, rather than a possible emphasis on information or incentivisation strategies 
(Moseley, 2008), though a great deal did follow statute and mandatory guidance in 
terms of capacity building across the sector, though strictly within the given 
paradigm for the new practice.  Coupled with the Climbié ‘crisis’, however, it would 
be surprising if the approach did not feel, in part, somewhat punitive and at least 
something where dissent would be difficult, and requiring full and active co-
operation.  There did, indeed, seem to be a high level of sign-up, commitment and 
energy achieved, and emerging from within the new arrangements.  Two research 
participants commented thus about this period31:   
I started with a brand new team, with a brand new government mandate to 
go out and change the world and change how we did things, y’know, it was 
exciting, exciting within my team – very scary and challenging for the services 
we were working for because ‘we’re used to doing things our way of doing it”, 
but within my team, we felt empowered. 
          
 
We felt like we were trailblazing and we felt like we could see, and I guess we 
thought, then, because people knew, and they namechecked it, that we were 
in it for the long haul because people knew that early intervention takes lots 
and lots of years in order to reap the rewards. So, we, I think, the whole 
programme we were excited about.   
     
                                                          
31
 Research participants were not directly or specifically asked about their responses to new children’s services 
arrangements a decade ago, but in asking the more general question about what they thought about practice, 
how it had been for them, these specific comments were made. 
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The new and detailed mandates from government involved local level design of new 
arrangements; the level and scope of organizational (re)structuring activities within 
local authority areas to achieve the new requirements was, indeed, profound.  Local 
understanding and interpretation of integrated services varied – for example, at 
delivery point was this to mean, simply, multi-agency teams (with or without co-
location), or was it a driver to more generically focused workers (and the loosening 
of particular professional ties) (Anning et al 2006; Straker and Foster 2009); or, did it 
mean the creation of new and specific (integrated services) job roles?  And how 
could this be linked to the required outcomes, and safeguarding exactly?   
The classificatory ‘regimes’ and terms relating to ‘integrated working’ are 
multifarious as evident in Atkinson et al, 2007,  Robinson et al, 2008, and Anning et 
al, 2006).  These authors take different approaches, the first being a review on the 
literature on the implications of multi-agency working, the second a direct review of 
theories and models for integrated working, and the last an early study of actual 
different models in practice in children’s services.  All authors deal with multiple 
(terms and) arrangements; Robinson et al (2008) demonstrate the sheer 
proliferation of approaches, models and the complexity of ‘integration’.  In 
conceptual terms the terrain is deeply unstable and uncertain suggesting (especially) 
‘standard tools’ produced might have little purchase for local and particular practice 
settings32 in their complexity.   
If the ‘vision’ was sweeping and aspirational in relation to what children and young 
people could expect, then the comprehensive delegation of accountability and 
delivery to the local state (and partners in the Children’s Trust) made them 
responsible for: 
organising themselves to 'deliver' the most complex ‘whole system change’ in 
a generation – whilst continuing to display an inability or unwillingness to 
acknowledge, or develop effective national solutions for, the structural and 
                                                          
32
 Some suggest that local-level contexts and practice are, themselves, what drives integrated working, that is, 
it is situation-specific and ‘bottom-up’, rather than the other way round (for example, Frost and Robinson, 
2007); others that we should move away from the idea that integrated working is the best model for practice 
because other factors provide evidence of better outcomes such as positive organizational climate or 
better/different professional practices (Frost, 2005; Siraj-Blatchford and Siraj-Blatchford, 2009) – this latter can 
also be seen as part of debates that shore up ‘professionalism’ as a mode of being (in the face of critiques of 
this). 
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systemic problems from which negative outcomes can emerge for children 
and young people.        (Hoyle (2008 n.p.)  
 
Here, David Hoyle draws attention to arrangements that deflect attention away from 
the structural, constitutive precursors/elements associated with children’s well-
being, in which government (rather than the local state, and individual workers) 
plays a major role.  The abdication to Children’s Trusts, whilst highly prescriptive and 
regulated at the centre, was also seen as a boon to continuing government rhetoric 
and sound-bite politics, that could deflect and disperse blame (Hoyle, 2010).     
 
It was, at best, unclear, given the problematic of extrapolation from one case, the 
overall ambiguous nature of the evidence on collaborative working (Oliver and 
Mooney, 2010; Atkinson et al 2007), significant gaps in workforce information, and 
the sheer complexity and scale of the changes, how simply mandating the 
attainment of clear goals under condition of statute might work.  Moseley, (2008), 
for one, notes how conditions of ignorance or uncertainty (and this could not be 
otherwise given what was being attempted) alongside such mandates are potentially 
likely to lead to inappropriate or flawed goals and other problematic practices; for 
example, one research participant commented in relation to data:  
There were some issues internally – y’know, a lot of that is about people’s 
ideas about data collection, monitoring, outputs, and outcomes and I think 
that those were …[we]..always felt we were not necessarily collecting the 
right data, in the right ways, for the right reasons….  we ended up collecting a 
lot of pointless dross really…and it took up a lot of time 
        (research participant) 
 
 
Not least, the new agenda also ‘mapped onto’, or ‘played out’ through and with, 
already existing discourses (including the Climbié narrative) and hierarchies for 
practice; this was particularly notable in relation to the professional status (and 
‘silos’) of different worker groupings, and to statutory, private and third sector 
relationships.  It was clear that what was ‘common’ (along with the requirement for 
compliance) was what mattered in the new agenda, and this meant a degree of 
reduction and standardization (common language, common tools and so on) which 
cut across not only, simply, existing ways of doing things, but also what was a range 
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of professional ontologies (White et al, 2009; Yardley, 2014).  These were disrupted 
via the top-down impositions with the attempt to shoehorn them through narrower 
standardized practices (cross-profession) in a discourse of deficit; this helped to 
generate much ontological insecurity and resistance, and operated in tension with 
the need to demonstrate compliance to the new agenda.  Commitment to individual 
‘professional identities’ remained strong with many different professionals feeling it 
was theirs under (most) threat.  Later, the Munro Review of Child Protection (Munro, 
2011) criticized standardization for its constraining, rather than enabling, effects and 
its impact on the professional sense of social workers; the effect on (weakening) 
professional identity also emerged in research conversations:  
Professional identity […] really gets chipped away at [….] over a period of 
time, and you remove all that professional stuff and all that growth into a 
kind of boxed down, minimalised, invalidated process really. 
      (Senior practitioner, statutory, health services)
   
Constituting self here involved profound ontological insecurities in the negotiation of 
territory.    
 
However, some services/sectors were more implicated and/or more central, than 
others – schools, for example, did not have a duty to cooperate under the legislation, 
and in 2008, despite some good practice, the Audit Commission (2008) reported 
many had not engaged (see also Deakin and Kelly, 2006).  There are numerous 
contextualized forms of integrated working in terms of structures and processes 
(Stuart, 2012) and particular local conditions really matter; changes played out in 
multiple ways, not just geographically, but also for specific workforces, and in 
relation to a variety of other factors such as a local history of collaboration (Percy-
Smith, 2006).  In both capturing a sense of professional hierarchy and the influence 
of local conditions, one research participant commented:  
….y’know, as you were asking I was thinking about social workers – [they] got 
lost first as individuals. That’s my experience of my colleagues y’know.  I can 
remember all that stuff about when they were going to court and they…. and 
then [county] did all that stuff about saying they weren’t allowed to give 
individual statements so it was all about, they had to get statements signed 
by the legal department, they weren’t allowed to speak in their own right, as 
professionals, and on behalf of the child, it was horrific. 
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      (Senior Practitioner, statutory, health services)
       
 
And similarly, on local conditions, one research participant talked about her local 
(geographical) area: 
Why does it work?  [Area] is often held up as a beacon of good practice in this 
way - very, very often. And people traipse up from [County town] going 
‘what’s different here, what’s going on’?      
      (Chief Executive, social enterprise, social work) 
      
Constituting self, then, involves productions locally (in relation) and possibilities are, 
in part, particular, even in the context of top-down, standardised moves and a 
widespread decoupling of professional sense and a becoming in insecurity. 
 
4.4 TOOLS FOR RESEARCH, EVIDENCE AND MONITORING 
The attempt at complexity reduction via the trope of integrated working produced, 
at the level of practice, well, a mushrooming of complexity (although I know many 
‘professionals’ who would simply call this chaos) – complexity reduction efforts 
became, themselves, part of the complexity itself (of dealing with the real at the 
same time?).  However, the new way of working was also to be profoundly evidence-
based - the new government-funded national Centre for Excellence and Outcomes in 
Children’s and  Young People’s Services(C4EO) was a classic example of the 
government ‘brand’ in its title alone – in mission terms, it:   
….identifies and coordinates local, regional and national evidence of 'what 
works', to create a single and comprehensive picture of effective practice in 
delivering children's services. Using this information, C4EO offers support to 
local authorities and their Children's Trust partners.... to improve outcomes 
for children, young people and their families.     
       (www.c4EO.org.uk)  
 
In this way, ‘excellence’, ‘outcomes’, ‘what works’ and ‘best practice’ would be 
assured and were at the core of the rhetoric for children’s services and services (and 
their workers) were to be constructed/subjected in this image.  Rather than being 
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associated with people, however, the outcomes agenda was mediated and 
understood through systems and structures and “quasi-industrial practices” (Ince 
2010, p.1) which would re-form those operating them: 
Monitoring is given great importance.  Supervision is not a matter of enabling 
a responsible professional to reflect on difficult and troubling situations.  
Rather it is a matter of quality control and authoritative action.  Supervisors 
are to check that agreed actions have been completed by specified times.  
They are to read properly completed files based on meticulous recording and 
checks on all possible sources of information.  They read records and sign off 
cases…..The chief executives of trusts are to put numerous procedures in 
place…..Discretion is reduced.  
(Sinclair and Corden, 2005, p.18) 
 
 
The ‘evidence’ of evidence-based/’what works’ practice, emerges from a positivist 
and techno-rational frame.  By this I mean that what is valued is research conducted 
within a scientised frame and oriented towards the specified/pre-determined 
outcomes of government policy.  This links powerfully with a managerialist, top-
down approach to children’s services development to help construct very narrow 
and instrumentalised routes to practice change, paradoxically operating alongside a 
broad and complex practice undergoing massive structural and cultural upheaval.  
For example, the Journal of Children’s Services (established in 2006) reflects the 
remit with a consistent focus on positivistic, quantitatively-oriented contributions 
and The Association of Directors of Children’s Services (ADCS) (established in 2007) is 
very clear in its research guidelines that, for approval, this instrumental frame is the 
preferred one (research projects should be related to improving outcomes and 
“improved evidence-based practice” (ADCS 2010, p.1), with a preference stated for 
“well constructed questionnaires” (ibid p.2) and negatives associated with interview 
schedules that might “need lengthy narrative answers” (ibid, p.3).  Inevitably, as part 
of this discourse, behavioural interventions are regarded as effective for dealing with 
complex social problems (Churchill, 2011). Oancea and Pring note:  
The problems seem to stem not from one particular model or design as such, 
but from the policy-driven filtering of evidence on technical grounds, the 
hierarchies of knowledge on which this filtering draws, and the standard 
setting exercises that narrow the contribution of research to policy and 
practice to a purely instrumental role.  (2008, p.19)         
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This is echoed by Reder and Duncan’s (2004) and Sinclair and Corden’s (2005) 
critique of the preoccupation with procedures, and reforms to the structure and 
organization of services; they identify concomitant dangers of overbureaucratic 
implementation.  Williams (2004) links this to the economistic and neo-liberal basis 
of the legislative thrust (particularly highlighting an emphasis on “achieving” rather 
than “enjoying” in relation to one of the five outcomes), arguing that Every Child 
Matters fails to be clear about its vision and values; she also questions the meaning 
of (and lack of attention to) respect for children, and the place of trust in 
relationships between parents and the state.  Garrett (2006; 2009), White, Hall and 
Peckover (2009), and Hoyle (2010) critique the introduction of new technologies and 
tools in the ‘surveillance’ of children and families, in particular in relation to the 
Common Assessment Framework (CAF) tool, and ContactPoint (a national, 
information sharing database on all children and young people) introduced under 
new arrangements.   
In a detailed critique, Ince (2010), a computer scientist, analyses the failure of one of 
the new, mandatory tools of the new children’s workforce, that of the Integrated 
Children’s System (ICS), through a detailed examination of the process of its 
development and implementation.  Noting that the Climbié Inquiry report had failed 
to acknowledge just how far those professionals involved appeared to have been 
poorly supported by IT and poor management/administration of this (preferring 
instead to broadly attribute the death of a child to individual mistakes/incompetence 
and mismanagement), he infers that lack of attention to this led to inappropriate IT 
‘solutions’.   That the ICS system was rolled out across the country and not rejected 
earlier, or “technical morticians” called in (2010, p.2) is a matter of comment; for 
Ince this is significant because it is a rare example of this not happening – perhaps it 
reflects a picture of a workforce pushed back on its heels, and lacking confidence in 
the face of the safeguarding discourse rollercoaster constructed through 
government and media discourses requiring, simply and at least in the first instance, 
simple compliance, not questioning – it could not be the IT that was wrong, it was 
bound to be the professionals.   
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Ince captures a number of assumptions upon which the new ICS system was based, 
and the issues this raises which, for him, are all problematic and, I also suggest, are 
illustrative of the technical-rational-performative assumptions and discourses in play 
alongside the deficit-failure-safeguarding one, and to which a variety of services and 
individual professionals were subject, and becoming-with: 
[T]he use of software to impose on professionals a set of quasi-industrial 
practices; the idea that computer code is always better than well-designed 
manual processes and can replace them; that life-critical systems are not just 
confined to areas such as nuclear control, medicine and avionics; that 
computer code can replace good managerial practice; that software 
technologies normally used for the development of industrial systems such as 
those deployed in retail, banking and customer relationship management 
applications can be used for human-centred applications; ….that when a 
system is used by large numbers of distributed user groups that a one-size-
fits-all approach should be preferred…..;….that, in a human-centred system 
where unstructured data dominates structured data in both importance and 
quantity, it is the latter that should drive technological decisions  
(Ince, 2010, p.2)  
 
Ince’s analysis is convincing in exposing the lack of fit between the ICS 
(standardizing) system, the exigencies and ‘interruptions’ of (in this case) social work 
day to day realities, and the inappropriate application of industrially based solutions; 
he demonstrates how up to 80% of a social worker’s workload might be taken up 
with ‘servicing’ the system’s requirements for ‘effective’ case management.  He 
describes a data/monitoring-driven approach which, arguably, ‘removes’ social 
workers from the field of play other than as instruments (everywhere and nowhere) 
requiring them to constitute themselves as coders of children, young people and 
families in all their complexities.  Ince says the system represents a “technological 
shackling” (p.2) and a ‘chiasmus’, explaining:  
The term ‘chiasmus’ is due to McLuhan who defined it as the reversal of 
process caused by increasing its speed, size or scope – every process pushed 
far enough tends to reverse or ‘flip’ suddenly   
(Ince, 2010, p.11, footnote).   
  
The system constructed data management (rather than work with families) as 
paramount in social work (despite the stated intentions of the Climbié Inquiry) and, 
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in so doing, instrumentalises and de-humanises both users and professionals and 
centralizes a narrow accountability “in which IT is used as a panoptican” (p.19; see 
also Garrett, 2004); Ince questions whether the development of ICS and its 
implementation treats social workers as professionals, specifically whether they are 
trusted and have any autonomy.  As inevitable problems in the system emerged in 
practice, Ince also implies attempts to suppress these coming to light – for example, 
a reluctance to engage with a multitude of concerns collated by UNISON and based 
on experiences of using the new system; and the government’s own commissioned 
(from the University of York), highly critical, evaluation of ICS pilot implementation 
which was only released eighteen months after the event, under a Freedom of 
Information Request (Bell et al, 2007).   
Ince’s (retrospective) critique is pertinent especially as someone who witnessed 
ongoing attempts to shoehorn (the multiples of) practice into the prescribed systems 
being introduced in the name of (standardized) ‘safeguarding’ – not only for the ICS, 
but for  ContactPoint33 and the Common Assessment Framework34 (CAF), all with 
their highly complex information transfer chains.  On ContactPoint Munro (2005) 
wrote it had “alarming potential for panopticism” providing government with an 
(apparently) “technically flawless means for exercising power and discipline in 
response to the confusion of ‘child abuse’ and the murder of children by their 
caregivers” ; she suggests it positions workers as ‘guards’ and ContactPoint a 
mechanism through which they share information with other guards.   Ince and 
Munro together, then, construct, an image of multiple layers of surveillance, in 
relation to the wider population, but also of professionals themselves.   
However, Peckover, White and Hall, who also document multiple problems with 
ContactPoint in their study, notably suggest that the strength of professional 
cultures and practices meant they were “not sufficiently malleable to be eroded by 
the introduction of an ICT system” (2008, p.379).  They suggest professional 
perceptions about the nature of their work did not connect with their idea of what 
                                                          
33
 ContactPoint was a national government database holding information on all young people under 18; it was 
heavily criticised and scrapped by the Coalition Government in 2010. 
34
 This is a standard assessment form used by all professionals engaged in child welfare work. 
100 
 
‘real’ work was - they cite a health visitor who explained she had not used the 
system “because she had ‘practical work to do, you know, making phone calls and 
getting on with the job’” (p.379); this might further suggest something in actual work 
practices and an understanding of self escaping the panoptic gaze of the new IT 
systems in children’s services and even as the problematic constitution of self with 
the new technologies and tools of children’s services emerged.   
 
4.5 WORKFORCE REFORM 
This was all accompanied by an unprecedented focus on ‘workforce reform’ with the 
wide-ranging Children’s Workforce Strategy (DfES, 2005) framing the picture and 
including a proposed ‘single qualifications framework’ and an ‘indicative career 
framework’ across early years, schools, social care, youth services, and health and 
proposals in each of these areas.  The Common Core of Skills and Knowledge (CWDC, 
2005, 2010) was to be applied across the sector with new reviews of all relevant 
national occupational standards to ensure its incorporation - “the professional 
learning of the Children’s Workforce is a top UK government priority” (Coombs 2006, 
p.1).   Changes were oriented to delivering the new agenda and (prescribed) 
outcomes, within a context of tight regulation and inspection regimes – “based on 
hierarchical, bureaucratic and legalistic assumptions” (Sinclair and Corden, 2005, 
p.18).   
 
Initial, professional, and CPD programmes were very much part of the landscape of 
the workforce reform agenda in children’s services through ‘commissioning’ (and 
employer engagement), and were subject to substantial investment and targeting of 
resources across diverse parts of the workforce, including in early years35, youth 
work and youth support, education, health, social work, playwork and, as 
significantly, for ‘leaders and managers’ across the sector as well as developed in 
specific occupational areas.  Such investment was organised, shaped and 
                                                          
35
 The workforce development activities in early years came through slightly different trajectories some of 
which preceded Every Child Matters.  They focused on Early Years Professional Status (EYPS) (now Early Years 
Teachers – EYT), and there was some join-up with ECM agendas. 
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commissioned by the activities of “powerful bureaucracies” and “designed to 
monitor and control” (Ward and Eden, 2009, p.4) – and that lay close to government, 
such as the Children’s Workforce Development Council (CWDC) established in 2005 
and Training and Development Agency for Schools (TDA).  This included, for example, 
the development of a number of Foundation Degrees endorsed by such bodies, and 
also a raft of aligned competency and skills-based frameworks.   
 
Whilst on the ground and in practice, there was a differential effect (some workers 
were centrally implicated whilst others were on the margins of such changes), the 
ripples (or waves) also spread more widely.  For example, a range of organizations, 
including higher education institutions (particularly those ‘second tier’ universities 
experiencing reductions in research income and an increasingly challenging funding 
landscape), recognized the ‘opportunities’, reoriented and aligned their objectives, 
and jumped on board with the new agenda, in the name of ‘income generation’ (the 
internal message) and ‘employer engagement’,  ‘partnership working’, and 
‘transformational learning to meet outcomes’ (the external ones).  The ‘industries’ of 
children’s services gathered momentum – we were all ‘on board’ or (albeit variously) 
‘implicated’, depending on your perspective. 
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C h a p t e r   5 
 
SELFHOOD AND SURVEILLANCE 
Constituting selfhood in surveillance, and its intensifications in neo-liberalism 
 
 
 
The poststructuralist hermeneutics of suspicion was only ever a slow interruption of the 
capitalist machine, pointing out its construction as reflexive and meaningless.  On the flat 
field of post-postmodernism capitalism speeds ahead, unhindered by significatory concerns.  
The slings and arrows of deconstruction can find no purchase on this juggernaut.  
        (Darby, 2013, p.735) 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter extends the account and analysis along two dimensions (or ‘lines of 
flight’).  Firstly, a posthuman (performative) understanding is brought alongside the 
fixed (humanist) subjects of children’s services, to consider how this might serve to 
lever or rework an understanding of social professional selfhood.  This is the 
humanist and posthumanist in relation, as both existing, and this is explored via a 
consideration of research in children’s services practice.  Secondly, some conceptual 
territory of an ‘intensifying’ neoliberalism, and as a mode of surveillance, is brought 
into connection, and as consequential, for social professional selfhood.     
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Research studies that include an examination of the impact on professionals of 
children’s services policy and practice changes emerge and are intertwined with an 
assumption of the humanist sovereign subject.  Such studies often enshrine 
approaches and questions foregrounding the experience of professionals, as residing 
in, and with, professionals themselves.      To ask how policy/practice constitutes the 
self is a shift from questions that focus on, and investigate, impact.  The literature is 
highly dominated by questions of ‘impact’ - on ‘outcomes’ primarily in relation to a 
range of specific measures (‘attendance at Key Stage 3’ for example) and more 
generally in relation to Every Child Matters (ECM) (DfES, 2004) five outcomes, but 
also sometimes about the impact on other things, such as ‘professionals’.  These 
questions foreclose;, when one asks about impact on (professional) self, they 
assume the prior existence of the subject, subject to that impact.  That is, (versions 
of) a liberal humanist subject are pre-existing - to be (imp)acted on. 
 
In posthumanist formulations the self is not sovereign or pre-existing, it is becoming 
and performative; questions about do-ings and makings (constituting, producing, 
generated in interaction and entanglement) become important – a focus on what 
policy/practice activities do and make, and what happens.   ‘Experience’ is located 
outside the individual self (of humanism), it is dispersed, and self appears or emerges 
as an outcome of interacting forces (Barad, 2007; Deleuze and Guattari, 1987/1980; 
Semetsky, 2010), rather than as being grounded in individual experience or agency.   
These involve quite different questions from those of impact on professionals, they 
direct attention to the conditions and circumstances in which self can emerge.   
 
What this means is that, whilst recognising the (profoundly ‘sovereign’) self-in-
surveillance of children’s services, I am also concerned with an emphasis beyond the 
standard humanist self, and beyond standard critical perspectives that are often 
utilised within this frame and brought to bear to critique children’s services policy 
and practice arrangements.  A consideration of the posthumanist subject moves 
beyond the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ and more towards what Nealon calls “a 
toolkit for the construction of a ‘hermeneutics of situation’” (2012, p.xii).  This draws 
attention to what is happening (performativity) in the here and now and the 
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conditions that produce this - a self emerging in entanglement and appearance.  This 
seeks to already call up a dynamism , a relationality, associated openings and 
possibilities, and movement (and the Deleuzian fold), a shift in emphasis with which 
it might be more possible to move beyond formulations of a sovereign self lost in 
conditions of surveillance.    
       
So, this chapter seeks to capture both the impact on, and the conditions and 
circumstances for enactments (becomings, appearances) of (professional) selfhood - 
that is, the workings and the constitution of self that might be thought within a 
humanist and post-humanist subject assemblage-for-self.   
 
This emphasis has not received attention previously although there has been some 
focus on redefinitions of the workforce and the promotion of new professional and 
managerial subjectivities (an identity project) and as central features of the wider 
management discourses of New Public Management (NPM) (du Gay, 1996; Halford 
and Leonard, 1999; Thomas and Davies, 2005).  For example, Ladner and Nocker 
(2012) openly acknowledge that the role of a manager (and Ladner is a local 
authority manager herself) is to “develop, manage and monitor the construction of 
the new [children’s] workforce” and that:  
.…the identity work involved in this process has been politically scripted, 
regulated and monitored by the previous Labour government and 
coordinated by local authorities across the country.     
(Ladner and Nocker 2012, p.2)    
  
This tethers the impact of the work of managers to worker identity, with the 
humanist subject assumed.   
 
In addition, the policy and practice landscape and its configurations for self does not 
operate in isolation.  The self is multiply configured and (re)worked in neoliberalism 
(Foucault, 2008/1978; Rose, 1989) and this connection in the assemblage provides 
further  mechanisms for self, both having an impact upon self, or (within a 
posthuman frame) as part of the generative conditions and circumstances producing 
self.  Certainly, neoliberalism as an ideological set of ideas about economy and 
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society has been noted as producing particular requirements for the selfhood of 
social professionals, where policy ‘reforms’ and ‘technologies’ are “not simply 
vehicles for the technical and structural change of organisations” (Ball, 2003, p.217).  
In the second half of this chapter I summarise the current context for children’s 
services in neo-liberalism, and as one involving the intensification of surveillance in 
neoliberalism.   This runs counter to the idea that the UK Coalition government 
simply deprioritised children’s services developments in its ravaging of ‘the public 
sector’ in austerity.  The issue is, what has intensified?  This word is deliberately 
chosen and drawn from Nealon’s (2012) book on Post-Postmodernism where this is: 
an “intensification and mutation within postmodernism” (p.ix) and where the author 
argues that:  
Capitalism itself is the thing that’s intensified most radically….The late 
capitalism of….the tail end of the cold war…has since intensified into the ‘just-
in-time’ (which is to say all-the-time) capitalism of our neo-liberal era.    
         (Nealon, 2012, p.x-xi) 
 
Capitalist neoliberalism escalates and accelerates; the question is, whether anything 
can be made productive and creative from this, via posthuman leverage. 
 
 
5.2 CONSTITUTING SELF IN CHILDREN’S SERVICES 
 
The account in the previous chapter (in the doing) of the Climbié Inquiry, the 
integration of services, and so on, begins to highlight generative and constitutive 
elements for selfhood.  If one’s lens is to focus on a non-sovereign (post-humanist) 
self, the question is about what is (and can be) done and produced by and through 
(children’s services) activities/discourses with the self as part of this mix – self 
constituted as part of an entangled becoming.  Reporting impact on professionals is 
not the same as trying to get at doings in action and the simultaneous appearance of 
self.  This question, generated via a performative, posthuman understanding 
immediately introduces more dynamism, relationality, perhaps more space and 
possibilities, and complexity, into what is happening.  Questions about ‘impact on’ 
‘professionals’ are more static and imply a pre-existing self (and indeed, divisions 
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between subject/object and so on), where versions of the neo-liberal subject – in 
this case as often secured to particular professional identities - are built in.   
 
However, a number of studies on children’s services do identify a range of ‘impacts’ 
on professionals (although these, it should be noted, are often  relegated or of 
secondary concern, not always thought relevant in the highly dominating agenda of 
examining impact on outcomes for children and families).  These studies do have 
some relevance and whilst reporting ‘impact on’ professionals is not the same as 
trying to get at doings in action (and self-becoming), the findings might be utilised to 
support more dynamic (entangled) interpretations.    
 
In their CWDC-commissioned review of integrated working, Oliver and Mooney 
(2010) claim some positive impacts on professionals including that the work is more 
rewarding and stimulating and that professionals have better knowledge about 
other services and professional roles; improved opportunities for career 
development are also reported.  Similar studies and findings are cited in the earlier 
Atkinson et al (2007) review of multi-agency working (for example, via studies in 
specific projects or sectors, such as Abbot et al, 2005; Moran et al, 2006) although 
these authors acknowledge that much literature focuses on intended rather than 
actual, benefits of multi-agency working.  
 
However, negative impacts on professional identity(ies), status and conditions of 
work/working practices are widely reported, including problems of ‘role 
demarcation’ and relationships.  Whilst framed in terms of impacts on self (with a 
built in assumption of the pre-existing sovereign self) such ‘impacts’ might also 
suggest that selfhood itself may be questionable, or not entirely unproblematic.  
Abbot et al (2005) report confusion and uncertainty regarding professional roles, a 
negative impact on professional status, and undermining of specialist expertise.  
Moran et al (2006) report power struggles and low morale (from role ambiguities), 
claiming professional image, hierarchies and identity all as significant challenges to 
multi-agency work; similar issues are reported by Lessard et al (2006) and Frost and 
Lloyd (2006).    
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Struggles over status levels between different professionals, and statutory and 
voluntary sector organisations, threaten multi-agency relationships (Anning et al, 
2005; Healey, 2004) with ‘turf issues’ prevalent (Johnson et al, 2003); different 
professional ontologies are also problematic, for example in relation to the different 
beliefs of different professional groupings regarding particular problems such as 
youth offending (Robinson and Cottrell, 2005). Overall, Oliver and Mooney (2010) 
and Atkinson et al (2007) highlight the potentials for integrated working to produce 
confusion about professional identities: 
The development of a ‘one workforce’ model represents a radical challenge to 
the traditional model, in which services such as education and social services 
tended to be dominated by a single and related profession with its own 
professional identity     (Oliver and Mooney, 2010, p.27) 
 
 
The term ‘role boundaries’ already delineates particular and assumed spaces (to be 
defended), rather than emphasising possible and different ways of connecting.  In 
terms of working relationships and practices the importance of trust and mutual 
respect is persistently cited (for example, Percy-Smith, 2006; Sloper, 2004; Carpenter 
et al 2005; Allnock et al 2006) and the necessity for cultural change in different 
sectors of health, education and social services/care (Healey 2004) where conflicting 
professional and agency cultures are a major challenge; there are difficulties evident 
in communication at all levels of multi-agency working.  Reder and Duncan (2004) 
comment: 
….the issues of communication are far more complex than has ever been 
envisaged by [child abuse] inquiry panels and that their more practical 
recommendations (especially those focussing on procedural and technical 
aides to improve message transfers) only address a small part of this 
complexity.       (2004, p.110) 
The range of impacts above often cited in summary in the catch-all ‘communication’ 
and ‘professional culture’ impact sections of research studies are suggestive of real 
difficulties in negotiating self and objects (organisations) as bounded, as sovereign; 
for selfhood, they suggest a formulation of humanist, individualised, bounded and 
sovereign selves begins to break down in relation, and cannot be sustained. Simply 
reporting impact on professional selfhood, then, does not really do justice, or 
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capture, the complexity and depth of the range of interlocking ‘doings’ that are 
imbricated on the surface of practice here (nor the spaces that might exist for other 
doings).  
 
There are also impacts at the level of service/professional structures, working 
practices, and processes.  Increased workloads and demands leading to great 
pressure on services are reported (Abbot et al 2005; Smith and Mogro-Wilson, 
2007); and some professional roles (for example social work in health settings) are 
reported as being marginalized (Oliver and Mooney, 2010).  The period has also seen 
the creation of new, ‘sub-professional’ roles on the back of children’s services 
developments, such as the youth support worker, and family and parenting support 
practitioners who are widely perceived to have displaced and undermined 
‘professional’ cadres of workers and legitimated loss of jobs and a drive down of 
wage and other conditions.  And, in referring to new forms of governance emerging 
in children’s services a research participant commented “I don’t know who will own 
me next year” (Manager, Education support).  In a 2014 small-scale study in 
statutory social work, Carey claims cynicism as a key response to extensive changes 
in the organisation and delivery of social work where a majority of reforms have 
increased employee responsibilities “whilst also altering and fragmenting their role”, 
leading to “commonplace emotional responses that include anxiety, melancholy, 
scepticism and cynicism” (Carey, 2014, p.141) and where “the ‘reifying’ rhetoric of 
distorted and soundbite claims about participation and empowerment” foster a 
sense of incredulity amongst social workers. 
 
Whilst complex, these impacts at the level of professional workforces can be seen as 
involving a de-coupling of professional identities in order to re-secure them to the 
children’s services project which, in part, in neo-liberalism, also involves a de-
professionalising move and a driving down of working conditions; this has led to 
significant ontological insecurity and uncertainty.  One of my research participants 
(RP) captured a number of the (felt) issues and impacts, in the following exchange 
(I=interviewer): 
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RP Like-mindedness… and a shared endeavour, a genuine goodwill – that doesn’t 
exist in children’s services 
I:  So how would you describe it? 
RP: Hostile, communication breakdown, blame, lots of projections…..the system is 
drained, and struggles…[…]…critical, undermining….lots of undermining 
I:  Why do you think it is like that? 
RP: That whole idea about internal competition, y’know, empire building….highly 
competitive…but, clustering, people clustering together, y’know and… 
I:  Where does that come from? 
Probably been starved, not supported, y’know, so people try and…..fighting 
over a smaller and smaller pot….it’s just a starved system really. 
      (Senior practitioner, Health services) 
In my experience, these kinds of descriptions are not uncommon.  Not least, they 
show how policy and practice changes in children’s services operate in relation with 
what is happening for individual self, in relation. 
 
The developments in children’s services can be seen as a bringing into sharp relief, 
and disrupting, an existing ‘settlement’ of arrangements between the state, 
professionals, and practice, and that cuts across these powerfully.  The striations in 
the practice landscape, of professional categorisations and agency/sector 
boundaries, add multiple complications, additional ‘barriers’ and further divisions in 
any new and multi-agency structural groupings and through which, often additional, 
new arrangements, must pass.  They certainly work against a vision of a smooth 
plane of practice which, despite the vision, was, and could not be, how children’s 
services would develop, in a highly managerialised and politically and 
organisationally segmented and charged landscape for practice, with an increasingly 
neo-liberal formulation of market disciplines, of competition, and cost-savings 
adding more to the mix.  The attempt to drive through cultural, relationship, 
professional identity and organisational sector changes via almost wholly structural 
approaches and means (Stuart, 2012) (by mandate and authority, with no additional 
resources) served simply to reduce complexity on paper rather than relate to, or 
work with, anything we might call (diverse and multiple) ‘realities’ of practice that 
are predicated on relational, cultural, and political complexity (and messiness), 
organisational agendas, professional identity and status issues, and the workings of 
power. Nor, for social professional selfhood does this capture the possibility of 
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something outside or different. The humanist, individualised subject is enshrined for 
social professional selfhood even as this might break down at the margins, or could 
be read differently.   
 
From the account and discussion in this and the previous chapter, then, Table 4, 
over, summarises, firstly, reported impacts on social professionals (that is, from 
questions that foreground and assume the humanist subject) in children’s services 
policy and practice changes.  It distinguishes these from a range of considerations 
that emerge when one asks slightly different, posthumanistically-oriented questions 
about the emergence or appearance of (what might be a posthuman) self.  This 
identifies the conditions and circumstances in an assemblage for social professional 
selfhood in children’s services, aspects of the habitat with which selfhood becomes 
and is produced, and suggesting the ways in which self might be tethered or limited 
in particular ways.  The table is intended to capture the different focus of (humanist) 
impacts, versus the (posthumanist) being/doing nature of self-constitutions in 
entangled becoming.  Impact on self is rather a ‘static’, after-the-event measure; 
identifying the conditions with which self interacts and is produced, allows for some 
dynamism, suggesting self can ‘play out’ or emerge differently, and the possibility of 
spaces, for different kinds of becomings.  This thus also suggests how one might 
intervene to help effect  and produce different selves, beyond the humanist subject.  
That is, if the conditions under which self emerges can be moderated, levered or 
affected (perhaps by the introduction of a new connection/relation in assemblage) 
then the possibilities for the emergent self might shift   
 
A recent small-scale study draws attention to the actual workings of, and conditions 
in which, selfhood is produced, constituted, generated.  Whilst her research study 
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Table 4 
Constituting self in surveillance in children’s services: static and becoming selves 
 
 
Policy implementation 
activities  
 
(Reported) Impacts on social 
professional selfhood 
 
 
Conditions and circumstances constituting 
the self 
 
 
 
The Climbié Inquiry 
 
 
Integrating Services 
 
 
 
Tools for research, 
evidence and 
monitoring 
 
 
 
Workforce reform 
Positive: Work more stimulating and 
rewarding 
 
Positive: More/better knowledge about 
other services 
 
Confusion regarding professional roles 
 
Negative impact on professional status; 
‘turf issues’ 
 
Specialist expertise undermined 
 
Low morale 
 
Problems of communication 
 
Increased workloads 
 
De-professionalisation 
Individual self as the crucial site of change; 
the requirement to rework self 
Understanding self as deficient and the 
failure of ‘professionals’ 
 
The need to subject oneself to (more) 
regulation, and for ‘accountability’; an 
active) compliance 
 
In a top-down regime, driven/supported by 
standardised, external tools 
 
Structural changes driving service and 
individual (self) change 
 
Collaboration and competition with other 
agencies 
 
Professional (ontological) changes to secure 
outcomes 
 
Self as inter- or multi-professional 
 
Oriented towards outcomes 
 
Knowledge about practice and practice 
interventions comes from ‘science’ 
 
‘Case management’ via data management 
and IT systems 
 
Use of tools whose impact can be 
measured 
 
Self in relation to a defined skill and 
competency base 
 
 
 
112 
 
with one multi-agency group over a year is not situated within something that might 
be called a posthumanist framework, Kaz Stuart’s (2012, 2014) autoethnographic 
and action research methodology does capture some of the productions and 
processes operating in multi-agency practice, in its doings, and for those involved.  
Whilst indicating the multi-agency group came to present the outward signs of an 
‘effective’ multi-professional group, she provides a detailed account of the 
emergence of lack of trust, of “surface behaviours that mask deep biases”, and 
engaging “in lengthy debate that was pleasant and inclusive on the surface, but hid a 
layer of professional distrust and critique” (2012, n.p.).  Some members of the group 
were “discounted and criticized”, there was “a privileging of one professional 
discourse over another” and “hierarchies of power played out covertly, for example, 
in invitations to join certain group discussions outside of the official meeting forums” 
(2012); creative exercises “elicited tacit stereotypes” (2014, n.p.).   
 
Stuart found it was extremely difficult not to perpetuate the culture (as 
researcher/leader – her own self) and/or collude with it, leading to her questioning 
her own “weak” leadership and capabilities.  Participants acknowledged that they 
were still “in professional silos” (2014, n.p.) and “all the participants knew that they 
needed a shared multiprofessional identity, but these difficulties seemed to exist 
nonetheless” (2014, n.p.).  The group achieved collaborative inertia.  Stuart’s study, 
whilst identifying ‘professional identity’ not as singular but as multiple and changing  
(as single professional, as professional in a body, as worker in a particular 
organization, as multiprofessional) and as played out alongside other “day to day” 
identities provides (further) evidence that professional identities are a real challenge 
in this work.  
 
Stuart comments (2014) that there are no existing models for integrated working 
that focus on the “needs” of professionals involved in the process of delivering 
integrated services to meet the needs of children, young people and families.  She 
highlights the virtual absence of attention in children’s services formulations to what 
she identifies as the relational (agency) aspects of what happens - relationship is 
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“perhaps so intrinsic that it has become almost invisible, and it is absent from 
structural policy accounts of collaboration ” (Stuart, 2014 n.p.).   
 
The illuminations in Stuart’s study, including a drawing of attention to the lack of 
recognition (beyond general exhortations to build trust) in a policy focus on 
structural (re)arrangements, help to capture some of the doings in practice, in 
showing what arrangements help to constitute and produce.  This holds some 
resonance with my own understandings of what happens (what I have seen) and 
with frequently what is working or being made – in (so-called)’ integration’.  A 
research participant (Chief Executive, social work voluntary sector), in describing the 
positive risk-taking in one multi-agency group to engage with difference and for 
connection (“it was extraordinary”) talked about this in relation to her more common 
experience: “…so many interagency groups are so bad, so tedious” , and “the 
elephant in the room” of professional identity, status, organisational, sector, and 
power differentials playing out.  Another research participant talked about how such 
problems sometimes play out at different levels, and over the longer term:    
There have been a couple of big inquiries locally that have brought senior 
people to inquiries,to the table…. to give evidence – and because we, say…we 
might have been the service reporting concerns…. that have led to…the 
inquiries.  All seems to go ok and, then…a couple of months down the line you 
suddenly find…say…the school nurse team doesn’t want to cooperate with 
you anymore, or ….a health visiting team, it becomes obvious….or they tell 
you themselves…you suddenly realise they are working against you, have 
been told to be less cooperative..[they]…are angry…it just filters through from 
higher up.    
      (Senior practitioner, health services) 
 
Others (for example Moseley, 2008) have highlighted the workings of the 
competitive context in which service providers operate which lead to the pursuit of 
strategies to promote their own organizational interests rather than working 
towards a dominant common interest, including a failure to share information, 
possessiveness over user outcomes, and projecting an image of success rather than 
sharing problems.   
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Stuart (2012, 2014) is right to highlight the sheer complexity of multi-agency groups 
at work and the fact that bottom up workings and local factors may be as influential 
as external conditions.    Her interpretations, which are largely about the importance 
of relational agency and an espousing of a greater attention to issues of 
communication are less convincing for an expansive selfhood in practice, in fact they 
only make sense if one only concentrates on her local factors and the close policy 
and practice environment as opened up in this chapter.  Beyond that, any 
improvements (in working together) might be won in the face of other existing 
(pre)conditions in which self is constituted; this could be a kind of endless swimming 
upstream (exactly the metaphor applied by one of my research participants to 
thinking both about the lives of users, and of professionals, in children’s services) – 
policy and practice does not operate in a connection-less vacuum – there are other 
connections to be made. 
 
There is politics and power here – both the politics of a neoliberal economy and the 
politics of self.  The politics of a neo-liberal world draws attention to power, and to 
economic arrangements that work counter to collaboration and that produce self in 
surveillance.  These are intensifying, and these intensifications are explored below.  
The politics of self is a focus on what different ideas about self can ‘bring to the 
table’, and draws attention to what might be thought and done (otherwise); that is 
the subject of chapter six where I extend critical posthumanist formulations (to 
imagine)the possibilities for self beyond and alongside the (disciplined, functional, 
instrumentalised, constituting) self of surveillance, operating and becoming in 
expansive spaces. 
 
 
 
5.3 TOWARDS AUSTERITY  
 
In the first independent review of Children’s Trust arrangements, the Audit 
Commission (2008) stated that government had been too prescriptive and that too 
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much time and energy had been spent on structures and processes in a context of 
“organizational blueprints” (p.19) from government –  
This begs the question of how helpful the centrally-directed approach to 
management arrangements has been.  The structural change originally 
proposed was not based on evidence that it was either necessary or 
effective…..There is a tension in mandating partnership working; the greatest 
benefit comes from common ownership of problems, rather than merely 
responding to external direction.    (Audit Commission 2008, p.65) 
 
The report concluded there was little evidence of improved outcomes for children 
and young people as a result of the reforms (nor of ‘value for money’ improvements) 
over and above negotiated working together arrangements that had been driven 
locally (and that ‘working together’ in the way the reforms had envisaged, remained 
a work in progress).   Further child deaths from fatal abuse, and attributed to 
ongoing individual (professional) and organizational failures, have continued, those 
receiving widespread coverage include Peter Connelly in 2007 (‘Baby P’) and Demi 
Mahon, 2008); others are less reported36.  The See the Child, Change the System 
campaign37, launched June 2014, reported: 
From 2005-2011 there were 645 serious case reviews, all of which reported 
multiple failed opportunities where those professionals involved in the child’s 
life could have protected them  (www.seethechild.org , 2014) 
 
It also cites “profound political failures”, a “lack of moral courage” and “apathetic 
responses” (Batmanghelidjh, 2014, n.p.) as characterizing the UK response to child 
abuse and neglect.  There are calls for wholesale review of children’s services and 
integrated working.     
  
A concentration on individual professional failures, common in formal inquiries, 
serves to direct attention away from other factors vital to child well-being. 
A damning 2007 UNICEF report on the well-being of children and young people had 
already placed Britain last amongst 20 OECD countries (UNICEF, 2007); the level of 
inequality in Britain was an underpinning feature (Cunningham and Cunningham, 
                                                          
36
 See the Daily Telegraph (2010) for a timeline of ‘social services failures’. 
37
 This campaign was launched by Camilla Batmengelidjh of Kids Company, London in June 2014 proposing an 
independent task force to review all children’s social care and mental health services – see 
www.seethechild.org  
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2012).  In a qualitative and comparative follow up study, Ipsos MORI and Nairn 
(2011) highlighted and explored materialism - a “compulsive consumption cycle” 
(p.72) - and inequality, as particular features of the UK environment for child well-
being.  Other international comparisons reveal similar pictures.  For example, the 
United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child made 108 recommendations in 
2008 in relation to the improvement of children’s rights in England; the Children’s 
Rights Alliance for England (CRAE, 2013) report, State of Children’s Rights in England, 
summarises progress made and where, despite some progress, “serious violations” 
remain, and overall the picture is described as “bleak”, and where: 
  
economic pressures have been used to justify not only a serious erosion of 
children’s economic and social rights, such as health, food and the right to 
play, but also fundamental changes to our justice system   
         (CRAE, 2013, p.1) 
 
There is cynicism about the form of serious case reviews and inquiries in this respect, 
which typically do not address the bigger picture.  Writing in The Guardian at the 
time of the Climbié Inquiry, Ian Willmore (ex-Deputy Leader at Haringey Council) 
says: “The "script" for this kind of Inquiry is now almost traditional. The Minister 
goes on TV to insist that: this must never happen again. Responsibility is pinned on a 
few expendable front-line staff, all conveniently sacked in advance. Criticisms are 
made about poor communication, with earnest recommendations about better co-
ordination and possible restructuring. Council officers - all new appointments - go on 
TV to say that everything has changed since the case began. Everyone looks very 
earnest. Voices crack with compassion. Nothing essential changes.”  (Willmore, 
2003, n.p.) 
 
In children’s services it is certainly arguable that resource questions had been 
underplayed and, more specifically, additional resources had not been made 
available for implementation of the new agenda in Children’s Trusts areas despite 
claims of a ‘social investment state’ (Lister, 2006; Churchill, 2011).  Lord Laming had 
dismissed the Association of Directors of Social Services (ADSS) claims that more was 
needed to implement reforms as “the usual kneejerk response” and as ”lacking 
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intellectual rigour” (cited in Batty, 2003), despite the body of the original Inquiry 
Report having documented some evidence of a stretched resource base.  Given the 
scale of the changes that had been progressed this was a significant (and 
extraordinary) omission (Sinclair and Corden, 2005).  This had sent, again, a clear 
message that money was not (regarded as) the issue (so, poor and ineffective 
practice and service organization was).  The commissioning environment in 
children’s services had certainly been established.  The pooling of budgets and joint 
commissioning, central to integrated working and with a rather neutral, government 
definition of “working across agency boundaries to identify needs, specify service 
requirements, decide whether to purchase or provide the services and then procure 
or deliver them” (DfES, 2004), hid a multitude of problems on the ground about the 
control of budgets; joint commissioning had not made significant in-roads in the 
delivery of services (Audit Commission 2008).    
 
The Conservative-Liberal Coalition government faced a different context in terms of 
economic landscape.  Under a discourse of economic crisis and austerity there have 
been some ideological and political shifts to a honed, redoubling of neo-liberalism 
and despite the economic crisis of 2008 that might have heralded something 
different (Stronach and Clarke, 2012).  This has brought, notably, further narrowing 
of targeted approaches for those multiply disadvantaged alongside further restricted 
conceptualisations of the problem (the Department for Education states child abuse 
is an extreme form of poor parenting hence the answer lies with parents and in 
parenting interventions) (Asmussen et al., 2012).  A racialised discourse is also 
evident, questioning the use of (any) welfare services by non-British nationals living 
and working in Britain or who may come in the future and under the guise of a 
‘fairness’ discourse.  Whilst Churchill (2011) sees some continuity he also identifies a 
new stage, referring to backing for civil liberties concerns about the interference of 
the state which (usefully) aligns with an austerity agenda.    
 
A changed language for children’s services was signalled by the incoming 
government - circulation of a Department for Education memo in summer 2010 
indicated the language which was now to be used.  For example, ‘the five outcomes’ 
118 
 
or ‘every child matters’ was now to be described as ‘helping children achieve more’ , 
‘targetted services’ was now to become ‘fairer services’ (Puffett, 2010) and 
‘integrated working’ is now to be described as ‘people working better to provide 
better services’.  This indicates subtle shifts to greater individual responsibility and to 
the ‘big society’, with a distancing from the New Labour project.  The ‘big society’ 
understanding of the delivery of services and as welfare cuts are implemented,  
envisages a much greater role for citizens, communities, the voluntary/social 
enterprise sector, and the private sector, in the commission, provision and delivery 
of services and in making ‘efficiency savings’ (Churchill 2011).  Certainly, further 
marketisation is in process very widely across welfare in an increasingly ‘economistic’ 
and ‘enterprise’ frame, with a transfer of (social) risks from the state to the 
individual.      
 
It is clear that cost savings take precedence and influence everything else and these 
align with neo-liberal themes of a smaller state, individual responsibility and self-
sufficiency, and residual welfare targetting only those most disadvantaged.  There 
have been some novel twists in the discourse, for example, with what have been 
widely touted, by those on the left, as a series of ‘divide and rule’ tactics; these go 
beyond the classic division into the deserving and undeserving poor and have now 
been applied to public sector versus private sector workers, with the former faring 
worse in the discourse, and the lowest paid of these at the sharp end of actual cuts 
and wider tax and pension changes.  Baxter’s (2011) review of public sector 
professional identities somewhat shores up these divisions as well as, once again, 
reviving ‘professional identity’ as the significant discourse of resistance.             
 
A range of legislative reform, centrally affecting children’s services in England has 
been, or is being, implemented, including The Localism Bill (2011), The Health and 
Social Care Bill (2011) and The Education Bill (2011).  The national Children’s 
Workforce Development Council (CWDC) was disbanded in the ‘cull of the quangos’ 
by the incoming government with children’s services workstreams either being 
discontinued (for example, the National Academy of Parenting Practitioners), or with 
responsibilities transferred, largely to the newly formed Department for Education 
119 
 
(under New Labour the Department for Children, Schools and Families).  Some 
statutorily driven and delivered children’s services are, across the country, under 
threat or have been reshaped and reformed, either through large-scale 
redundancies, decommissioning, and/or commissioning out, for example, youth 
services.  Cuts are being implemented even in formal education services, social work 
and in early years, and with further shifts in emphasis to business models of practice, 
with efficiency savings and cost effectiveness to the fore (what works best for least 
money) (C4EO, 2011).   
 
 
5.4 SURVEILLANCE: INTENSIFICATIONS IN NEO-LIBERALISM 
 
Traditionally, in liberalism, the state is associated with the roll-back of the state to 
allow the market to operate in freedom.  In his latterly translated lectures on 
bioethics, Foucault (2008/1978) argues that neoliberalism should not be equated 
“with laissez-faire but rather with permanent vigilance, activity and intervention” 
(p.132) to ensure market competition.  In this way, neoliberalism is not about the 
absence of government but about ensuring the state is “marketised to its core” 
Gane, 2012, p.627); the state works to makes competitition play a “regulatory role at 
every moment at every point in society” (Foucault, 2008/1978, p.145) and the 
“general regulation of society by the market” (ibid.p.145).  This is not surveillance 
based on panopticism as this positions the state as watching over the market (which 
means minimal supervision because it is said to be natural and self-organising).  
Rather the state governs for the market to continually ensure that competition is 
maintained, and as guided by the market so, increasingly, it watches itself so that the 
‘freedom’ of the market penetrates into all its own workings (institutions).  Inasmuch 
as there might be both movements operating (both a Panoptic state oversight of 
market freedoms, and the market as making incursions into the operations of ‘public 
services’ themselves) Jamie Peck (2010) refers to this as both ‘roll-back and roll-out’.     
The complementary strategy that has been identified, perhaps where privatisation 
and the furtherance of market principles is not possible, is ‘audit explosion’ (Rose, 
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1999, p.153) with a proliferation of performance indicators and other forms of 
measurement producing new regimes of accountability; in education, Stephen Ball 
relates this to “the battle for the teacher’s soul” (Ball, 2003) but this could apply 
widely across children’s services.  The immunity in education and children’s services 
to market principles has long gone, backed up by now taken-for-granted inspection 
regimes that, in part, focus on the capacities and practices of schools and children’s 
services to undertake their own self-scrutiny and self-surveillance via monitoring 
machinery that makes market disciplines familiar.  
What this means is that the state in neo-liberalism is not simply overseeing the 
market (and increasingly marketised ‘public’ services) it is involved in active and 
intensive relationship with it that works both ways – the state protects the market 
and the market shapes the state and so lines are increasingly blurred between the 
public, and the private.  Nicholas Gane (2012) proposes a fourfold typology of 
surveillance, an heuristic device, to understand the logic of contemporary capitalism 
– surveillance as discipline, as control, as interactivity, and as the promotion of 
competition.  This draws attention to multiple, overlapping mechanisms that may be 
in operation in an intensifying situation and to which children’s services (and those 
who work in them) are subject/in relation.  
According to Gane (2012) (and after Foucault), surveillance as discipline is based on 
the Panopticon.  The Panopticon is a prison, with a central tower, and with circularly-
arranged cells.  This means a guard stationed in the tower can always see every cell – 
unlimited surveillance - but through an arrangement of screens is not necessarily 
themselves seen.  This means that there is an unlimited capacity for watching, but 
the guard may or may not be there.  Hence, those in the cells act as though they are 
being watched, whether or not this is the case.  Foucault utilises the idea of the 
Panopticon to describe a disciplinary technique of supervision, not necessarily with a 
material reality, but a cultural logic and as a mode of governance.   
Thus, the relationship between the state and the market can be described as one 
where government watches over (a free) market/marketised services, but only 
intervenes when something is seen to go wrong in the conduct of this.  More direct 
121 
 
supervisory strategies of “breathing life into….introducing additional freedom 
through additional control and intervention” (Foucault 2008/1978, p.67) are also 
possible.   Gane says that the discipline of the Panopticon “is tied to fixed 
institutional spaces” (2012, p.620) and when one considers the plethora of 
‘institutions’ associated with children’s services and as market principles, such as 
‘choice’, make even greater incursions (for example, via a diversifying education 
market of academies, free schools), the supervisory (regulatory) machinery needs to 
run counter to a classically neo-liberal ideology of reduced government.  However, 
the Panopticon is relatively efficient so supervisory (observation mechanisms) are 
the audit trails so beloved across public services.  Commissioning machinery and 
relationships (whether local or via national contracts) are also premised upon 
effective monitoring and supervision and as private sector companies increasingly 
take over swathes of children’s services operations the ‘arms-length’ supervisors 
(guards) watch over, though to interfere as little as possible with expanding market 
freedoms.   
In surveillance as control, Deleuze (1995, cited in Gane 2012) argues that Foucault’s 
disciplinary societies were short-lived and that new forms of institution are much 
less to do with the confinements implied in the Panopticon.  He writes:  
We’re in the midst of a breakdown of all sites of confinement – prisons, 
hospitals, factories, schools, the family.  The family is an ‘interior’ that’s 
breaking down like all other interiors – educational, professional, and so on.  
The appropriate ministers have constantly been announcing supposedly 
appropriate reforms; but everyone knows these institutions are in more or 
less terminal decline.  It’s simply a matter of keeping people busy until the 
new forces knocking at the door take over.   
     (Deleuze, 1995, cited in Gane, 2012, p.619-620) 
 
 
Deleuze’s control societies are much more mobile and flexible than the fixed spaces 
and forms of institutional settings in disciplinary society; they are a “mutation of 
capitalism” (ibid. p.620) and have the same dispersive logic in their operations, with 
mobility and speed at their heart but surveillance is at a distance.  This is a “post-
disciplinary model of governance which devolves power downwards from crumbling 
state institutions to new agencies of control that emerge from the market” (Gane, 
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2012, p.631), mobile and fluid entities but with continuous power often achieved 
through control mechanisms of ICT.   Others have also noted that mobility is an 
“evocative keyword for the twenty-first century”  (Hannam et al, 2006, p.1), with 
some giving it a paradigmatic status (Sheller and Urry, 2006).    
This draws attention to new forms of governance, notably various forms of network 
governance through which Ball and Junemann (2012) claim governance by the state 
is stretching out and penetrating, tentacle-like, via various forms of network 
governance and thereby acquiring new forms of power, of “metagovernance” 
(Jessop, 2002, cited in Ball and Junemann, 2012, p.8).  This is more than simply 
expanded structural and operational extensions of the market into what have 
traditionally been public sector operations, they are new “discursive and epistemic 
communities” (Ball and Junemann, 2012, p.11) and involve a mode of being, a 
sensibility, that enables and constrains what policy can do and how we can be.  This 
is part of the ‘shadow state’ (Wolch, 1990) and Ball and Junemann establish how the 
educational state is much more “congested” as “new and a wider variety of players 
‘enter’ into forms of ‘statework’” (2012, p.137).  In children’s residential units, only 
11% are now owned by charities with 65% in the private sector; two out of the big 
three foster placement providers are owned by private equity firms (Williams, 2012).  
Williams comments “It is very hard to pinpoint which firm owns what; their waters 
appear to be in perpetual motion, as they buy one another, take one another over, 
and offload assets” (2012, p.8), operating “through mobility and speed” (Gane, 2012, 
p.620).   
Partially drawing on Bauman’s critique of market capitalism and his analyses of 
individualization, Gane’s surveillance as interactivity reverses the model of the 
observing Panopticon (whether of those confined, or via more mobile methods); in 
interactivity, the many watch (and interact with) the few.  In this scenario, people 
and organisations are tied into consumerist and market-driven modes of being (for 
example, in terms of a concern with presentations) so look to the ‘freedoms of the 
market’ and media for guidance (rather than to other sources), and as willing (or 
perhaps as unwitting) participants.  Indeed, those organisations working with 
children and young people are acutely aware of the importance of their ‘image’ and 
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‘branding’, for example.  One research participant (senior practitioner, youth and 
community services) described how she was “always getting into trouble for not 
producing enough ‘trophies’ from my practice [area]” – for example, “not getting 
enough photos showing ‘achievements’ that can then go on display on the website.” 
Finally, Gane’s surveillance to promote competition likewise is a ‘post-Panopticon’ 
form where the state actively seeks to rework itself in the image of the market.  It is 
the reverse of Panopticism because the market now fully penetrates (in a kind of 
feedback loop) state and society, increasingly manufacturing “marketized forms of 
competition where previously they did not exist” (Gane, 2012, p.632) (rather than 
the state overseeing the operations of the market).  These processes of self-
surveillance (for example a raft of audit procedures and mechanisms) by the state on 
the state are essential to maintain legitimacy (in the eyes of the market), to promote 
competitive possibilities and opportunities, and where enterprise is a generic 
solution to wicked social and educational problems (Ball, 2010).  The mechanisms of 
audit and associated performative policy tecnnologies are often linked to forms of 
managerialism; here, Gane links them explicitly to neo-liberal intensifications. 
Gane’s typology is an heuristic device and, as he acknowledges, needs more 
development.  What it does make clear though are multiple forms of surveillance, 
operating together and overlapping (and in the intensifying neo-liberalism of 
austerity).  Certainly the replacement of ‘disciplinary’ modes by the notion of 
‘control’ seems premature; both appear to be operating.  For example, the securing 
of children’s services professionals to particular tasks in particular modes of 
governmentality certainly does not preclude the straightforward ‘command and 
control’ of (surveillance as) discipline – a very direct approach was adopted in the 
government progress report (Laming 2009) following the death of ‘Baby P’ (Peter 
Connelly):  
The utility of the policy and legislation has been pressed on me by 
contributors throughout this report.  In such circumstances it is hard to resist 
the urge to respond by saying to each of the key services, if that is so, NOW 
JUST DO IT      (Laming, 2009, p.6-7) 
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What are the alternatives in debates about expansions and intensifications of neo-
liberalism, in austerity?  it is clear that parts of the political left are engaged in 
seeking out alternatives in the face of the hegemony (and their critique) of a neo-
liberal project in welfare38, and that also link to (potential) selves of professionals 
(whether generically in ‘welfare’ or more specifically for parts of children’s services).  
Dorling, for example (in his review of Marquand’s (2014) Mammon’s Kingdom) 
comments that it will be difficult to reject individualism until we can embrace 
mutuality, and here the “greatest obstacles in our way are ourselves” (Dorling, 2014, 
n.p.).  Themes of a revitalized public realm – co-production (between professionals 
and users/children), participatory democracy, new models of public ownership and 
the social return on investment and early intervention – abound (for example, Hall et 
al, 2013-14; Angel, 2014; Marquand, 2011; Aked et al, 2009; Frost, 2014) though 
these are not particularly evident in public discourse.    
 
There is also an emphasis on ‘the good society’ and a politics of public good and civic 
duty, positioned in contrast to the marketised and neo-liberalised (for example, 
Compass, 2014; Marquand, 2011), and also (normatively) against the paradoxically 
narrow ‘big society’ of a residual welfare state, for what is often called a ‘progressive 
capitalism’; the debates also include attention to alternative developments outside 
of the UK (for example, Wainwright, 2014).   There is talk of an ethic of stewardship 
for public good and, Ed Miliband (Leader of the Labour Party until 2015)  
acknowledged that the public realm felt “strangled by a sort of audit and marketised 
culture” and that it “went too far” under the New Labour project (in Marquand, 
2011, p.10).  Some are more explicitly oppositional than others (to neo-liberal 
themes) – those that focus on the social returns on investment, for example, 
arguably implicitly accept that an economic argument at least has to be won (for 
example, Aked et al, 2009), others continue to argue for old left expansionism (and 
universalism) in the public sphere, against privatisation, and linked to collective 
                                                          
38
 This at least involves a number of ‘think-tanks’ and activist organisations such as Compass (a membership 
organisation seeking to ‘give direction for the democratic left’), the New Economics Foundation (NEF), and 
Soundings journal (started by those previously associated with Marxism Today and the New Left Review), as 
well as a range of individual political commentators and academics and particular (often social movement-
linked) campaigning groups. 
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action (for example, Wainwright, 2014) in the face of neo-liberalism.  In recent 
months the economic debates have been given further impetus by the publication of 
Thomas Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First Century, a sweeping analysis of 
how inequality concentrates (intensifies) in capitalism rather than distributing its 
gains; this has been somewhat seized on by those on the left of the political 
spectrum39 to provide economic justifications for its different political (welfare) 
platform. 
 
However, realignments of the political debate appear a dim prospect and make little 
headway against a hegemonic (and ‘common sense’) belief in the power of free 
market economics and a politics of austerity that is set to continue following the 
2015 UK General Election.  A significantly shifted welfare paradigm, including in 
children’s services, seems unlikely.  This is the case, extraordinarily, as Stronach and 
Clarke (2012) point out so vividly, despite the global economic crisis of 2008 – with 
apparent “amnesia” (p.54) we  follow a “discredited” (p.55) and “illusory” (p.57) 
economic model as ‘business as usual’, in fact the “state culture continues and even 
intensifies [its] worship” (p.55).]   
 
5.5 LOST IN PRACTICE?   
Children’s services is not protected from the big picture; indeed, under the UK 
Coalition government’s reframing of our welfare paradigm, they are arguably at its 
heart.  At the same time, policy imperatives “do not arrive in empty spaces” (Clarke 
2007, cited in Garrett 2009, p.140), they are already populated (and gridded) by 
other discourses.  Garrett argues that this has contributed to the sheer messiness of 
the ‘transformation’ in children’s services, its unevenness, calling up a picture of 
both micro-resistances and inertia.  There may be something in this – Jayne Osgood 
(2006, 2012), for example, undertook a detailed study of early years workers and 
showed how, at a micro-level, early years workers act to subvert and re-shape 
                                                          
39
 An unsurprising counter  from the right has ensued, with a series of allegations about data errors originally 
published in the Financial Times, May 23
rd
, 2014 (that also impugn methodological choices that Piketty made); 
a rebuttal, with further statistical and methodological detail, was made by Piketty on May 28
th
 – see Piketty 
(2014a).    
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discourses of both professionalism and neo-liberalism.  On the other hand, if one 
sees a neo-liberal capitalist project as being in tension with a democratic way of life 
it would be unsurprising, simply, if the dismantling of ‘the public’ was, as yet, 
incomplete.  In addition, the complexity of the ‘transformation’  being demanded in 
children’s services is not something done overnight.   
Most of the literature examining the impact of neo-liberalism on children’s services 
(and the specific sectors that make it up) focuses on policy direction – that is, it is 
concerned with staking out particular positions in relation to versions of the left-
right political ground, and in terms of what should be done.  Certainly, there might 
be a basic tension between ‘the needs of the child’ and budget cuts in austerity.  
Garrett (2009) catalogues, in some detail, the impact of neo-liberalism in children’s 
services but largely focuses on the shifts and implications at the level of services and 
what should happen, rather than on those who work in them.  Literature about 
children’s services that does focus at the level of professionals almost wholly 
concentrates on the impact on ‘the workforce’ and ‘the profession’ as a whole and in 
terms of its organisational and structural features; this often highlights ‘de-
professionalising’ moves for the particular profession under discussion. For example, 
Bradford and Cullen (2014) trace youth work’s ambiguous relationship with 
‘professionalisation’ but also its increasing non-recognition in terms of professional 
status in current government policy.  They also highlight particular features of neo-
liberal and associated managerial practices that run counter to some of the main 
thrusts of youth work; relationships between young people and youth workers are 
now seen as being “subject to aggressive calibration and measurement” (Bradford 
and Cullen, 2014, p.10), and “at risk of being hollowed out by audit categories to 
become another ‘zombie category’” (p.10-11).    
With a focus at the level of the (professional) self, Ball’s (2003) article ‘The teacher’s 
soul and the terrors of performativity’ is unusual.  Stephen Ball shows how teachers 
begin to talk in new ways about themselves, in terms of new vocabularies of self, 
and as they work through requirements to reshape themselves in terms of ‘policy 
technologies’ involving ‘markets, managers and performativity’, including the 
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requirement to become an enterprising self (echoing the work of Nikolas Rose), 
present oneself in particular ways and maintain ‘fabrications’:  
versions of an organisation (or a person) which does not exist – they are not 
‘outside the truth’ – but neither do they render simply true or direct accounts 
– they are produced purposefully in order to ‘to be accountable’.  Truthfulness 
is not the point – the point is their effectiveness, both in the market or for 
Inspection or appraisal and in the work they do ‘on’ and ‘in’ the organisation 
– their transformational and disciplinary impact.    (Ball, 2003, p.224)   
      
The emotional impacts in attempts to ‘neo-liberalise’ one-self include guilt, 
uncertainty and stability as one orients oneself to external contingencies (and here 
Ball cites the work of Basil Bernstein on identity). 
A sense of flows and mobilities (and changing goalposts) was captured by a research 
participant but, at the same time, more mandatory (that is, more strictly 
‘disciplinary’) elements are still (and additionally) at work: 
It’s also been about - inconsistency, not so much in that what people do 
individually but in the sense  that, that  people change the framework around 
you all the time, all the time, because they decide they’ve got a better idea.   
So I’ll give you an example, the current Troubled Families agenda is an 
example, and going, right, this is what works, this is what you should do.  And 
obviously that’s just a reinvention, as Louise Casey would say, of family 
intervention work, project work.  But having said that, it’s got another name 
on it and it’s got these parameters, these mandatory parameters, which 
identify what a troubled family is   So it’s a very top-down bureaucratic 
exercise.   
      (Chief Executive, social enterprise, social work) 
 
Here, then, is both mobility and stasis with which the self (in practice) is working 
(becoming in practice/action). 
Austerity and cuts have led to much (more) reconfiguring and restructuring of 
services, including the widespread commissioning out of children’s services40.  
Multiple organisations have ‘transformed’ themselves into social enterprises, with 
                                                          
40
 This already sees private companies (such as Virgin Care) running a range of core NHS and social care 
children’s services; recent proposals to privatise child protection services (Butler, 2014) were later rescinded 
after widespread concern about the potentially distorting effect of introducing a ‘profit motive’ into such 
services(Butler, 2014a) 
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income generating ‘arms’ to ‘align’ with the new environment and its 
entrepreneurial requirements, rather than simply remaining legally constituted as 
‘voluntary organisations’.  Two research participants spoke about the impact of cuts 
in their own areas on the work: 
….giving up on a huge bit of work that lots and lots, hundreds of people across 
the county had put time and effort into making work, given up on all the 
families we were currently working with, and given up on all the potential 
families that might have needed that support…. and what is the message 
back to families, it’s that we don’t give a shit, we don’t give a shit….and that’s 
the same message to the workers too. 
.…the thing about working smarter,  actually there are ways we can all save 
time here but, again, that requires people to commit and hold their nerve for 
a period of time.  And the conditions weren’t necessarily right for people to 
commit and hold their nerve because they were also seeing redundancies 
happening.… [….]…. there was a lot of wobbliness around. 
      (Chief Executive, voluntary sector, social work) 
 And, later:  
The fact [is] that nobody was interested in having that debate [about the 
need for long-term interventions to see change] anywhere, and so there’s the 
part of me that, just, it’s crazy.  For months and months and months you 
could see it coming…. and we know then that what we’re doing is tinkering 
with families…. 
These fragments highlight the continuing uncertainty and the lack of valuing many 
workers feel is evident (and also for their service users) in an intensifying picture.  
 
Neo-liberalism, in its extensions, infuses and extends ‘the market’ into all aspects of 
the work of children’s services, and those who work in it.  Children’s services 
involves ‘social’ and ‘public’ goods but it is increasingly ‘fuzzy’ to know whether it is 
the public good, or market forces, that should be being served.  Things cannot be 
only private or owned by the ‘market-state ‘ but the revival of something called ‘the 
public sphere’ looks uncertain in current conditions.  
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C h a p t e r   6 
 
POSTHUMANIST RECLAMATIONS: BEING/KNOWING/PRACTISING 
Rethinking self beyond the humanist, in appearance 
 
 
When the King asked him what he meant by infesting the sea, the pirate defiantly replied: 
‘The same as you do when you infest the whole world; but because I do it with a little ship I 
am called a robber, and because you do it with a great fleet, you are an emperor.  
(Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans) 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter brings together a posthuman theoretical territory with my interview 
‘data’.  However, the quotation above draws attention, in this context, to the way in 
which children’s services policy and practice may be hegemonically saturated with 
‘the human’ (and therefore perhaps the small ways in which something other might 
be introduced, thought, or made).   That is, the social, political and organisational 
arrangements in children’s services policy and practice are premised on an 
Enlightenment humanism (and the separation of the human from everything else), 
whereby social professionals are autonomous individuals with agency.  In this world, 
dualisms emerging from the Cartesian separation of mind and matter multiply.  The 
(Western) world is ontologically choreographed in this image, humanism as a frame 
of reference (and likewise, the humanist subject) is institutionalised, continually re-
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secured and reproduced (Braidotti, 2013).  That is, a reality takes shape and people 
come to live with it (Mol, 1999).   
 
For example, in chapter three I suggested that particular categories of ‘social 
identity’, including professional identifications, pre-define who we are (and contain 
possibilities for politics along a left-right axis).  Social identity acts as a mediating 
concept in relation to the experience, agency and interests (Hall, 1996; Hunter, 
2003) of the individual, to which selfhood hitches itself, maintaining the autonomous 
human subject, and separation between self and other (and things).  These 
categorisations for self (and upon which representation and analysis in critical social 
policy appears to depend) create particular grids or striations that carve up the 
landscape of practice.  The individual, separate from this matrix, nonetheless names 
and attaches itself (and is named and attached by others) via identifications, choice, 
‘experience’ and agency, and in this, reproduces the subject of humanism.  Similarly, 
in chapter five I suggested that centering the ‘experience’ of social professionals via 
studies of the ‘impact’ of policy change on them once again assumes the pre-existing 
sovereign subject  (to be impacted upon), and is also a static (and post hoc) way of 
understanding the messiness and complexities of practice.   
 
This tells us something about the circumstances and conditions of the world that 
pre-figure particular selves in particular ways (and in conditions of surveillance in 
neo-liberalism), that ineract and interfere in ‘self’.  However, they tell us little about 
practices - the performative and productive aspects of self and that might lie beyond 
a humanist grip, that emerge with and alongside myriad connections in the world.  In 
this thesis, I call up a Spinozan monism and a posthumanist understanding of the 
world where we are not separate from it, but part of it in its ongoing re-creation.  A 
oneness of the world, and in its differing, suggests rhizomatic formations where self 
is part of multiple (inter)connections in intra-activity (Barad, 2007), as part of the 
same, where agency (and selfhood) are part of the “ongoing configurations of the 
world” (Barad, 2003, p.818).   
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Critical posthumanism as an ontological practice, then, does not repudiate the 
already-existing for this too remains as part of the mix.  If practice involves particular 
ways of doing and enacting self one can ask how one is ontologically choreographed 
in particular ways, according to, or entangled with(in) the gridlines that are part of 
the interacting forces productive of self.  And a critical posthumanism encourages us 
to think beyond the humanist subject, to see what else might, or could, be there, 
that might not perhaps be entirely tied down to the versions of self that are insisted 
upon by established questions and knowledge practices, but that are actualised in 
relation to these.  To make available a posthuman territory is to make a new 
connection, to help (one) see (and produce) such actualisations.   
 
There are assumptions in my research questions suggesting that self is pre-figured in 
a number of ways (via Enlightenment humanism and surveillance), that interfere 
with and prescribe certain selves.  Also, that posthumanism might potentially be 
used as a generative tool for new, or different, thinking.  So, bringing posthumanism 
in relation with my interview ‘data’ is to make a particular agential cut and effect a 
particular connection, as cuts/connections have been made in previous chapters.  
Therefore, below, the examples of (actualisations and re-presentations of) practice 
are also selective, in line with my research assumptions and approach.  This is a 
different form of research that attempts to push beyond the conceptions of what 
can be produced in (interpretive or post-positivist, for example) humanistic 
qualitative inquiry (though not a claim to better research).  For example, in the way 
that coding ‘works’ (for interview data), claim Jackson and Mazzei, this disallows “the 
production of different knowledge” and “locks us into more of a territorialized place 
of fixed, recognizable meaning” (2012, p.12), rather than one that is dynamic, and 
productive, of new possibilities.  And: “Becoming by definition is an experiment with 
what is new, that is, coming into being, be-coming.” (Semetsky, 2010, p.480, 
emphasis in original).   
 
In this research, my interviews are not so much a resource to be analysed and 
scrutinized according to ‘coding’ or a reduction into themes (nor for uncovering ‘the 
truth’), but part of an investigation practice of gathering and effecting  relations in 
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assemblage, and with attunement.  They work in connection with other parts of the 
assemblage (critical social policy, children’s services and so on), for a particular 
mapping of self, effected by the agential cuts identified.  That is, the interviews do 
not ‘drive’ the research, nor are they operationalised via linear research pathways, 
they are part of a rhizomatic gathering and mapping.  
 
In what follows I present selections of my interview data that concretize and 
particularise aspects of social professional selfhood in practice, as they emerged in 
my research conversations.  They exemplify self (as presented in research 
conversations) emerging in entanglement, that is, as interacting with the discursive 
conditions and circumstances that pre-figure selfhood; and that also exemplify 
aspects of self that might lie beyond these.  In bringing a posthuman theoretical 
territory to the interviews (in relation), the insights or ‘levers’ these suggest are used 
as generative to help in seeing, re-thinking and re-framing new possibilities for the 
selfhood of social professionals in children’s services, as they emerge.        
 
 
6.2 THINKING/BEING OTHERWISE IN CHILDREN’S SERVICES 
 
6.2.1 Identifications and defamiliarisation 
 
Identifications are categories to which people do, or do not, align themselves.  The 
suggestion is that they are important because they represent boundaries for thinking 
and being.  Further, the modern ‘autonomous’ fixed subject of humanism – Deleuze 
and Guattari’s ‘majoritarian subject’ (1987/1980) - is argued to align with 
capitalism’s proliferation, and with identities that are designated and prescribed.  
These are ‘tramlines’ that “organise identity in terms of either/or categories” 
(Lorraine, 2011, p.82) and in this way a “range of continuous variations in human 
living….must be cancelled out” (ibid. p.81).  Moulard-Leonard asks: 
Can we extricate ourselves from the connections and assemblages of which 
we are a part in order to form new assemblages more in keeping with the 
unfolding of our new capacities?  (Moulard-Leonard, 2013, p.103) 
 
133 
 
Children’s services (and its connections) involves a set of discursive and social 
practices that constitute subject positions informing the categories by which people 
are designated, as well as through which they identify themselves.  These practices, 
from Deleuze and Guattari’s posthuman perspective are both “corporeal and 
semiotic assemblages that tend to replicate and extend themselves, thus settling 
into stratified configurations of power” (Lorraine, 2011, p.64) and, thus, as I have 
suggested in previous chapters, in relation to the set categories and labels of social 
and professional identity, and an actively constituting neo-liberalism (in 
surveillance).  Lorraine goes on: “….myriad social investments coalesce around that 
identity” (p.64).  By securing self to named and allowed identities, these replicate, 
repeat and extend – and so settle into fixed patterns, involving power.  This 
posthuman ‘lever’ suggests that ‘dis-identifications’ may be important for producing 
selves beyond humanist, neo-liberal selves.    
 
Whilst many practitioners are involved in efforts to shore up professional identities 
and professional status (and as reflected in a wide-ranging literature), it appears that 
when it comes to practices, professional identifications are much more negotiable, 
and produce even some ambivalence in practice.  In response to my question (R = 
interviewer) about whether self was important in practice one participant (RP = 
research participant) emphasised:  
RP: Very much, very much so, there’s a real sense of [bringing ourselves]-  
 
R: Why is that important? 
 
RP: Because you’re working with people and you can’t afford to be in the 
position – if you think about the position of therapist staff - you can’t afford 
to be in the position of ‘a professional’….[…]….you do not want to be ‘a 
professional’ when you go into somebody’s house because if you go into 
somebody’s house - and you come as ‘a professional’ - you come with an 
agenda, and an assessment, and a rhetoric, and a pathway, and other 
language which acts as a barrier….[…] 
   (Chief Executive, social enterprise, social work) 
 
This sense of practice was also echoed thus, in an exchange where the participant 
was emphasising the importance of working alongside service users:  
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One reason is the public’s perception of you, y’know - I don’t wear a uniform, I 
don’t have a badge, I haven’t got a kind of policing role I don’t know whether 
you’d, you’d, call it quite that - but a very formal role.  If you have a title, a 
label, - people know what a social worker is, they don’t necessarily know what 
a social worker does but they know they have a lot of power.  They know that 
if you work in social care y’know, people are, - people have lots of ideas and 
perceptions about that,-  whereas if you’re in the voluntary sector – well I 
think people just maybe get a bit confused about what the voluntary sector is.  
But they know what you’re not.  And so then, the next bit, is - you have an 
opportunity to, to, show them what you are 
    (Chief Executive, voluntary sector, social work) 
 
So, whilst this does not suggest a blanket disavowal or ‘dis-identification’ with 
professional identity per se, it does suggest that in practitioner presentation of self, 
an awareness of professional identities as involving power, and surveillance of 
others.  It can be consciously minimised, or moved around for self (presentations).  
Selfhood may not, then, best be secured to notions of professional identity all the 
time, it is at least context-specific.  Self, here, is more than, or outside, professional 
identity. 
 
The latter research participant cited above also linked a problem of professional 
identifications with directly changing practice with children, in a more entangled 
way.  This participant had previously had a role leading and developing cultural and 
operational change, to integrate children’s services, in the statutory sector.  As 
resource constraints had bitten, the thresholds for formal social work interventions 
with children and young people had risen – those children assessed as having 
particular levels of need and who would have previously warranted formal 
intervention, would no longer receive this.  The participant spelled out the dilemma: 
[The feeling was]…’Social care are putting up their thresholds for taking cases 
on so we’re going to end up being social workers down here, more children 
coming to our level [of service] then I’m doing a ‘social worker’s job’ - and 
that’s not right.’   
 
Y’know I could go along with either way of looking at that  -one is, yes, 
putting up thresholds, yes, y’know, people were feeling aggrieved – if 
threshold ds go up and there are more children coming to our level 
….[…]….  But, those kinds of – separations, - they don’t exactly help with 
building an integrated service and systems. -  Just forget thresholds, and just 
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work together, our job is to care about that child – everybody’s job, whether 
you are a children’s centre worker, health visitor, teaching assistant,….[…]….it 
doesn’t matter. 
     (Chief Executive, voluntary sector, social work) 
 
What is presented here is a dilemma of whether one ‘sticks’ to the set delineations 
that operate, and define who we are and what we do (and do not do), or whether 
one seeks to move beyond or through this, to something different, not so secured to 
the fixed and prescribed – and that might be more oriented to the care of children.  
However, to step outside or beyond occupational and professional identifications (or 
at least to loosen ties) has implications for selfhood, there is a sense here that 
practitioners may know that this may begin to open a lot, perhaps in ways which 
mean we can be, or know, differently.  
 
There is a desire to move beyond professional identifications in other ways too: 
  R:  What supports, in practice, a sense of self then? 
 
RP:I think it’s like-minded people – If I..[…]…could cherry-pick a 
team….[…]….our-selves would be an integral, vital part of that, you’d pick 
them for that, not necessarily for their professional skills, you would pick them 
also because…but, for who they are, how they present themselves, and what 
kind of interplay that is….[…] 
     (Manager, statutory sector, Education support) 
 
This respondent went on to associate “not necessarily more like-minded people, but, 
[people] more prepared – to experiment I suppose” with the voluntary sector, rather 
than the statutory sector, where: “I think your sanity is challenged on a daily basis in 
a statutory organisation….[…]….it’s so restrictive, you are almost like a clone, a clone 
worker ”.  
 
Here, then, is some more active resistance to the subject or identity positions 
assigned in oppressive ways within (supposedly) some organisational contexts, and a 
positing that self – more than professional associations - might have some 
advantages for practice.  In a longer extract a respondent presents how self appears 
entangled with both organisational and professional identifications, and as perceived 
for both service users and herself as a worker:    
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  I:  What’s the purpose – the aim of your role? 
 
  RP: My aim – as opposed to the organisation’s aim…. 
 
I: Oh… 
 
RP: Yes, different – very different from the organisation’s aim… my aim is to 
give people the opportunity to make change…. 
 
I: So, how is this different...? 
RP: The organisation wants me to get people to do things for the, - interact 
[with the organisation] in a positive way….dissemimate the organisational 
information in a way that’s palatable – and they want me to smooth over any 
ruffled feathers so that there’s a nice warm glow. 
 
I: They don’t want anything to hit the papers then… 
 
RP (laughing) No….no….Well, not unless it’s a good news story of course! 
(laughing)..Because I’m constantly getting into trouble for not having enough 
photographs, of some, of some [person] clutching a certificate or something, 
or for not promoting the work that we do, in the way that is wanted....[…] 
 
I: So how is all that for you? 
 
RP: (pause) It’s heart-wrenching....[…]….being constantly blocked and stopped 
– but some of them, for some reason I had the image of a little fish swimming 
upstream – some of them get through, y’know.  I want to be able to 
encourage people to make changes - if they want to do that - but everytime 
you do that it’s like ‘yes, but…’, ‘yes, but…’, ‘yes, but…’, but, so, your 
organisation is always saying they [service users] can only change like this, or 
like that….[…]….you want to be freer.…[…]…..at every turn you’re blocked by 
some bureaucracy or other… 
 
I: So for you it’s, is it the same metaphor of a fish swimming upstream…? 
 
RP: It is,-  but it feels even worse, because I don’t feel I do negotiate, y’know, 
all the rocks, and weeds, and stuff – the picture that came into my head was 
of being hung, drawn and quartered (laughs), that sense of being publicly torn 
apart – it’s like, as a professional, y’know, you want to be high vis[ibility] in 
terms of kind of saying this is the way to work, this can be a way forward. – 
But people take great pleasure out of, like, no, that’s,- ‘ you don’t understand 
how businesses work’….[…]   
 
I: So that must feel… 
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RP: It makes me feel totally and utterly undermined.  Because I struggle, I 
struggled with the idea of being a professional to start with.   That was really, 
really hard for me, coming from a working class background, the idea of being 
a professional….[..]….it took me a long time to claim that for 
myself….[…]….and now I’ve claimed it for myself, it’s like no one cares or is 
interested in what I have to say – ‘who are you?’, ‘you don’t understand how 
the real world works’ 
 
I: What d’you mean by the real world? 
 
RP: The business world, the world of targets, the world of funding, the world 
of ‘practicality’…[…]….but I’m not a stupid professional….I have an 
understanding of all those kind of things, of course I have to, in running 
services.…[…]….but I challenge them…[and]… want to do things a bit 
differently.  
  (Senior Practitioner, public/private partnership, youth and community) 
 
In this presentation of self, ‘surveillance’ appears very real, and as actively seeking to 
secure selfhood, via pathways to achieving particular identifications (through certain 
kinds of interactions and attention) as well as the difficulties of (trying to) stand 
outside of its field of vision.  At the same time, this participant has felt ambivalent 
about their own professionalism alongside a class position identified.   One gets a 
sense of complex, daily (and affective) interactions and negotiations of such spaces.   
  
A further example of the risks to self was given by one participant who described the 
difficulties of re-inventing her organisation as a social enterprise, and the serious 
demands and stresses it had placed on her: 
Yeah, it’s a risk with all sorts of things, it is a risk, all of it’s risky and that 
doesn’t feel very good…[…]….if it was just me that would be fine but it’s 
not….[….]….It’s all very well sitting out in your professional space being 
confident.....[….]….The whole point about setting up an organisation was, 
quite aside from the practical reason of needing a job, was to own the 
agenda…[….]….but that’s the point, it was created so that we could say what 
it was, we’ve written an outcomes framework, we write the commissioning 
framework, I’m completely motivated by that, and I’ve become far more 
politically aware…[….]….And there’s also, on the other side of me, is the whole 
social enterprise agenda which is glamorous and is on twitter, and looks 
gorgeous and is all very sexy, and that’s not real either….[….]….And you have 
to take risks to open up the space.  If you open up the space you don’t know 
what people will come up with .  The last time we opened up the space….and 
we did it with the families, we did it with the workers, we did it with the 
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directors….[….]….it’s challenging….but you genuinely have to be able to go, 
‘that’s good, that’s OK’. 
(Chief Executive, voluntary sector, social work) 
What is interesting about this presentation is that what is being described here is, 
arguably, both an adherence to a direction of travel in welfare (neo-liberal 
configurations) involving the setting up of new forms of organisation that align with 
market practices but, at the same time, an extension of ways of practising towards 
more open practices (“open up the spaces”).  Later this respondent talked about 
both “the safety of payroll” in attachment to an organisation and then, after re-
invention as a social enterprise, “well, I’m payroll now” and the tensions inherent in 
this – involving both a sense of freedom, and of loss.  In posthuman vein, Deleuze 
and Guattari remind us that de-territorializations (becoming), and new variations in 
human living that diverge from the fixed are founded in, and have to proceed from, 
historical (pre)conditions, that is, in the conditions that exist now.  This can involve a 
use of what is existing, and work to intensify it to work towards new possibilities.  
This is one way of reading an entangled becoming in to the presentation above.  
Here is someone ‘on message’, ‘doing’ enterprise and working forward in a new 
(neo-liberal) environment.  By extending that, by intensifying the work being 
undertaken, new possibilities emerge – here, both in a political self-sense, and in 
new outcomes, involving others.  This could be a way of seeking and getting 
sustenance (for self) from conditions that may not be very concerned with our 
sustenance (Lather, 2008). 
 
Self simply as ‘identified’ or secured within the boundaries of humanistically inspired 
‘categories’ that striate the landscape of children’s services, seems too simplistic 
here.  If one brings this (posthumanist) concern into relation with what practitioners  
present about themselves and their practice, it appears to become much more 
possible to identify ways in which self as secured to notions of ‘identity’ interacts in 
an entangled, quite complex, way.  Actualisations in practice interact with all the 
circumstances and conditions that are productive of (particular) selves, in a dynamic 
and shifting assemblage.  This insight – drawn from a posthuman lever that 
questions how we are secured in multiple ways - highlights how the different 
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elements and aspects of ‘self’ and ‘identity’ are negotiated in complicated ways in 
practice.   
 
Highlighting ‘identity’ as potentially complicated and problematic for thinking/being 
otherwise suggests, that social professionals might advisedly pursue explicit  
strategies of de-familiarisation.   And, for example, the ‘development of professional 
identity’ (still a ‘catch-all’ important descriptor in professional training courses) 
might usefully, and explicitly include such strategies in their mix.  Braidotti (2013) 
certainly suggests that we need to pursue such strategies in posthuman 
operationalisations.  For Braidotti, de-familiarisation involves processes of dis-
identification, a disengagement from that which has become fixed, familiar and 
normative, to work towards a posthuman frame of reference.  This is important 
because, she claims, it means the self can become “relational in a complex manner 
that connects it to multiple others” (Braidotti, 2013, p.167) and more distant from 
“dominant institutions and representations” (ibid. p.168).  This could move social 
professionals away from the grids of policy and practice a little and locate (their own 
recognitions of) selfhood outside of dominant modes of being.  This, of course, runs 
radically counter to a prevalent orientation where professionals seek to ‘hold on to’ 
or shore up their professional identities.  But in the posthuman, a designation of 
‘social worker’ or ‘youth worker’ or ‘teacher’ can never be a static category anyway 
as its meanings inevitably shift along with the multiple interacting forces (as they are 
actualised in specific patterns of meaning and activity) that enact it,  Braidotti also 
acknowledges: 
Dis-identification involves the loss of cherished habits of thought and 
representation, a move which can also produce fear, [a] sense of insecurity 
and nostalgia       (2013, p.168)41 
 
 
However, for selfhood, operations of organisational, occupational, sector and  
professional power/identifications in organisations and multi-agency groups are 
                                                          
41
 Braidotti (2013) also takes this further, into post-anthropocentric forms of de-familiarisation in order to 
pursue a monism and encourage connections with the non-human and the material in relation to 
environmental perspectives that see connections with the earth/the world as vital for understanding and 
tackling climate change and other (human) ravages of the planet. 
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problematic.  Likewise, the hierarchical forms of top-down managerial ‘solutions’, 
and the separations between professionals and users (often now increasingly framed 
in ‘contractual’ modes of being between clients/consumers and 
‘experts/technicians’) sediment and dis-connect us from each other (and the world), 
in ways which reify and (negatively) separate.   
  
6.2.2 Linearity and non-linear relationality 
In posthuman configurations, things are “web-like, scattered and poly-centric” 
(Braidotti, 2013, p.65).  The image of the rhizome suggests diverse, unusual, 
recursive, and multiple connections (and via lines of flight) that brings proliferation 
and plenitude to the idea of relationality.  A radical relationality is also about the 
quality of connections made – perhaps creative and affective as part of this, and “a 
focus on making difference rather than making similarity” (Fenwick, 2010, p.92).  
Given the complexity of the world, and of practice in children’s services, assuming 
and practising (self) in a more linear, or two-dimensional way may be problematic 
(merely an imagining of a less complex world that does not exist, or an ongoing 
attempt at complexity reduction).  Relationships in hierarchical structures are, of 
course, also shot through with power.      
 
One particular participant described the differential workings of multi-agency groups 
of which she was part.   In one example she explained:  
That meeting was just crap, because, - it was chaired by someone I know – 
really, really well, who I’ve got a lot of time for, whose humour and company I 
enjoy very much but – in the meeting context had ‘come down from on high’ 
and everyone sat going ‘humph’, again, ‘enforced external agenda’.  I mean it 
wasn’t even his agenda, that was a DWP [Department of Work and Pensions] 
agenda.  So, the distancing of where the meeting rhetoric has come from, and 
how it is done – how it draws people in and engages – or not, I think makes a 
difference.   
      (Chief Executive, social enterprise, social work) 
What is being described here is a lack of relationality, in terms of the approach, a 
lack of connection and a linear supposition – that policy equals implementation - 
and, to some extent, a use of enforcement and hierarchy.  On the other hand, a 
different description was given about another meeting: 
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It [the group] exists already, in and of its own right.  So, when ‘Troubled 
Families’ had arrived, it arrived at this meeting – the meeting of us all.  And 
the meeting had a look at this ‘Troubled Families’ agenda and eventually said, 
‘Yeah, OK, you can be part of what we do’ – Not, here’s ‘Troubled Families’ 
and everybody went to join it.  See what I mean?  It [the group] exists in and 
of itself, whether the local focus is on a community budget or whether the 
national focus is on ‘Troubled Familes’…..the people who go to it care about 
what happens to families and children in [geographical area] and they will 
listen, and think about, what is in front of them…..[….]….and whether it’s 
right, whether they can get involved and commit something to it. 
      (Chief Executive, social enterprise, social work) 
Here a richer connection is made – between a group and something external to 
them, that it was possible to have a dialogue about and to connect with – it was 
folded into the group.  Acts of folding are to be open to otherness, so that the other 
becomes part of us; this is not a description of procedural, legalised, contractual 
relationships between bounded parties, but affective engagement and connection.   
She goes on: 
I think it’s about individuals but I think it’s about how they manage their 
relationships – so, if I think about, let’s think about that group of 
people….some really influential people who for me…..they’ve inspired me, 
they’ve guided me, they have been opinionated, they are strong minded, they 
take risks, they’re quite bolshie, and they’re not particularly interested in the 
formalities of whatever….What makes things happen  and change?....they’re 
putting their own stuff into the room and other people are working with it, 
they’re not holding it back …..[…]..the meetings are long, they last a long time 
because people really do talk, I like to talk, those people really like to talk and 
I also know those people in that room if I’m struggling with something and I 
need someone to give me a little bit of input from their professional sector, I 
will call them, I will email them, and I’ll always get something back. 
      (Chief Executive, social enterprise, social work) 
 
This is not a description of the malleable, subjectified, deficient (and shamed) social 
professional prescribed in policy and practice for children’s services – in part it is a 
description of forthright dialogic debate in which people (feel they) have some 
power (and responsibility) and which has been generated collectively and 
collaboratively.  This is something that many social professionals can be very good at, 
and very committed to – again, relationality (often of the complicated, non-linear 
sort) infuses (often difficult) practice situations with service users. 
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A lack of dialogue or sense of rich relationality is problematic.  A Senior Practioner in 
health services talked about ‘inserting’ herself in active ways into discussion but of 
sometimes getting little response: 
I find that – maybe that’s the thing I’m waiting for – to have a good 
conversation, and actually what I often get is ‘oh’, a bit of a shock, rather 
than,- so, it’s like they haven’t got any sort of – their own - thought 
necessarily, behind what’s been done – nothing back - so I don’t get an equal 
and opposite reaction, - which I would respect and like. 
   (Manager/Senior Practitioner, statutory, health services) 
Later, she explained more as to why she thought this important: 
I need to be able to practise more freely, and we have to be professionally together 
on that.  I mean, I respect other people’s view....[…]  If we are restricted from having 
very good conversations about what the best thing is, or the vest thing in a very 
difficult situation – is – then – we can’t practice in, in an – inventive way, or y’know – 
we’ve got to back each other up, not in a defensive way…[…]….we’ve got to be able 
to defend our decisions as being right in an ethical, moral sense, rather than in an 
absolutely infallible, narrow accountable sense…..[…]  And, - I don’t always feel that 
I’ve got the answers because my style is to think there might be more than one 
answer to things.  
    (Manager/Senior Practitioner, statutory, health services) 
 
And another respondent described what happened over a period of time, and how  
self becomes more closed down ways when dialogue was not held central:  
You no longer hold any tools to be able to enforce or effect change.  Y’know, 
you no longer feel you can stand up and say ‘y’know what, I think this 
commissioning process is wrong – ethically, morally – you don’t do that any 
more, you just kind of suck it up, and you kind of have to in a way.  You 
become disenfranchised from your own kind of power. 
    (Manager, voluntary sector, youth and community) 
 
Likewise, a Senior Practitioner in health services emphasises the quality of (the 
relationality of) clinical practice to which she elsewhere describes as “retreating” and 
recounts a series of relationally-related reasons for that.   
R: So, what supports, how is your sense of self supported in practice? 
 
RP: Well, for me, it would be very much my clinical interactions with families 
actually, which is why I’ve probably chosen, well it is, to go back to, I’m very 
much immersed back in clinical practice – and, and being able to speak 
authentically about what goes on.  So, y’know….When peple get chipped 
away for a long time the voices diminish – and having been out there over the 
143 
 
years on panels, on boards, in reference groups and you just watch – watch 
what – well, really I would say managerialism has done to that over a period 
of time and you remove all that professional stuff and all that growth intoa  
kind of boxed down, minimalized, invalidated process really.  Y’know, for me, - 
it’s been about retreating…. 
 
R: How does it do that? 
 
RP: Yeah, well, I would say, through a kind of systematic undermining.  I think – so 
y’know it’s a gradual process – y’know, as you were asking I was thinking about 
social workers – [they] got lost first as individuals.  That’s my experience of my 
colleagues, y’know.  I can remember all that stuff about when they were going to 
court and they – and then [county] did all that stuff about saying they weren’t 
allowed to give individual statements, so it was all about, so they couldn’t speak in 
their own right, they weren’t allowed to. 
     (Senior practitioner, statutory, health services) 
    
Policy and practice guidance in children’s services routinely cite the need for better 
communication within and across agency boundaries, and a plethora of description, 
research, and different perspectives has been brought to bear on how this might be 
done (see Forbes and Watson, 2012 for some detailed examinations).  What a critical 
posthumanism does, or might emphasise, in this mix, is a particular focus on the 
importance of practices (of a performing) of an expanded relationality and as 
(potentially) productive – for example, of difference.  This is not a relationality to 
gain greater ‘control’ or impose will but as a device in, and as part of dynamic 
practice assemblages.  This mode of practising, of conferring plenitude on 
relationality, stands in tension with bureaucratised and managerial practices that 
persist, and that have been (both in national and local configurations) too often 
structure-procedure-protocol bound. As a mode of practising (self) it does not – 
intentionally - fit, for example, the static boxes and linearised narrow 
accountabilities of defensive practices in austerity, and likewise works beyond the 
(now deemed failed) electronic systems in children’s services.  It may be a practice-
focused way of ‘matching’ or facing new (global and local) network mobilities (in 
governance and finance, for example) (Ball and Junemann, 2010).          
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6.2.3 A hermeneutics of situation 
A critical posthuman connection draws our attention to productions in the present, 
what Nealon (2012) calls a ‘hermeneutics of situation’.   It is a close attention to the 
here and now because “[r]educing human beings and their experiences to categories 
stabilized in past encounters loses the specificity of present encounters” (Lorraine, 
2011, p165).   Because a critical posthuman lens draws our attention to multiply 
performed enactments and ‘ongoing reconfigurations of the world’ in discursive and 
material assemblages, of which we are only a part, and through which there are 
constant mutations and differentiations, attention to the present here-and-now, 
becomes crucial.  This is not the humanist subject managing a situation.  
 
This, again, is not a hark-back to the set, the fixed and the static, but it is to look 
forward by looking closely at the specificities of a given situation, to sense its flows, 
affects, and detail, and for appearance.  In part this is what Braidotti (2013) talks 
about when she talks about research in the posthuman as involving accurate 
cartographies.  This means also that attention to the present brings a situatedness to 
practice (rather than too many external referents) and emphasises the fact that 
knowledge is situated.  The possibilities of what can happen, or appear, in the 
present is what an accurate reading of the present can promote, because it can 
sense and see possibilities.  Practice in children’s services is also affective, and 
experience is also outside of ourself (again, of which we are only a part), a force.  The 
senior practioner in health services who talked about her “retreat” back into clinical 
practice into work went on to talk more of her difficulties of engaging with the 
politics of the organisation and direction of change.  However, when she spoke of 
her practice in detail, her “immersion”, the dynamics of practice situations, and how 
her “clinical interactions” supported her sense of self because of a “close 
engagement…and authentic talking about what is going on and what might be 
done”, one could see that this was an attention to a hermeneutics of situation that 
had become no longer possible or sustainable elsewhere in her organisation.  
Through this she was able (with service users) to pay attention to the here-and-now, 
and use it as a creative moving forward; this sounds less like a retreat and more like 
an extension if one sees it in these terms. 
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Another research participant talked about an “extraordinary moment” in a multi-
agency group which had been difficult and uncomfortable.  This involved someone 
taking a (personal) risk in diagnosing an impasse round the room: 
She said she thought something was going wrong, that she felt 
uncomfortable and she wondered if it was because of….[….]  She wondered if 
we could do something different, if the new, and small, organisations round 
the table who hadn’t been at the last meeting….could say whether that was 
right.  We had to work to respond to the new initiative and people did not 
know what was going on really.  It was remarkable, the whole meeting 
changed, and the group has been different from that point.  She sensed it, it 
was difficult, she took a risk and it can be really difficult in those groups, and 
it has been really productive from that point.  Everyone responded, everyone 
knew what she was talking about, she kinda named it, y’know, the power, 
and the nuances of that in terms of what was going on – everyone responded.  
Then we could move forward.    
 
This describes an attunement and risk-taking in situ, and a forward-step, not 
according to a protocol or procedure.  It echoes Tamsin Lorraine, who encourages us 
not to ‘stick to form’: 
Anytime that a theory imposes a form on lived experience, finer distinctions 
are lost and connections excluded that might have led to creative evolutions 
in living….in ways that could unfold towards a future we invent with others. 
        (Lorraine, 2011, p.166) 
  
One participant talked about inventiveness and ‘making new situations’ each week in 
work with young people (running an educational project in a previous post): 
It gave me and them the freedom.  What I said when they came in the door 
was ‘I don’t care who you are on that side of the door – every time you come 
this side of the door you can reinvent yourself – every week if you want.  You 
can be whatever you want, there’s nothing that’s on that side of the door that 
you have to bring in here, into this situation, if you don’t want to….[…]….it 
was a testing ground for them – and they used it!  It was an opportunity to 
explore the possibilities of what could go on in that space, for that time.  I 
don’t know if it did any good, - as soon as they went out the door they would 
have the whole weight of the community on top of them again.   
      (Manager, statutory, education support) 
In this instance, a hermeneutics of situation can suggest, then, questions about how 
we (might)  become with our outside, in practice - and what Deleuze and Guattari 
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might call experiments with self, in  (affective) ‘encounter’ and being/living as 
‘event’.  O’Sullivan calls this an “experimental ‘pragmatics’ for living” (2006, p.309).   
 
A theoretical territory of posthumanism provides particular devices or ‘levers’ with 
which to think social professional selfhood.  In this chapter I have brought these 
devices into a connection with the data from my research conversations with social 
professionals in children’s services.  Particular agential cuts are made here.  The 
presentation of data is not comprehensive – research conversations took place as 
part of an early gathering towards an assemblage, they did not flow from a worked-
up theoretical framework nor were they driven by it; they were conducted in a spirit 
of curiosity and interest.  As such, and in line with my research objectives and 
assumptions, and a methodology of mapping (creating) an assemblage for self, I 
have selected from my ‘data’.  What I have done is make available posthumanism, as 
generative, to think differently with my data.  So what is presented are not 
enactments of self but re-presentations in the thesis to see how they might be 
productive of selves beyond humanist formulations.   
 
What emerges are some particular, but broad insights for self and some ways 
(practices) which might move beyond humanist reproductions.  Reading through a 
critical posthuman lens begins to open up a space for thinking, seeing, and being self 
differently in a number of ways.  Explicit and conscious practices of de-
familiarisation, a rich and expanded relationality, and a hermeneutics of situation 
not only effect potentially different ways of being, but are also suggestive of a 
different world. 
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C h a p t e r   7 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Significance of the research and its possibilities 
 
 
 
7.1 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 
 
In this thesis I have been concerned with the selfhood of social professionals who 
work in children’s services in England, and to ask how it might be possible to think 
and do ‘self’ differently. 
 
In my introduction I presented social professionals as secured to dominant strategies 
of any given order, as constituted in discursive and material relations and in 
conditions of surveillance and appearance.  As such they are tethered to a neo-
liberal project (by markets and managerialism), as its instruments, required to 
demonstrate pre-determined policy outcomes in particular ways.  But professionals 
as ‘selves’ are virtually absent.  That is, they are everywhere and nowhere.  Where 
alternatives – counter to the prescribed selves of neo-liberalism – are proposed, my 
premise was that these continue to be rooted in the same structures for self, that is, 
the (liberal) humanist subject.  If one does not see the world, or practice, as rooted 
in Enlightenment humanism, where there is a split between mind and body and self 
has mastery, autonomy and (individual) freedom or agency, then one must look 
elsewhere for answers beyond this frame, and that might unsettle fixed patterns. I 
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used theoretical resources of a critical posthumanism to try to think differently, 
based in a Spinozan monism rather than Cartesian dualisms where we are not 
separate from the world but part of its entangled becoming.  That is, self is an 
amalgam, as part of an assemblage of (multiple) others, imbricated on the surface in 
doing.   This is to draw attention to both the conditions and circumstances in which 
self is produced, and a focus on practices of self.  A non-sovereign self is part of a 
continually reshaping mix, and being and knowledge are thus emergent. 
 
Paradigmatically, posthumanism challenges the division that is made between being 
and knowing, and the tripartite Enlightenment division of the world into a field of 
reality, a field of representation and a field of subjectivity (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987/1980).  Here the world is organised into these fixed patterns and what can be 
researched is, in some sense, better knowledge about what already exists.  An onto-
epistemological positioning moves beyond this (to a trans-disciplinary space) in 
seeing the world as multiply connected, and through which knowledge/being might 
be produced.   A rhizomatic approach is a theoretical articulation (of method), that is 
part and parcel of (a) theory itself as well as one methodological device.  
 
The research strategy  I articulated for a ‘mapping’ of self sought to make 
connections between different parts of an assemblage for social professional 
selfhood.  In this, particular ‘agential cuts’ (Barad, 2007) are made, which are 
temporary delineations of territories in order to effect knowledge about a 
phenomenon or a reality, in the connections made – as an ‘experiment’ in effecting 
relations between different elements in an assemblage (that are productive of self).   
This is, of course, a challenge to conventional methodological configurations but it 
does actively pursue and seek to articulate an alignment with a theoretical 
positioning in the research processes employed,to pay careful attention to the 
strategy and methods and to describe the processes of the research, to deploy these 
with some systematicity through the chapters of the thesis.  One always has a 
relationship to foundational categories of course, even if one seeks to move beyond 
these, and there do remain points of connection with these , for example, in my 
articulation of positioning in relation to foundational paradigms, and of aspects of 
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methods employed such as in setting up interviews with research particpants.  But in 
thinking differently about self (in a critical posthumanism) and about research that 
might produce a different kind of knowledge about self, I move to explore 
connections, rather than foreclose to one whole answer, to see what they do, and 
how they work.  The assemblage effected in the thesis is, then, both generated, and 
intended to be generative and, in terms of the cuts (or delineations) made brings 
together in connection, following Mazzei’s (2013) own description in this vein 
elements of policy-practice-ideology-participants-theory-researcher.  Each chapter 
pursued a particular effecting of a relation for self. 
 
As part of my research I conducted eight interviews with social professionals in 
children’s services.  These were drawn from across children’s services organisations 
and sectors. They were conducted early in the research process as part of initial 
‘gathering’ towards an assemblage and were conducted in a spirit of interest and 
curiosity rather than emanating from some fully worked through theoretical framing 
– this brought an openness to these conversations.  Later, they were utilised (as 
were other parts of the assemblage) in a re-presentation.  This is to acknowledge the 
selections and utilisation of this empirical data in particular ways, in line with the 
directions of my research and assumptions inherent in my research questions and 
approach.  In using ‘posthumanism’ as a generative tool to see and think differently 
about self, to make new connections, this necessarily involved selection.  But there is 
a particular form of ‘experimental’ rigour here too; in making available posthuman 
possibilities that may not normally be available elsewhere (in other studies) this is to 
offer an opportunity for different readings and re-presentations. 
 
My first and second chapter introduced and established the theoretical and 
methodological basis of my research.  This produced four subsequent chapters with 
each one bringing different elements of the assemblage into relation.  Chapter Three 
examined the field of critical social policy (representations) and its concept of ‘social 
identity’, making available a posthuman lens to examine the workings of social policy 
as productive of selfhood, one set of conditions and circumstances in which self 
emerges.  The ‘work’ that social identity does in social policy is to enable and 
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constrain the emergence of particular selves in assemblage; here they are secured 
to, and via, categorisations and identifications that serve social policy’s own ends, 
and that re-produce and reiterate humanist subjects.  Chapter Four is an analytical 
account of the actual policy and practice changes in the setting up and 
implmentation of integrated children’s services in England.  Bringing critical 
posthuman insights in relation is to pay attention to the performative functions of 
actual policy, practice, organisational and technological change as they work with 
productions of social professional selfhood.  These required a ‘shamed’ social 
professional selfhood in the wake of the death of Victoria Climbié, one with a 
preparedness to loosen professional ties, to re-secure to the new order of children’s 
services.  Chapter Five examines self in surveillance more directly, in conditions of 
austerity and an intensifying capitalism and as seen through research on the impact 
of children’s services on professionals themselves.  In bringing a posthuman 
theoretical territory to bear, I argue that research into ‘impact’ presupposes the 
fixed, sovereign subject of humanism.  Instead, posthumanism can draw more 
effective attention to the conditions with which self is emerging and to help imagine 
re-workings of this.  Chapter Six brings insights from a posthuman theoretical 
territory in relation with my interview ‘data’ from research conversations with social 
professionals.  In this re-presentation it becomes possible to examine self as 
entangled with multiple conditions and circumstances that make self, but also to 
glimpse selves beyond these forces.  They suggest practices and practice strategies 
that might take self beyond contained, secured selves in neo-liberal configurations, 
that bring more for self.  I suggested  such practices of self might include those of de-
familiarisation, a non-linear relationality, and a hermeneutics of suspicion – a 
different, be-coming project for social professional selfhood.         
 
There is a further question for me, which asks about the wider meaning of what I 
have done.  For, whilst my research is explicitly not about ‘outcomes’ it does, of 
course, contain an implicit treatise on, and about, (self in) practice.  I think it is this.  
What my research suggests is that we may know far less than we think we do about 
what and how our services work (or not) for the well-being of children, young people 
and families.  What we know about, much more, is the selfhood as secured 
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(continually) to a variety of powerful grids, the tramlines for practice, about their 
surveillance.  Self must (re)produce itself in children’s services as a response to the 
grids (and requirements/desires of) social policy, organisational imperatives and 
structures, professional (and other legitimised) ‘identities’, and the workings of neo-
liberalism, and more.  This may not be to know about looking after children, in fact it 
may be to work against this, producing deformations of self/practice (being/doing).  
To try to over-plan and foreclose self, its pathways, appearance and, yes, outcomes, 
is to close down possibilities and opportunities for a self beyond self that 
is/knows/does differently, and that might contribute to children’s well-being and 
protection.    
 
Practice, and the self, can be more a place of creativity than a place of ensuring 
alignment to the pre-existing and required that plays to other agendas.  To think in 
critical posthumanism is to think the self beyond (this) self, in part to become non-
categorisable and non-identifiable, a self running against the very principles by which 
one is formed.  This must be to risk oneself, its very formation, and beyond the 
compelling or coercive effects of (prior) ‘knowledge’, to risk an uncertain self, and to 
risk newness.  But one does not need to work from a posthuman theoretical space 
(or set of beliefs about the world) in order to effect such practices for self, practices 
are part of the world in its be-coming, they are not pre-existing.   
 
 The killing and abuse of children (and all kinds of acts of terror) may continue.  My 
research is really part of responding, producing a response, to this.  It is not about a 
play of self nor an attempt to be clever and beyond what has been produced for the 
selfhood of children’s services professionals (in various theorisations and operational 
prescriptions for practice), nor is it a centering of the selfhood/subject of social 
professionals.   We could do well to give our-selves the best opportunities, in 
stepping forward from the present possibilities (our historical preconditions), for 
openings to multiple and different possible understandings.  I have argued that in 
children’s services this may not come from being and practising the grids of social 
policy, professional practice, nor neo-liberal regimes which foreclose and attempt 
predeterminations.  The question is not, what is being done to me, what is required, 
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but, how can we become with what is happening in the world in a way that moves 
beyond what we know, that pursues connections and with an openness to what is 
happening. This is to realise an ontology of uncertainty in an attention to 
post/human self beyond self.  This is selfhood is an everyday, ordinary being-politics 
where social professionals are civic actors in organisational contexts and where 
being, knowing and practising are one in their multiplicities, and whose experiments 
with self might offer proliferation, sustenance, innovation, and different ways of 
knowing, in appearance. 
   
The main contribution of my research is its assertion of social professional selfhood 
as central to practice configurations, and in its movement towards rethinking and 
reframing this selfhood via a posthumanist lens.  I have begun to articulate how a 
posthumanist understanding levers both practices of self, and the conditions and 
circumstances for practice into productive relation.  My thesis is framed by a body of 
knowledge in (an inter-disciplinary) critical social policy and has the potential to 
make a contribution which could involve bridging a divide between theoretical 
studies in an ‘ontological turn’ and practices in welfare and organisational settings.  
My work brings insights about ontological and epistemological practices, and how 
these might be re-framed or extended.   
 
More specifically, the notion of ‘social identity’ and how it works to foreclose 
possibilities for self, and how it might move beyond the production of subjects in 
humanism links to other theoretical developments in this area, notably in relation to 
post-colonial subjectivities.  And, one imperative in children’s services is to be able to 
better examine the conditions and circumstances that are inherent to child 
protection crises, that move beyond narrow accountabilities, to examine what policy 
and practice in organisational settings contributes and, of course, to effect change.  I 
would claim a potential contribution in this respect to opening up particular spaces, 
via posthumanist insights, for question and debate about the workings of practice 
and selfhood that work in assemblage for practice and for what happens.     
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